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No. 71-452 HEALY v. JAMES
Argued 3/28/72
Tentative Impressions*
This case involves effort of SDS to be recognized as an "official
campus" organization at Central Connecticut state College (the College).
The issue in this case is not whether the Court thinks the
decision of the College in denying SDS official status was wise; rather,
whether this denial deprived the students in question of First Amendment
constitutional rights.

As little as I think of SDS, the wiser ,course,

in my judgment, would have been to allow the group to become an
official campus organization, and then expell it if its conduct so
justified. Of course, expulsion or even suspension would no doubt
involve litigation with insistence upon due process rights.

Nevertheless,

I would have thought that less harm might have resulted from that
procedure.
* *** *
Facts:
In September 1969 - a year of college turmoil - several students

applied to the College for "official recognition" of "a local chapter of
*These impressions are dictated on the afternoon fallowing argument
to record my initial and tentative impressions. I will have read,
in preparation for the arguments, the principal briefs, some of the
cases and the bench memo. I hope to do further study before the
Conference. My views are subject to change and to the discussion
at the Conference.

-

2.
students for Democratic Society". Official recognition - according to
petitioner's brief and oral argument - would allow "use of the College
bulletin boards and newspaper for notices"; "use of campus buildings
for meetings"; access to "funds from student governmenf'(Appendix 95)
and the "status" of being an officially approved campus organization.
The procedure required consideration by a!'student affairs
committee", which - by split vote - approved the application.
President James, however, denied the application, and this litigation
resulted.
The district judge ( Judge Claire) handled the case with great
care (see his first memorandum opinion p. 50a of petition for writ) in which he ordered an administrative hearing by the College. A
full hearing was held, after due notice.

Counsel for SDS was present

and participated. Although he deliberately declined to put on any
witnesses, he testified and argued - quite objectionably - himself.
Following the hearing, the President reaffirmed his negative decision.
returned
Petitioner~ .ati:wxt1 to the federal district court, and Judge
Claire sustained the College President (p. 40a et seq. of petition for
writ.)
Judge Claire stated, at the outset of his opinion, that he had
ordered the evidentiary hearing for the purpose of ascertaining:

-

3.
"whether or not the proposed groups had among its aims and purposes
the philosophy of violent activism. "
He noted that prior to the hearing the group had offered to change
its name to "Students for a Democratic Society of Central Connecticut
State College", and disclaimed connection with the "existing national
organization" of SDS.
WUh respect to the attitude of the SDS group, the district court
found:
"Rep:resentatives of the group were asked how they would
respond to issues of violence as compared to the action
taken by other SDS chapters, where violence had in fact
erupted on college campuses. Their response was
significantly evasive and obtuse; it was consistent with
and typical of a generally recognized pattern of respons(;
by those who are known to foster subversion and violent
conduct. They stated 'our action would have to depend
on each issue'. When pressed on the means of action
to be used the response again was in similar vein. When
specifically asked whether they could foresee the
organization's activities interrupting a college classroom
activity, their response was that it was impossible to
say. "
As to the connection between the local group and the national
organization, the evidence was equally unresponsive and vague:
" . . . , the question was asked as to the meaning of the
term_'local chapter, ' as it related to the national
alliance. The response was that there was no such
thing as an SDS national and the members wanted to
keep a loose arrangement, so as to pick ideas from
several of the fractioned groups; furthermore, the
concept of SDS exists in the minds of those who run
it. II (p. 44a). *
*This quotation comes from the judge's opinion describing what happened in
Oct. 1969 when the initial committee was considering the request.

-

4.
Basic Finding as to Purpose of the Proposed Organization:
The district judge found:
"The evidence clearly and unequivocally discloses
that the philosophy and purposes of the national organization advocate violent overthrow of existing government
institutions, through the medium of disruptive anarchistic
force. The College President responsibly concluded that
'recognition of such a group would be contrary to the
orderly purpose of change and would be contrary to the
philosophy and lawful mission of this College. ' This
Court finds that his decision was validly arrived at and
violated no constitutional rights of the plaintiffs under
the first and fourteenth amendments to the federal
constitution. " (pp. 48a-49a)
The district court emphasized that what the petitioners desired
was a privileged status that imposed responsibilities:
''What is denied to this plaintiff-group is the
privileged position of acting from within the college
structure, as an officially approved campus organization. The historical record of their application discloses that the plaintiffs have not met their burden of
complying with the college standards established by
the declaration of rights, freedoms and responsibilities
of students adopted and approved by the school
administration. Until they do so conform, they have
no constitutional or other right to have the administrative
seal of official college respectability conferred upon
them under the theory of constitutional equal protection."
(p. 47a)

-

5.
My Tentative View:
Although I expect to talk further with Larry and to make a final
judgment on this close case at the Conference, I am inclined to affirm.
There are conflicting interests here which must be balanced as is so often the case.

The First Amendment rights of petitioners -

of all college students - are well known.

The rights and responsibilities

of a college administration have been more or less subordinated in
recent years, but it is essential to the preservation of meaningful
education at our colleges and universities that presidents and boards
of trustees have authority to prescribe and enforce reasonable rules
and regulations.
It is reasonable for a college to have rules and regulations

with respect to organizations accorded "official status".
are limited for campus organizations.

Facilities

The conferring of official

status carries with it a certain indicia of approval. It also affords
to such an organization an opportunity - if it proves to be disruptive
and lawless - to do greater injury to the college than would be possible by an organization not enjoying official status. An outside group
would not be entitled to due process if it were expelled or denied
access
XKRKB to buildings. Such a group would have far less opportunity -

-

6.
I would think - to be disruptive and discordant.
The history of SDS suggests that at least some (perhaps many)
of its chapters have brought violence and disorder to the campus; rather
than contribute to academic freedom, they have denied it to others;
they have refused to tolerate speakers with whom they disagreed
(Prof. Archie Cox at Harvard had occasion a few months ago to
characterize this type of anti-intellectualism - indeed fas cist
conduct - which someof the radical organizations have sought to
perpetrate on the campus.
In this particular case, the petitioning group took an arrogant
attitude - making no commitment whatever not to engage in violence
or lawless conduct. Indeed, in effect its counsel reserved the right
to judge each situation as it arose.
~n oral argumen~ Mr. Wulf said that the College authorities
had no right to inquire as to the purposes of an organization; that
the prospective organization could simply respond that such an inquiry
was irrelevant. (Mr. Wulf was ambivalent in some of his answers,
and also contradictory. I believe, however, that this is a fair summary
of his basic position. ) He further acknowledged that under his concept
of First Amendment rights, a college could not exclude the Ku Klux
Klan, a fascist organization or any other organization which characterizes

-

7.
itself as "political". He stated that no one had a right to determine
whether an organization is or is not "political", escept the organization
itself.
These students were not deprived of any right of free speech
individually; nor were they deprived of the right to organize an SDS
chapter off campus; nor were they deprived of the right to bring SDS
speakers to the campus.

The denial of their rights, if any, was

minimal and must be balanced against the right of a university to
adopt and enforce reasonable rules and regulations with respect to
organizations on which "official status" is conferred.
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CHAMBERS OF

March 31, 1972

JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

Dear Chief':
As I said in Conf'erence,
I suggest that No. 71-452 - Healy v.
James, be assigned to Lewis.

LQ\)\J

William

The Chief Justice
CC:

The Conference

o.

Douglas

- .

•

,.
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-
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,

~✓~
Judge:

I thought you might find this article interesting.
points are of particular interest.
lost some of its violent tinge.

(1)

(2)

Two

The SOS seems to have

The leadership, as your

memo in Healy indicated, is incredibly bigoted in its view of
the First Amendment rights of others.

Note that one of the

proposals is to ban certain medical texts which they find
have racist themes and to organize a campaign to shout down
certain speakers who espouse what they find to be racist
views.

This is the narrow-mindedness to which Archibald Cox

must have been referring.
LAH

•

•

11111"

.. . ......
THE'"NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, APRIL 3, 1972

S. D. S. in Milder Mood at Convention Against Racism
sure it did not take long for white students, many of them to determine if whites are the Revolutionary Communist
them t9 realize it."
short-haired and neatly dressed. generally more intelligent than Youth, a dissident Trotskyite
CAMBRIDGE, Mass., April 2 In fact, the militant Progres- There were also many working blacks.
group affiliated with the Spar-Three years after it led stu- sive Labor-oriented majority people and blacks, although These names hung in the air tacist League, declared that
dent rebellions that convu1sed found itself under attack here S.D.S.'s opposition to black na- as the convention opened Students for a Democratic Soscores of American universities, from a vocal minority who ac- tionalism still separates it from Thursday in the vast wood- ciety was retreating from "the
students for a Democratic so- cused them of taking a "right- the black left.
paneled Ames Courtroom at struggle over slippery mats and
ciety is still very much alive ward plunge" and retreating to The participants attended the Harvard Law School. scalding pots in the cafeteria
but not so well as it once was. old campus issues.
dozens of strategy workshops Draped on -th e walls we.re ban- to the safety of armchair aca• ,,
.
ners declaring "Ban Racist Text d • l'b
.
.
With lingering memonies of
It 1s still strong enough to
on such topics as "The Govern- B0 k " "W k
f th w Id emic 1 era1ism.
th
st
th
have attracted more than 1 000 e S.D.S.-led ~ke . at para- ment Plans and Pushes Racism,'' u ?t
~r .~~s to h s~
"!f Sh~c~ley, ~errnS t ein a nd
a c ,, oc ey their wntmg disappeared off
.
' . lyzed the uruvers1ty three "A r R . t T hi ., "ff h ~1 e •. an
.ig Y,1th his G_ene~ Dow_n. Punch- the face of the earth,'' the payoung people to Cambridge this springs ago, Harvard was a re- n 1- ac1s . ~ac,, ~f'
weekend for a "national con- luctant host. Nervous deans School Organizm~, ..~e Figh; mg th e air like high school per said, "the same number of
st0
vention against racism " the made emergency plans and the to
P Lot>?tomieS, Wor~e cheerlea~ers, members of th e black infants would be bitten
.
.
. '
l'b
h
d
Student Alliance and Strike Progressive Labor party sought
b
f
h'1
. ·t ·th
h by rats, the same num er o
first national gathenng of the 1 rary was s ut own early. S PP rt" and "Smash Military t
t~u: . P u~ srm ~~
~UC black families would be on welrevolutionary organization since Plainclothes policemen peered Ru ci ~ ..
it was splintered at its tumultu- a! the young people through a..;acist ideology" was the . m..!Jnf
as
an ac- fare, the same number of black
0 ~
· · ·
.
youths wouldAi~ of overdoses."
ous Chicago convention in binoculars from p11rke~ ~ars chief focus of the convention is ,
June, 1969.
and from the darkened ms1des and the main targets were a
A Tremendous Rebirth'
Another cntic1sm came from
S.D.~. has change~ a great of New England Telephone group of scholars who the The meeting heard Martie !ames F. Henry, a Harvard sendeal smce then, havmg fallen ~ompany_ trucks, but. an Amer- radicals say provide the intel- Riefe declare that the last three IOr, not an S.D.S. member,
under t~e hegemony of the ican Legion convention would lectual underpinnings for "ra- months had witnessed "a tre- y,ho told the forum on racProgress1ve Labor party, a doc- pr?bably have been more cist oppression" in the United mendous rebirth in the student ism ~hat S~udents for a Dem~inaire, tightly disciplined fac- b01ster?us. .
States. Heading the list was movement and s.D.S." The ocratic ~oc1ety too~ Professor
t10~ _that h8:s sought to for?,e a Martie R1efe, ~ 22-year-ol_d Richard J. Herrnstein, a Har- group is attacking not only op- Herrnstem mor~ sE;~101;1sly than
politica!_ allian<;e between op- student. from Chicago who 1s vard psychologist who has pression, she said, but also "the anybody else did. It 1s ~nnecpressed workmg people and tho!! national secretary of ~tu- argued that intelligence is ideological basis that supports es~ary to exa~erate claims to
students.
dents for a Democratic Society, largely genetic and that society it."
build a wo:king class moveA Gentler Mood Discerned had declai:ed ear:lier, "We're. in- might evolve into different The reason racism is being mE;~t,'' h~ sai~.
.
tere_sted u~ building ~ fight strata with differing levels of made such an issue, said a Har- . I don t _think burning books
.
vard law student who is a long- 1s a sol1;1tto'.1 -:; these. people
In four. days o~ mee~ings agamst racism, not havmg any abilit
here the_ a1r ran.? wuth str1?en,~ IDnd of oonfrontation at Har;·
time s.D.S. member, is that ~re t?talitar1an," ~e said later
exho~11:tions to s~as~ ra,~ilSm vard."
Pigeons Weather Storm
"the main force in the United m an _mterv1ew. Its bad . .
and fight for socialism. Yet And true to her promise, the Because Professor Herrn- States for dividing the working Marxis~ to say J:IerrnS t em is
r~spo;1;1s1ble for attitudes on rato many, the m~od seemed members shuffled purposefully stein's laboratory, filled with class is racism."
more gentle than m the P8:St. from . workshop to workshop, valuable pigeons specially bred He said in an interview that cism.
.
.
In a departure from the policy sold literature and renewed old for experiments, was only a .racist appeals to working peo- One sub)ect ~hat got very litf?llowed alt: the 1969 co~v~n- friendships. "We're not bomb- few hundred feet from the con- pie, such as the appeals of tie attention . m al~ th e t~lk
tion, a subs_tantlal maJo:1ty, ers-this is not the Weather- vention hall, there was fear of Governor George C. Wallace of was Communist Chi?a, which
voted to a~1t the "establis~- men," said Gregory Minshall, a destructive sit-in. But the Alabama, were beingused to has become someth ing of an
ment. press . to Thursday s a tall, clean-cut Californian with pigeons evidently spent an un- divide blacks and whites who e!Ilbarrassment to th e revoluopenmg session, although re- clos~-cropped reddish hair, re- eventful weekend.
Alabama, were being used to tionary left. ~nee the hero of
porters were excluded from ferrmg to the violent faction Also under attack were gether in revolution by their th e Progressive Labor party,
many subsequent workshops. that spLit away at the Chicago Arthur R. Jensen of Berkeley, class.
Mao Tse:tung has been d~".T~ere does ~eem to,, be .a convention.
author of an article suggesting Much of the discussion cen- nounce? smce he greeted Presi•
·•definnte change m tone, said
Dozens of Wo ksh
that black children performed tered on ways of stifling the dent Nixon.
~ faculty observ~r of the rad.
. r ops
poorly in school because of in- Herrnstein and Shockley ideas.
- - - - - . - .- . - - .
1cal le~t, who ~8:~d he thought Carrymg sleepmg bags, the herited mental deficiencies; Ed- There was talk of mounting Ceausescu V1s1ting Cairo
a tactical dec1s1on _had been young people c~me from all ward Banfield, author of "The campaigns to ban their works CAIRO, April 2 (AP)-Presimad~ . to reach left-liberal and parts of the Umted States, as Unheavenly City," and William in colleges, to have them dis- dent Nicolae Ceausescu of Ru•
apolitical students. "As of last w_ell as from Canada and Puerto Shockley, Nobel-prize winning missed and to shout them down mania, who is winding up a
October, stut1ent support for Rico. For the most part, they inventor of the transistor who at lectures.
tour of Africa arrived today for
S.D.S. was just pitiful-I'm appeared to be middle-class has been urging a major 'study But a position paper by a five-day vi;it.
By ROBERT REINHOLD
spectalto'I1heNewYork'l1lmes

d"

if

;i ~.

:!Lan awner maintains ancl services his vehide in accorclonc.e with the Volkswagen mointenonce schedule any factory port found to be defective in moteriol or work

•- • • • • - • : - - 1 . 1.., a01r:am1tniLIw.arir_t1nd_taar_~n..J.ANic.a it.ams.I : wil1-ba reooir.ed or raolaced bv onv U.S. or Canadian Volkswa.cen Dealer. And thi-
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ROBERT K. KILLIAN
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ATTORNEY GENERAL
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ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
30 TRINITY STREET
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HARTFORD

April 3, 1972

Honorable Michael Rodak, Jr.
Clerk, United States Supreme Court
Washington, D. C. 20543
Re:

Healy vs. James
O. T. 1971
No . 452

Dear Mr. Rodak:
At oral argument of the above case on March 28, 1972,
Chief Justice Burger requested that I supply copies of the
enclosed exhibit for the use of the Court in view of the
fact that said exhibit was spread across three pages of the
single appendi x and consequently lost the effectiveness
intended by the res pondents. Accordingly, I am enclosing
herewith ten copies of "Hearing Officer Exhibit G" for the
use of the Court.
With kind personal regards,
Very truly yours,

~

ROBERT K. KILLIAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
By :~ \ ~ ( t~

FMA:R
cc:

Melvin L. Wulf, Esq.

\\u.,~ l\itc,,t,,

F. Michael Ahern
Assistant Attorney General
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
Re:

No. 71-452 - - Healy v. James
After reviewing the record and the briefs again since the Con-

ference, it occurred to me that the underlying problem in this case is
the failure of the college to establish really clear and adequate stan<lards for the recognition or non-recognition of campus organizations
and standards £or the decision making.

I analogize this situation as

somewhat like an application to F . C. C. or F. P. C.
them to say simply '"Granted" or "Denied,
A. P.A.

11

We do not allow

even apart from the

I agree that it would be improper to deny recognition to an

otherwise legitimate organization on the mere suspicion that because
it used the name

11

some future time.

S . D.S." it might engage in disruptive activities at
It appears that this may be what the college presi-

dent has done .i n this case.

-2-

-

Nothing in the ske l etal policy standards 0£ the coll ege as to
s t udent conduct instructs what standard the president is to use, thus
leaving him an unfettered discretion.

On the other hand, I know 0£

n o First Amendment principle requiring a state university to place its
imprimatur on an organization whose policy it is to engage in violence
on campus.

The First Amendment does not protect such conduct.

I£

it were entirely clear that petitioners I group had been denied recognition o n t h e basis 0£ a well founded £ear 0£ violence, I would have no
hesitation in voting to affirm.

But on this record I £ind it somewhat

difficult to be sure what standards guided the college president in his
decision or what he relied on.

I can guess that Page 95 0£ the Appendix

loomed large, but neither we nor the student group should be left in
the dark.

If the conduct 0£ the arrogant lawyer was a £actor - - as it

could well have been -- should the college be permitted to penalize the
students £or the misconduct 0£ their advocate?
For these reasons I £eel that this is an inappropriate case £or
deciding major First Amendment questions.

I would recommend a

remand; since my notions are only tentative, I wiH not review the £acts.
We took this case to determine whether the district court erred
in refusing to order the administration 0£ a state college to give official
recognition to petitioners' student political organization.

This college,

like most, has been confronted in recent years with demands from

-3-
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student groups occasionally leading to irreconcilable conflicts.

There

was a time when the relations between students and administrators
were generally amicable and problems were solved by ad hoc negotiations.

To the extent that students and administrators now deal with

each other at arms length, the need for regularized procedures and
articulated standards are obvious .

Recent experience teaches that re-

lations between students and administrators, not unlike those between
labor and management, are inevitably smoother if standards exist to
guide both.
Few things are greater irritants than unilateral , ad hoc decisions
that cannot be related to known standards .

The absence of such stan-

<lards permits, or at least gives the appearance of permitting, a college
decision on the basis of subjective and perhaps even impermissible considerations .

There can no longer be serious doubt that a public facility

must accord -equal treatment to its constituents, and a state-sponsored,
tax-supported educational institution is no exception.

To be sure that

the decisional processes in administering such an institution are in
fact even-handed and are seen to be e v en - handed, guidelines should be
specific, known to all , applied with uniformity and articulated with some
clarity.
Here the c ollege had some, but not fully articulated, guidelines
telling students what would be required of groups seeking to use college

-4-
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facilities, what was unacceptable, or on what basis the college would
decide.
bilities,

The college I s "Statement on Rights, Freedoms and Responsi11

adopted by the faculty on May 19, 1969, does establish pro-

cedural prerequisites for official recognition of student organizations:
''Student organizations shall submit a clear statement
of purpose, criteria for membership, rules of procedures and a list of officers as a condition of institutional
recognition. They shall not be required to submit a
membership list as a condition of institutional recognition.
Pt. V, B.

11

The Statement on Rights also contains a general statement on appropriate
student behavior which has been deemed relevant to the recognition of
student organizations:
Students do not have the right to deprive others
of the opportunity to speak or be heard, to invade
the privacy of others, to damage the property of
others, to disrupt the regular and essential operation of the college, or to interfere with the rights
ofothers. 11 Pt. V, E.
11 0
, : :,,:" :'

More important, the college apparently has no guidelines for the manner in which these general principles are to be applied by the college
to student groups seeking official recognition.

Rather, the college

president appears to have virtually unbridled discretion to determine if
an organization actually or potentially poses a threat to these basic
student rights or is objectionable for other reasons.
The district judge recognized problems in this procedural scheme
and ordered a full hearing at the college level, but he did not go far

-5-
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enough.

His order outlined procedures and areas of fact ual inquiry;

even on the remand for a de novo administrative hearing, however, the
students and hearing officer were without adequate guidelines as to what
had to be proved or how it would be judged.
Petitioners have asked the federal courts to intervene in this
dispute and exercise extraordinary, equitable powers.

The exercise of

equitable jurisdiction has traditionally been characterized by flexibility,
and the courts should refrain from ordering injunctive relief where there
are means, as yet unused, at the disposal of the parties to resolve the
conflict.

I would therefore remand the cause to the Court of Appeals

with directions that judgment be entered in the district court requiring
(a) that Central Connecticut State College establish and promulgate more
adequate standards for the accreditation of student groups entitled to
use student facilities;

(b) that the college conduct a further administrative

hearing on the application of petitioners pursuant to those standards;
(c) that if petitioners I application is rejected, the college president or
other final-decision maker supply a clear statement of reasons for that
decision; and (d) that the district court retain jurisdiction to review the
results of the achninistrative hearing on the application of either party.
This is all very hasty and tentative but, in general, it expresses my
view as to why this case does not warrant a major constitutional adjudication.

/

4/6/72--LAH

•

Res

Healy v. James, No. 71-452

Judges
Attached is a memo from the CJ expressing the view that
in the SDS case, rather than deciding the case under the
First Amendment, the Court should remand the case to the DC
ordering it to instruct the college to promulgate more precise
standards to govern accreditation.

He would treat this case

as a due process case, analogizing to administrative proceedings before federal agencies, and require (1) clear
standards, (2) an appropriate administrative hearing, and
(3) a statement of reasons from the President explaining his
decision.

First, I think there may be some merit in the

CJ's due process thesis, I would be glad to find a way to

•

accommodate those views and gain his vote in the majority.
While we may be able to agree with him in part, in the main
his views appear to have too many difficulties to be acceptable.
I will outline the roadblocks which occur to me at first
blush.
(1)

As I have stated, the central thesis of the CJ's

memo is the need for "standards."

But, standards--in any

sense other than Constitutional standards--has never been an
issue in this litigation.

In the first USDC opinion, Judge

Clairie stated:

•

"The petitioners are not challenging the constitutionality of the standards established for the recognition
of campus organizations and thus that question is not before
the Court. The plaintiffs do claim that their application
for recognition does conform with the established standards
and the defendant James' action in going outside that appli"
cation and arbitrarily attributing to them aims and purposes
not evidenced therein, without first affording them some

- ... 2--

•

form of a hearing was in itself a constitutional denial of
due process.
,
There is nothing in the stated purposes of the petitioners (
,n the application itself which can be said to be inconsistent
with the standards for recognition set by the college. In
fact, President James in his memorandum denying recognition,
presents no claim to the contrary • • • • " (App. to cert petn
at 562)
Judge ~irie then goes on to discuss the mandate of
due process in matters of the constitutional rights of college
students.

He states that due process requires both.._

"standards" and procedures to determine whether particular
groups meet that standard,

•

"No student group is entitled, per se, to official
college recognition. Rather, once a college allows student
groups to organize and grants these groups recognition,
with the attendant atvantages, constitutional safeguards
must operate in favor of all groups which apply. This requires standards for recognition and the fair application
of these standards. It is the procedural application of the
existing college standards that is in issue here." (App. to
cert petn at 61a)
After the hearing called for by the DC, the case returned
to that court a second time.

This time the DC looked at the

record of the hearing and concluded that the still unchallenged
standards had not been complied with:

•

"The historical record of their application discloses
that the plaintiffs have not met their _b urden of complying
with the college standards established by the declaration of
rights, freedoms and responsibilities of students adopted
and approved by the school administration." (App to cert
petn at 47a)
Finally, the CA2 opinion makes the basis of the lower court
ruling clear.
the CA noted,

In discussing the factual history of the case,

•

--3-"(The DC) summarized the claims of the parties, noting
that plaintiffs did not challenge the constitutionality
of the standards established by the college for determining
whether campus organizations are to be recognized, but that they
did claim a denial of procedural due process • • • " (App
to cert petn 7a)
Later in the opinion, the CA again says that "the essence
of Judge Clarie's decision of October 29 was that plaintiffs had
not met their burden of complying with the standard established by the college's 'Statement on Rights, Freedoms and
Responsibilities of Students.'" (P. 18a)

Again, at another

point, the CA refers to "the concededly valid college policy
governing the constitutional rights, freedoms and responsibilities
of students at CCSC."

•

These excerpts from the lower court opinions persuade )
me that there was never a question raised heretofore as to
whether the college had an adequate set of standards.
(2)

The "standards" referred to b!Ythe lower courts are

contained in Part V of the "Statement on Rights, Freedoms and
Responsibilities of Students," reprinted in the appendix to
the CA2 opinion (app to cert petn at 29a-30a).

Five sub-

sections deal with the standards for approval of college
organizations a
(A)

General statement that care must be exercised

in establishing and organizing campus groups "so that the
basic rights, freedoms and responsibilities of students

•

will be preserved"
(B)

This section se~s forth the procedural requirementss

"clear statement of purpose, criteria of membership,
rules of procedures and a list of officers"; no membership lists are required.

_..,.4 __

•

(C)

Membership is limited to matriculated students;

"Membership shall not be restricted by race, religion
or nationality," and important to this case, "The
members shall have sole power to determine organization
policy consistent with
(D)

the regulations of the college."

Each organization may choose its own adviser and

the adviser "shall advise but not control the organization
and its policies."
(E)

"College students and student organilzations shall

have the right to examine and discuss all questions of
interest to them, to express opinion publicly and pri~

vately, and to support c•ausesby orderly means.

They

\..,

may organize public demonstrations and protest gatherings

•

and utilize the right to petition,

Students do not have

the right to deprive others of the opportunity to
speak or be heard, to invade the privacy of others,
to damage property of others, to disrupt the regular
and essential operation of the college, or to interfere
with the rights of others,"
These five broad standards were the ones referred to by
the lower courts.

-

--

I do not think that they are inadequate

and I think they clearly cover the case at hand.

~

It is clear

f rom the President's letters and from the three lower court

~ \ opinions, that the reason why recognition was denied was that
~~ the organization would not clearly and unequivocally disavow

~~
trS
,1).,..;,
IA-

•

a philosoply of activism--because they indicated that they
might advocate, at some time under some undetermined set of
circumstances, conduct at odds with the protectable rights
of others.

•

--5-(3)

The CJ contends that the President's rejection

letters are not sufficiently clear to satisfy the requirements of student due process, he urges the Court to impose a
statement-of-reasons rule.

--

--

Again, I disagree.

The Presi-

dent made sufficiently clear what the crux of his decision was.
'---

-

-

-

--

It was the expression of a philosoply antithetical to the

----

school's policies which motivated his decision.

-

And, it is

precisely that basis for his decision which renders it constitutionally untenable.

The provisions of the standards

that (1) members "shall have the sole power to determine
organization policy," and (2) that student organizations
may discuss and express opinions on "all questions of inter-

•

est" are, essentially, the embodiment of what I apprehend to
'\
be the const• tutional standard. The school may not refuse to
extend recognition to particular organizations because of the
philosophy it advocates.

It may, however, as the CJ

correctly points out, prohibit "conduct" which intt:erferes with the legitimate policies of the school.
(4)

I would resist turning this case into a due process

case at this point.

I am satisfied that these plaintiffs

received all the process that was due any group.

They

were accorded a hearing and two statements of rejection.
We have discussed the difficulties of the due process
rationale as it applies to the rights of college students.
As you ~ntimated, it may well be that at some future point

•

the due process rights of college organizations will present
to this court the most difficult of questions, Le~_ what
action of the administration must precede the revocation of
campus recognition in the event that advocacy turns to action.

•

--6--

This is a question which the court need not and, in my view,
should not reach until it is presented with that case.

I

think the administration and the lower courts would be
dismayed to receive a mandate from this Court telling them
that desp~te all they have done they have not as yet accorded

-

due process to this applic~ ant organization.
RECOMMENDATION
As I indicated at the outset, I think in the main the
majority opinion cannot accommodate the CJ's view of the
case.

It might be worth considering, however, the possibility

that a remand rather than a reversal is in order.

The Court

should state the Constitutional standard, and while it appears

•

that the SOS chapter has measured up to that standard, it might
be appropriate to remand to the DC with an order that it is
to tell the President to reconsider the application in light
of the requirement that the mere advocacy of an abhorrent
philosophy is not sufficient grounds for rejection of recDg---.......

nition.

There will need to be language in the opinion we

write indicating where the line between mere advocacy and
action may be drawn.

We will have to think through the

doctrin~in the area and decide whether it is some vari~ t of
the "clear and present danger" test or whether something more
akin to the Tinker standard (interference with substantial
and material functions of the school) is appropriate.

On

this score, at least at present, I find Torn Emerson's

•

approach to the First Amendment persuasive (the view
approved by CA Wright) and I will endeavor to spell out that
rationale in more detail as work on the majority opinion
progresses.

•

--7-For the present, I think the burden probably falls to
you as the assignee of the majority opinion to respond to
the CJ's suggestion.

I think you should indicate that,

subject, of course, to closer scrutiny as preparation of the
opinion progresses, your initial view is that the due process
aspects of this case are no longer in an appropriate state
for reconsideration.

You should state that you see no

persuasive basis for avoiding the First Amendment issue,
especially when the tact of avoidance gets the Court into
another even more uncharted sea.
I would be glad to talk this over with you in more
detail.

•

•

LAH

l

•

4/9/72--LAH
Re:

Healy v. James, No. 71-452

OT 1971

Judge:
Attached is a recent opinion by Judge Wisdom, which I
mentioned to you in the course of our discussion today.
In reflecting on your tentative notes and on our discussion, I come to the conclusion that we are not far apart
,_.-.-

-

in our views.

--

....

We agree, I believe, that at the core the concern

is primarily to maintain an atmosphere on college campuses in
which the educative process can go forward: you refer to an
air of "civility"--! think that characterization appropriate.
We agree also, I believe, that college administrations may not
deny recognition to organizations merely because they

•

advocate a philosophy incompatible with the philosophy of
accommodation and mutual respect necessary to maintain a
educational institution.

If all SDS did was blow hot air,

advocating a philosophy that they would never put to action,
I think you would defend their right of speech to express
that view •. The problem is that we have a history in this
country of similar organizations doing much more than
advocating violence in a vacuum.

Indeed, education has been

terminated completely at some institutions. Experience
and impatient
dictates that advocacy among impressionable/students may
contribute directly to action.

Your conclusion, as I read

your statements, is that the college ought not have to wait
until the match ignites the administration building before

•

action may be taken.
I would be quite willing to go along with any opinion
which, somehow, accomplishes the result of guaranteeing freedom from violence and disruption, if that opinion can be written

•

--2-in such a manner as to make clear that it is not the
distaste for the theory advocated which underlies the decision,
but that the crux of the decision is the "likelihood," or
"probability," or "potentiality" of action or conduct

antithetical to the legitimate functioning of the school.
I think, for instance, that it would be permissible for
a school to ascertain whether a particular group seeking
recognition planned to engage in such prohibitable conduct.
In the case--like the instant one--where the administration
has no history of prior conduct by which to judge these
individuals making up the orgnaization, I think the college
can do no more than require that the organization accept the

c.,)

•

basic rules of the college environment.

In this case we have
A

the positive statement that CCSC-SDS approves of the Student
{•\

Bill of Rights and the acceptable statement of purposes of the
JI

organization.

On the other side1 we have only the statement

that the organization cou1cf•tay whether they could envision
~

any case in which it might disrupt classes, coupled with a
SDS
history of other/organizations causing disruption. I would
conclude that this recognition issue is a matter of prior
restraint on associational rights and that the burden to
justify is on the school.
been met.

In this case, the burden has not

We could delineate what that burden

wiiit:

is.

No

one contests that a college may prohibit disruption or that
they may take steps in advance of violence to quell it.

•

If

this were a different case--a case in which this particular
chapter had violated the rules in the recent past, or a case
in which the individual leaders had violated college rules in
the recent past, then I might agree that the college has
met its burden of showing a potential for conduct contrary

___ 3_ ..

•

to the school's legitimate interests.

It could then be up

to the applicants to demonstrate that they have purged themselves of the proclivity for unlawful action.
As long as this can be accomplished in the framework of
a line-drawing between advocacy and action, it could be
squared with existing First Amendment precedents.

We could

hold,for instance, that in this case we had little more than
the "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance."
Whatis required, however, is a reasonable basis on the part
of the administration to conclude that this organization is
likely to engage in action that will "materially and substantially interfere" with the legitimate functioning of the

•

college community.

This is a more flexible sttandard than

clear and present danger, but it is more demanding than a
simple determination that the group refused to disavow the
possibility of disruption at some undetermined time.

In the

course of expounding such a test, we could state forthrightly that students are free to advocate and express views
on whatever matters concern them, and no administration is
empowered to prohibit the expression of those views.
could make clear that it is only the potentiality of
unlawful conduct which may justify official action.

LAH

•

We '

I

•

..

•
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Tentative Reflections on a Possible Remand Theory
1. The standards were reasonable and were not challenged.
I/

2.

To be recognized, an organization must submit a clear statement

of its purpose. "
3. The Rules (included by inference if not expressly in the
standards) proscribed "disruption" of "operation of the college", damage
to property of others, and invasion of rights of others.
4.

The SDS statement, on its face, comports with the requirement

for a statement of purpose.

•

The stated purpose is not inconsistent with

the Rules of Conduct.
5.

President James (as District Court found) initially denied

recognition becuase of the affiliation with national SDS.
6.

The District Court held this was a denial of due process, in

that a decision was reached on a central factual issue without a hearing.
The District Court ordered a hearing, without precisely defining the
issue (62a)
7.

The hearing focused almost entirely on the relationship of the

local SDS with the national organization.

This issue was muted ( if not

mooted) by the only evidence on behalf of Petitioners, namely, a brief
statement of independence and non-affiliation with national SDS.

•

~

..

...

•

2.

(a) The Petitioners rested on this statement.
(b) The College questioned the continued use of SDS name.
(c) College also introduced hearsay data as to disruptive
objectives and history of SDS for purpose of showing that a local
SDS presented a danger of such disruption.
( d) Petitioners said burden of showing that there remained
some affiliation or identification with SDS was on College.
8. At the meeting of the Student Affairs Committee (A94), the
Petitioners had refused to dis:savow disruptive tactics (A 95).
9.

•

At the hearing before Dean Judd, this issue - the central one

is my opinion - was not addressed directly, either by Petitioners or the
College.
10. Questions: Is case in a posture where we could remand for
further hearing on the issue whether the College had reasonable grounds
for believing that Petitioners would engage in disruptive conduct?
(a) Was the Petitioners' statement of purpose prima facie
acceptable? It certainly would have been except for its proposed
affiliation with SDS.
(b) Is affiliation with SDS per se justification for denying
application on ground that College could assume likelihood of
violence? I think not, although such application might be

•

sufficient to shift burden of proof to Petitioners.

.,

... . .

•

3•
( c) Normally, burden of proving likelihood of disruption
would be on College if application states lawful purpose and there
is no affiliation with a disruptive organization.

But here Petitioners

refused to disavow or repudiate violence in the brief colloquy before
the Student Affairs Committee (A94).

Did this shift burden of proof

to Petitioners in the hearing before Dean Judd?
( d) Should we, after an appropriate opinion, remand with
directions to the District Court to order a new administrative
hearing at the College on the "likelihood of disruption" issue,

•

stating that the burden of proof remains on the College but that
the burden of going forward with evidence shifte~ to the Petitioner~
because of (i) ambiguity of the relationship with and extent of control
of SDS and (ii) Petitioners' failure to disavow violence and
disruptive tactics .
(e) We would have to define some standard. I would think it
clearly should be less than the "clear and present danger" test.
A College is not a public street or park, and there are obvious
and legitimate interests to be protected against what happened at
Columbia and numerous other educational institutions.

•

ltp/ SS

-
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Did College have a set of standards o(regulations applicable
to recognition of organizations?
1.

statement of Student Rights, etc. (Pet. for Cert - 24a).

ID. (B) - Duty of College to "define its own regulations as
clearly as possible . . . (27a).
V. - "On Campus Freedom of students"
( B) Prescribes what shall be submitted to an organization as
a "condition to institutional recognition" (29a).
(C), (D), and (E) are relevant (30a) but none is specific as to
what substantive standards need to be met.
-

Although B requires a

"clear statement of purpose" there is no indication as to what "purposes" if any - will justify rec ognition or non-recognition.

E does refer to

conduct (e.g. "students"have no right to deprive others of free speech
or to disrupt) but no clear relation between B & E.
2.

Pleadings A3-24.

Neither Complaint, AnswerAbr stipulation refers to any standards
though Complaint refers to and incorporates the Statement of Rights.
Answer by College mentions standards and does not assert
that SDS failed to comply with applicable Regulations, Rules or
standards (Al 7).

-

-

2.
3.

Statements of President James.

(a) Memo of Oct. 30, 1969, disapproving recognition (A 14-16).
President Janes states that "the statement of purpose to form
a local chapter of SDS carries full and unmistakeable adherence to at
least some of the major tenets of the national organization . . .

The

published aims and philosophy of SDS . . . are contrary to the
approved policy of (the College)!' He then quotes the last sentence of
the S tatement of Students Rights in subparagraph V(E) - with respect
to "students" having no right to disrupt, damage property or interfere
with the rights of others.

-

(b) Letter of July 10 to Dr. Judd, acting dean of student affairs,
in which Dr. James "reaffirms my earlier decision to deny recognition. "
He concludes:
"Rec ognition of such group, in my judgment, would be
contrary to the orderly processes of change and would
be contrary to the philosophy and lawful mission of
this college. "
Comment:
In neither of these communications did Dr. James refer to
any specific standards or regulations applicable to an organization
seeking recognition.

It is clear, especially from his letter of July

10, 1970, that he exercised a discretionary judgment to the effect

-

-

3.
that the SDS had a philosophy contrary to the college's philosophy.
He did not go as far as the Court did in basing his refusal on any threat
of disorderly conduct - although this is no doubt implicit from a full
reading of the letter.
4. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Smith (Petition for Cert 32a)
Judge Smith bases his opinion on "prior restraint", and
analogizes to cases which relate to the right of a particular speaker
to appear on campus (37a).

But he does indicate that the College would

have been justified if the evidence disclosed a "likelihood that it (SDS)
would 'materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of

-

the school."' Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District, 393 U. S. 503.
In summary, there is nothing in Judge Smith's opinion which

is really relevant to whether we should remand on the grounds
suggested by the Chief Justice.
5.

Majority CA 2 Opinion.

In commenting on Judge Clarie's opinion, it was noted:

''That plaintiffs did not challenge the constitutionality
of the standards established by the College for determining whether campus organizations are to be
rec ognized . . . " (Petition for Cert 7a).

-

4.

-

The opinion further noted:
"Judge Clarie directed that President James, after
conclusion of the administrative hearing . . . 'make
his findings as to whether or not the application met
the existing policy standards of the college, which
would qualify the applicant club for official campus
recognition. "'
The opinion further noted:
"The essence of Judge Clarie's decision of October 29,
was that plaintiffs had not met their burden of complying
with the standard established by the College's 'statement
on Rights, Freedoms and Responsibility of students';
that until they did so, they had no constitutional or other
right to have the College's stamp of approval conferred
upon their organization; . . . "

-

At another point, the majority said:
"Despite the concededly valid college policy governing
the constitutional rights, freedoms and responsibililities
of students at CCSC, plaintiffs fail to avail themselves
of the procedural due process accorded to them. . . . "
(Petition for Cert 20a)
My Comment on the Majority Opinion:
It emphasized the " narrow ground of our decision", and stated
it was unnecessary ''to reach the substantive constitutional questions
which might have been presented if plaintiffs had availed themEel ves
of the procedural due process to which Judge Clarie ordered they
were entitled and which the college administration accorded them."
(22a, 23a).

-

5.

-

Although the majority opinion's rationale is not clear, I believe
it is based - as the quote above indicates - on the view that the burden
was on the student group to show compliance with the college's admittedly
valid standards; that the student group failed to carry its burden of
proof; and that the substantive issue - namely, whether the SDS group
met the standards - was never reached.
As the legality of the standards was not questioned, this was not
an issue.

-
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SECTION B

Mandel Assails
Md. U. 'Vandals'
✓

By THOMAS LOVE and LANCE GAY
Star Staff Writers

Gov. Ma,rvin Mandel today angrily condemned anti-war
demonstrators at the University of Maryland, calling them "a
handful of vandals." He ordered National Guardsmen to
nearby Greenbelt as "a precautionary measure."
About 650 members of the National Gui,rd-scheduled to
hold training drills over the weekend-instead were ordered to
ireport to the Greenbelt Armory today, after a night of
confrontations between demonstrators and state police.
Mandel, taking a hard line against the three years of
periodic anti-war violence at the university, blamed a small
portion of the 36,000-member student body for the trouble and
called on other students to "weed them out" and stop the
disruptions.
"There is no justification or excuse for the irrational
behavior of a handful of students at the College Park campus
for the past two days," Mandel said.
"I AM FED UP with this violence and destruction of
public and private property," the governor continued, "and I
·
fully intend to see that it ends.
"When unruly mobs take to our streets, hell-bent on
nothing but destruction and disturbance, the citizens of this
state have every right to be concerned. The university is
public property, supported by the tax dollars of the citizens of
.
this state."
"And I want them to know that this handful of vandals}
has cost Maryland taxpayers more than $1 million to restore
peace and order to our university campus during the past
three years," he said.
"There are more than 35,000 serious students at the
university who abhor the violence and tactics of the few who
{ are disrupting their studies.
"The students know who the ringleaders are. They know
their plans and plots. As governor of this state, I am appealing
directly to the majority of students-and to their parents-to
weed out the destructive ringleaders and to put an end to this
vicious and wanton destruction," he continued.

f

"IF THEY DO NOT, I will use every resource and force at my disposal as governor to see that the University of Maryland remains open •and free of the disruption and disturbances
that have caused a number of personal injuries and property
damage to the university and the private businesses," the
governor promised.
The governor's statement followed two days of spasmodic
demonstrations and violence at the College Park campus
climaxed by a series of running battles between anti-war
activists and state police last night.
A spokesman for the governor said that the men were not
on a state of alert, but were merely on standby as a preceution.
The youthful protesters, some of whom were high school
students, swarmed onto U.S. Route 1 at least four times during
the night, blocking traffic for up to 15 minutes each time until
riot-equipped troopers marched along the boulevard and employed tear gas and pepper gas to clear them away.
As of 3:30 a.m. today, state ponce reported 19 arrests on
charges varying from disorderly conduct to carrying dangerous weapons, specifically rocks. Prince Georges County Deputy Chief John W. Rhodes reported some minor looting of stores
in the College Park business district towards the end of the
demonstration.
Police said one trooper was injured. He was identified as

1st Sgt. William E. Brooks who was flown to Johns Hopkins
University Hospital in Baltimore where he was treated for a
ruptured blood vessel in his hand. He reportedly had been
1
.
struck by a brick.
AT LEAST ONE STUDENT was injured when he was
struck on the hand with a tear gas canister.
The confrontation began shortly after 10:30 p.m. when the
young people left a rock concert featuring Commander Cody
and his Lost Air Band. During the concert, militant students
had passed out leaflets in the audience urging them to meet at
the Armory afterward.
As the young people filed out of Ritchie Coliseum at the
end of the concert, a group of activists gathered around a Viet
Cong flag and one of their number exhorted them over a
bullhorn to "come over to the Armory," which is across Rt.1
from the coliseum.
A crowd of about 400 persons gathered in front of Rockford
Armory, chanting, "stop the war, stop the freeze, victory to
the Vietnamese," and "ROTC must go, ROTC must go." The
unidentified student at the bullhorn egged the crowd on to "do
something," and one burned an American flag while others
pelted the white columns of the Armory with bricks and
stones. On at least four separate occasions, to chants of "burn
. . . burn ... burn," some of the demonstrators threw burning
objects through broken windows. Only the window frame and
curtains of one window caught fire and went out by itself.
Bored with pelting rocks at the unrelenting building, they
moved to the Main Administration Building, where they broke
most of the windows in the front of the two-story structure and
then moved up the three-block-long Mall, smashing windows in
classrooms along the way.
They next lolled on the lawn near McKeldin Library
debating · whether breaking windows was a proper way to
protest the war in Southeast Asia. "It's at least some action
'
any action at all," one young student said.
More than 1,000 students had clogged the roadway when
state tr~pers ~~essed in flak jac~ets and riot gear moved in
double lines, frrmg tear and pepper gas into the youthful
ranks. Police were immediately greeted with Yippie war
whoops, obscenities, firecrackers, rocks and bottles some of
which hit the police lines.
'

MEMORANDUM

TO:

Mr. Larry A. Hammond

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

May 30, 1972

Healy v. James
In rereading the opinions below, I note the comment of the

district judge as follows:
"It (the President's decision) is not in the same category
as a criminal prosecution involving the teaching or
espousing of revolution; nor does it attempt civilly
to enjoin those utterances which might be considered
as an imminent threat to order. See Brandenberg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444."

I have had a concern, lerking faintly in the back of my mind,
that we may be extending cases involving criminal prosecution to the
denial of a privilege. I suppose the answer to this is that the
principles upon which we rely have been applied (although over
vigorous dissents) to admission to the bar, to teaching on a faculty,
and perhaps to other privileges which may or may not be granted by
the state.
I send you this note merely to assure that we focus sharply on
the point made by the district judge.
L. F. P.,

~

5/31/72--LAH

•

Rea

Healy v. James, No. 71-452

Judge,
Attached is the redraft
we have discusseds I hope that
7.
we are close enough in now to bring to an end this "gentle
arm-twisting."

Reorganized in this fashion, I was able to de-

lete approximately 4 or 5 pages from the second half of
the opinion.

Part Dis not as long as you may have envi-

sioned but, as reorganized, the factual basis (resting ~n
petitioners' statements to the Student Affairs Committee and ~
the policy embodied in the Student Bill of Rights) is stated
in Part C.

I think the redraft is now more fluid.

Part D

while not lengthy is , I believe1 pretty direct and unequivocal.
I have tried to make it clear that a requirement of adher-

•

ence to school rules is nothing more than an extension of
the advocacy-action dochotomy and that conditioning recognition on a willingness to abide by thoee rules imposes
no interference with associational rights.
Most of the footnotes from 13 on are new or substantially
redrafted.

I have deleted your reference to the demeanor

of the petitioners' counsel at the court-ordered hearing.
If you think the point you make in that footnote needs to
be made, I suggest we append it to the discussion of the

hearing in the factual layout of the case (in Part I).
LAH

•

LIBRA R Y
Supreme Court, U. S.
IN THE

NOV 15 1971
/

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No.

71-1801

Summary Calendar*

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI
CHAPTER OF THE
MISSISSIPPI CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ET AL,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN MISSISSIPPI, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Cou rt for the
Southern Dist rict of Mississippi
(Nov e mber 10, 1971)

B efore WISDOM, COLEMAN , and SIMPSO N ,
Cir cuit Judges.
W ISDOM, Circuit J udge : Twic e t his Court has been
a h arbinger of major expansions in the F irst Am endmen t r tghts of stu dents. In Dixon v. A labama State
*Rule 18, 5 Cir.; see Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Casualty
Company of New York, et al. , 5 Cir . 1970, 431 F .2d 409, Part I.
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Board of Education, 5 Cir. 1961, 294 F.2d 150, we turned
our baicks on the old saw that attendance at a university was a privilege granted by the state and was therefore subject to whatever conditions the state soug'h t
to impose. Five years later, we said that students'
rights to free expression cannot be curtailed unless
that expression "materially and substantially interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate disoipline
in the operation of the school." Burnside v. Byars, 5
Cir. 1966, 363 F.2d 744, 749. The Supreme Court adop,ted
this phrase in the landmark case of Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District,
1969, 393 U.S. 503, 83 S.Ct. 733, 21 L .Ed. 2d 737.
Today's decision requires us to break no new ground.
During the summer of 1970, the plaintiff, the University
of Southern Mississippi c:1apter of the Mississippi Civil
Liberties Union was denied official recognition a,s a
student organization in accordance with the usual procedures provided by the University of Southern Mississippi for processing proposed charters of student
organizations.' This denial m ,e ant that the Chapter
tThe Chapter's application was submitted to the Director of Student Activities and presented by him to the Student-Faculty
Committee on Student Organizations. The membership of the
Committee is appointed by the University President, William
D. McCain, and is presided over by the Dean of Student Affairs. The Committee consists of four faculty members and
three students. After two meetings the Committee voted to
deny the charter; the decision was approved by President
McCain. Upon rehearing, the Committee stuck to its decision,
and this action was filed. We need not consider the procedural
adequacy of these proceedings since we have concluded that,
however it conducted its. business, the Committee failed to
adduce any valid reasons for banning the Chapter from the
University campus.

U. OF SO. MISS. C.L.U. v. U. OF SO. MISS.

3

could neither participate in University-approved student activities nor conduct student activities on campus on its own initiative. Thus exiled, the Chapter filed
suit in federal district court for a preliminary injunction to compel the University to approve its charter
and grant it official recognition.
The district oourt found that the Chapter had requested and been denied a statement of reasons for
the University's denial of its charter application, and
held that the Chapter was entitled to such a statement.
In addition, the district court considered each of the
grounds which had been asserted by the University
during the court proceedings to justify denial of
a charter. The only ground which seemed to the district court to pruvide a possible basis for keeping the
Chapter off campus was its litigious orientation. 2 This,
s,a id the district court, was not alone enough to justify
the denial; but the court took the view that the university need not condone "frivolous, vexatious, and
haras,s ing actions to impede the legitimate function
of a university." It therefore refused to order approval
of the plaintiffs' charter. Instead, it simply provided
plaintiffs with a new chance to apply for recognition,
and, implicitly, the Univers ity wit'h a ne w chance to
adduce support for its assertion that the Chapter's ac-

2The district court found: "Of the reasons offered for the denial
of the charter, the Court does not find sufficient merit in
any to justify sustaining the University's position except for the
barely tenable reasons based on the expressed threats of litigation by the local chapter and this history of the litigation waged
by the state and national organizations."
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tivities would interfere with the operation of the University.3

is analogous to one attempting to prevent a particular
gr,oup or individual from speaking on school premises.
Such "speaker bans" uniformly have been struck
down. E.g., Brooks v. Auburn University, 296 F. Supp.
188 (M.D. Ala. 1969); see Wright, The Constitution on
the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1027, 1050-51 (1969). The
rationale of the speaker ban decisions is that it is plainly incompatible with our constitutional system for a
state-supported institution to permit some speakers
but turn others away "accoridin g to the orthodoxy or
popularity of t:heir political or social views." Brooks
v. Auburn University, 296 F. Supp. at 194. To sustain
such censorial practices, a University would at the
very least have to demonstrate a stron g probability
of the kind ,of material disruption spoken of in the Tinker case.

4

It is no longer a serious contention that "either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom ,of speech o:r expression, at the schoolhouse
gate." Tinker, supra, at 393 U.S. 506, 21 L.Ed.2d 737.
Student rights of free expression may he prohibited
only if t:hey "materially and substantially [interfere]
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school." Tinker at 393 U.S. 509, 21
L.Ed.3d 739, citing Burnside v. Byars, 5 Cir. 1966, 363
F.2d 744, 749. When the restriction upon student expression takes the form of an attempt to predict in advance
the content and consequences of that expression, it is
tantamount to a prior restraint and carries a heavy
presumption against its constitutionality. See Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 1963, 372 U.S. 58, 70; Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 1971, 39 U.S.L.W.
What is at issue here is whether the students affiliated
with the Chapter will be permitted to use t:h.e buildings
and grounds of the campus to conduct meetings and
discussion s. The r estriction impo,s ed by the University
SThe district court also noted, apparently on its own motion, that
the Chapter proposed to include non-students as members.
The record disclosed that on a prior occasion a charter had
been denied to a group whose membership was to include nonstudents. Although the district court thought that the university
should have "an opportunity to consider" this issue during any
further proceedings, we see no reason why a justification
never raised by the University should play a part in our disposition of this case. If the University did not see fit to object
to the composition of the Chapter's proposed membership, we
find it difficult to view the problem as significant enough to
justify banning this organization from the campus of the Uni,:70,.c-1+-u

5

The district .court found only that the litigiousness
of the national and state Civil Liberties Unions was
a "barely tenable ground for denying the charter to
the [USM] Chapter". Serious, bona fide litigation carried on by a minority group as a peaceful means of
guaranteeing its rights in a larger community is a form
of expression and association protected by the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. NAACP v. Button, 1963,
371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405. As such, it
cannot serve as a justification for keeping the Civil
Liberties Union off the campus of the University unless the litigation itself would result in the kind of disruption spelled out in Tinker.
Only litigation conducted in bad faith could fill that
bill. The lower court expressed the thought that if the

6
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Student Activity Committee were to make a new investigation, the Committee might turn up some support
for the assertion that the Chapter's litigation would
be vexatious and frivolous. This bare possibility, unsupported by any evidence in this record, does not justify a drastic curtailment of constitutionally favored
expression. T'he assertion of novel and so,m etimes
threatening positions through recourse to litigation
might all too easily be characterized as vexatious or
harassing by the individuals so threatened or surprised - and in perfectly good faith.
But, in our system, undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance is not enough to
overcome the right to freedom of expression.
Any departure from absolute regimentation
may cause trouble. Any variation from. the majority'·s oipin,ion may inspire fea:r. Any word
spoken, in dass, in the lunchroo•m , or on the
campus, that deviates from the views of another person may start an argument o•r cause
a disturbance. But our Constitution says we
must take this risk, Terminiello v Chicago, 337
US 1, 93 L Ed 1131, 69 S Ct 894 (1949 and our
history says that it is this so,r t of hazardous
freedom - this kind of openness - that is the
basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of Amedcans who grow
up and live in this relatively permissive, often
disputatious, society.
1
);

Tinker at 393 U .S. 508-09, 21 L.Ed.2d 739. We think it
far more compatible with free expression to relegate

µ.
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the University to its rights if the litigative activities
of the Chapter should turn out to be carried on with
disruptive intentions and do result in substantial disruption to the life of the University. In that event, the
:riecognition granted the Chapter could be challenged
and withdrawn in a fair proceeding based upon evidence of actual, and not vaguely predictive, misconduct.
'I1he University has cited us to a recent case decided
in the Second Circuit, Healy v. James, No. 733 , July
15, 1971. In Healy, the court approved a denial of official recognition to the Central Connecticut Chapte·r
of the Students for a Democratic Society ("SDS").
Without in any way implying our approval of the Healy
decision, we need note only that it is factu:ally distinguis'hable fr:om the present case in two respects. First,
SDS has not expressed any commitment to a policy
of litigat1on, and certain members of SDS have advocated disruption as a means of achieving its goals.
Second, in Healy, SDS actually demonstrated a refusal
to abide by university procedures for dispute re•s olution when it behaved defiantly during a court-structured hearing to determine its status. The denial in
Healy was therefore based at least in part upon some
evidenee of actual misbehavior and not upon unfounded prognostication of future conduct.
Finally, the University argues that the Chapter has
in effect waived its right to relief fr.om this Court by
failing to resort to the procedure for rehearing outlined
by the district court. But we are unwilling to find fault
with the Chapter for its impatience to achieve recogni-

9
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tion for its constitutional prerogatives. It has now been
more than a year since the Chapteir was denied the
same place in the sun on the campus of the University of Southern Mississippi a.c corded to other student
organizations - without any justification at all, so far
as we are able to discern.

ties have been made previously available to outside
organizations". The record shows the exis,t ence of such
outside organizations, as "Young Democrats" and
"Young Republicans" on the Southern campus.

8

We find it ulllilecessary to consider the adequacy of
the prooedure afforded the Chapter by the Unive,r sity,
since even that procedure failed to produce any permissible justification for denying the Chapter's application. For t'he reasons stated herein, the judgment
of the district court will be REVERSED, and the case
REMANDED to the district court for the prompt issuance of an order requiring the University of Southern
Mississippi to grant immediate appro•v al to the application for recognition of the University chapter of the
Mississippi Civil Liberties Union.
COLEMAN, Circuit Judge, Concurring Specially.
I am of the opm10n that this is not purely a First
Amendment cas,e. The primary purpose of the proposed organization appears to be litigious rather than
the right to receive and dispense information and
ideas. I, therefore, would decide this appeal on Fourteenth Amendm·e nt ( equal protection) groun:ds.
I do agree, in general, with the rationale of American
Civil Liberties Union of Virginia, Inc. v. Radford College, 315 F.Supp. 893 (W.D. Virginia, 1970). In that case
it was held .that a tax suppo,r ted college cannot apply
restrictions to outside organizations "When such facili-

u

l

I agree heartily with what Judge Dalton wrote in
Radford,
"Student organizations do not have an unqualified rig'ht to be recognized by a college
administration. College officials properly have
wide discreti-on in operating the school and in
determining what actions are most compatible with its educational objectives * * *. This
Court has no desire to interfere with the operations of any school OT to give encouragement to the trenld of in creasing challenges to
the considered dedsions of university administrators." 315 F. Supp. 896.
1

On the reoord compiled below, ho,w eveT, Mississippi
Southern failed to develop constitutionally permissible
ground for the exclusion of A.C.L.U.
In this state of affairs I can only point to the language
in Radford, supra, 315 F. Supp. at 899·:
"If their conduct as a campus 0 rganization
is unduly disruptive of the orderly funct1oning
of the institution, this Court will be the first to
reconsider its decision."
1

With this comment, I concur in the opinion prepared
for the Oourt by Judge WISDOM.
Adm. Office, U.S. Courts-Scofields' Quality Printers, Inc., N. 0., La

MEMORANDUM

TO:
FROM:

Mr. Larry A. Hammond

June 1, 1972

DATE:

Powell, Jr.
Healy
Here is the manuscript. I think you have done a superb job

in restructuring the 3rd session. I also think the opinion is one of
which we can be proud - provided we get a court.
Attached hereto - on a yellow sheet - ·are a few things to do,
in addition to running through the manuscript to note my few changes.
=

-·

.1

I will be glad to discuss any of this with yoli:

.....

-

June 8, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE;
Re: No. 71-452 Healy v. James

Here is my circulation in the above case.
The Conference vote was 5 to 4 for reversal. ' My opinion is
In addition, I concluded that with respect to
one issue the case should be remanded for further consideration.

in accord with that vote.

It is clear to me that First Amendment associational rights

of the student group which sought recognition were infringed by the
action of the College, as sustained by the courts below. Yet, upon
a careful reexamination of the record, I conclude that there was a
significant ambiguity as to whether the student group was willing to
agree to abide by the College's rules and regulations, the reasonableness of which was not challenged.
In my view, a college is entitled before it accords official
recognition to any organization to have the minimal assurance of an
intention and willingness to abide by reasonable rules and regulations
applicable to all student organizations and activities.

It is apparent from what the College President said in this
case that he was concerned, in view of petitioners' ambiguous statements as to disruption, as to whether petitioners intended to comply
with the rules embodied in the "Student Bill of Rights. " This concern
may well have been a significant factor in his decision. Yet, this
issue was not a subject of consideration at the court-ordered hearing;
nor was it focused upon in either of the opinions below. It can be
resolved quite simply on remand.

- ..

- - - - - - -~

-

~ - ~ ~ - - - -

- 2 -

In view of the r eversal and remand, I have tried to write the

opinion in a way that will afford appropriate guidance to college
administrators and student organizations in this case and in the
future.
L. F. P ., Jr.
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June 8, 1972

i·
\ MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
Re: No. 71-452 Healy v. James
Here is my circulation in the above case.
The Conference vote was 5 to 4 for reversal. My opinion is
in accord with that vote. In addition, I concluded that with respect to
one issue the case should be remanded for further consideration.
It is clear to me that First Amendment associational rights
of the student group which sought recognition were infringed by the
action of the College, as sustained by the courts below. Yet, upon
· a careful reexamination of the record, I conclude that there was a
significant ambiguity as to whether the student group was willing to
agree to abide by the College's rules and regulations, the reasonableness of which was not challenged.

In my view, a college is entitled before it accords official
recognition to any organization to have the minimal assurance of an
intention and willingness to abide by reasonable rules and regulations
applicable to all student organizations and activities.
It is apparent from what the College President said in this
case that he was concerned, in view of petitioners' ambiguous statements as to disruption, as to whether petitioners intended to comply
with the rules embodied in the "Student Bill of Rights. " This concern
may well have been a significant factor in his decision. Yet, this
issue was not a subject of consideration at the court-ordered hearing;
nor was it focused upon in either of the opinions below. It can be
resolved quite simply on remand.
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In view of the reversal and remand, I have tried to write the

opinion in a way that will afford appropriate guidance to college
administrators and student organizations in this case and in the
future.

Lf P.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 12, 1972

71-452 - Healy v. James
Dear Lewis,
I am glad to join your opinion
for the Court in this case.
Sincerely yours,

0~ ,

(/.

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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June 12, 1972

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

No. 71-452 - Healy v. James

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely; /

~
Mr. Justice Powell
cc:

Conference

-
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CHA M BERS OF

.JUS T ICE W M. .J. BRE NN A N . JR .

June 13, 1972

RE : No. 71-452 - Healy v. James
Dear Lewis:
I fully agree, of course, that the judgment below must be
reversed for the First Amendment reasons your opinion so
finely sets out. But I have some trouble with a few matters in
your opinion and I take the liberty of mentioning them for your
consideration.
First, would you consider dropping footnote 8? A complete
ban on student organizations seems to me to be of very doubtful
constitutionality for the same cogent reasons your opinion gives
for reversal here. Moreover, as you indicate, it is unlikely that
any college would ever want to attempt such a prohibition.

/

uf ,

Second, might the discussion (at, e.g., pages 14-15, 20, and
22) be revised to state merely that petitioners have not argued
either that they were improperly required to file an application for
recognition, or that the standards for recognition were invalid, and
that we therefore do not address those questions? It seems to me
that Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449, and Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, counsel that those
issues be left open, and we may do so since petitioners have not
raised them.
Third, could the first sentence in the paragraph beginning on
page 17 be omitted, since the rule stated in the preceding sentence
would seem to indicate that recognition could not be denied simply
because of affiliation with a national organization dedicated to unlawful conduct?

,, .•

•

--
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Fourth, could the last phrase quoted from Esteban on page
23 be omitted? I suggest that it appears overbroad and indefinite.
Fifth, I am unclear why the case is to be remanded. Is it
for a determination (1) whether the college has a rule denying
recognition to groups that refuse to affirm that they will abide by
time, place and manner restrictions on their associational activities
and (2) whether petitioners were denied recognition for failure to
comply with such a rule? Or is it for a determination whether
petitioners are now prepared to make the affirmation? If the latter,
it would seem (even though not intended) that the remand is for a
determination whether petitioners failed to comply with a rule
established not by the college, but by this Court.
If the former, your premise must be that the record is
ambiguous as to whether the college has a rule denying recognition
to groups that refuse to affirm and also as to whether petitioners
were denied recognition for failure to comply with the rule. But
if the record is ambiguous as to the existence of a rule, would not
Staub v. Baxley require the holding that the denial of recognition
in petitioners' case would be unconstitutional whether they had made
the affirmation or not? In other words unless the record before us
shows that the college had a clearly established rule which was applied against petitioners, Staub v. Baxley would be authority that
this Court should not even address the question of affirmation rules,
let alone approve such rules in general terms. Rather we should
at most reserve discussion of the problem until it is presented in
an appropriate context in which its ramifications may be assessed.
I suggest this may be the appropriate course for the following reasons:

1. As your opinion states, "a 'heavy burden' rests on the
college to demonstrate the appropriateness of 11 a prior restraint on
associational freedom, and recognition regulations may pos sibly not
be "an appropriately related and narrow response" to the state's
interest in controlling disruption on the campus. If so, can we say
at this juncture that any affirmation rule in implementation of those
regulations satisfies, regardless of its content, First Amendment
requirements .? Moreover, wouldn't such a statement be particularly
inappropriate when the constitutional validity of an affirmation rule
apparently hasn't been briefed or argued here?

.

..,
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2. On the assumption that an affirmation rule may be valid
in some circumstances, its precise terms may have an important,
and perhaps crucial, bearing on its validity. Would we, for example, uphold a rule requiring "willingness to abide by campus
regulations" without some requirement that those regulations
themselves be constitutional? Or a rule calling for an affirmative
promise to comply rather than an indication of present intent? Or
a rule making the applicants for recognition responsible for the
intent or conduct of all members of the group? The consequences
of failure to abide by the affirmation (e.g., revocation of recognition
versus perjury conviction) may be no less significant.
3. In view of these questions, would a general approval of
affirmation rules at this time open up a host of issues rather than
help resolve the difficulties that colleges must face in drawing the
fine line between protected freedoms and unprotected conduct?
Moreover, would it cause colleges to focus, not on the drawing of
that fine line, but on affirmation rules that, like loyalty oaths,
must at best be an ineffective solution to controlling future conduct?
In sum, I wonder whether the case should be reversed and
not remanded. Under that disposition your discussion in section
IIID indicating the four th basis for the denial of recognition here
could be modified to say that even if petitioners refused to affirm,
still recognition could not be refused since the college had not
previously established an affirmation rule. If it had, the validity
of the rule would present an important question, which, however,
need not be addressed in this case. If you have the time, perhaps
we can get together and talk about these comments.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell

/4d
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C H AM B E R S O F

J USTICE W M. .J . BRENNAN , .JR .

Jwie 14, 1972

RE: No. 71-452 - Healy v. James
Dear Lewis:
Further reflection on my suggestions in my memorandum
yesterday prompts me to suggest the possible resolution of
Point Fifth in my memo along the following lines:
1. Petitioners have not challenged any procedural or substantive aspects of CCSC's requirement that proposed organizations file for official campus recognition.

2. CCSC may have, as part of that requirement, a rule
calling for an affirmation by the proposed organization that it
intends to comply with reasonable regulations governing campus
associational activities.
3. The case may be remanded, then, to consider whether
CCSC, in fact, has such a rule and, if so, whether petitioners
are willing to comply with it. Only if the rule exists and petitioners are not willing to comply with it need the lower courts address
the constitutional validity of the application of the affirmation rule
to this case.
I suggest this because with that treatment I think I can join
your disposition to remand.
Sincerely,

;5u)
Mr. Justice Powell
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June 19, 1972

Re:

No. 71-452

-

Healy v. James

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Jiu. 4.
Mr. Justice Powell

cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

June 16, 1972

Re:

No. 71-452 - Healy v. James

Dear Lewis:
Subject to our conversation,
I join your opinion in this case.
Sincerely,

~,__.,,,
Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to Conference
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Dear Lewis:

ames

'I'hanJr You so Very lnuch fo•
Sideration of lny suggest;ons.
trisions I am trery ,._
iiappy

~ Your con-

.
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.,. J.CJJ Your re-

to Join.

Sincerely,

l\ffr • Justice PoweJJ

cc : Tbe Conterence
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR.

June 16, 1972

RE: No. 71-452 - Healy v. James
Dear Lewis:
Thank you so very much for your
consideration of my suggestions. With
your revisions, I am very happy to join.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference
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C HAMBERS O F

June 13, 1972

JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

Dear Lewis:
In No . 71-452 - Healy v . James,
I had a talk this morning with Bill
Brennan and he listed some of the difficulties he has had with the opinion that
you circulated .
It seemed to me on listening to
him and knowing what your general position
is that an accommodation can be made
between your views and his .
I am dropping this note before
catching a plane to express my desire
that you and Bill Brennan sit down and
work out something that is mutually
satisfactory . Whatever the two of you
decide upon is O. K. with me .

l<_VJ

William O. Douglas
Mr . Justice Powell
CC :

Mr . Justice Brennan
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR.

June 21, 1972

RE: No. 71-452 - Healy v. James
Dear Lewis:
I am not going to file or indeed even
circulate the attached if you think I should
not. As the draft states, I prepared this
only in response to the concurring opinions,
but the last thing I want to do is upset your
applecart. I'll hold it until I hear from you.

SJJ:;
Mr. Justice Powell

~/~C.j,
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CHAMBERS O F

..JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

Re:

June ninth
l.972

No . 71- 452 - Healy v . James

Dear Lewis :
Pl.ease join me in your opinion .
I may fil.e a separate opinion which in
no way wil.l. derogate from yours.

v,uJ
o.

Wil.l.iam

Mr . Justice Powell.
CC :

The Conference

Douglas

,,.
,,
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6/21/72--LAH
Re, Healy v. James
Judge,
Justice Brennan's concurrence does three things, (1) it
highlights the things in the opinion which he favors, emphasizing the ~zior restraint and the notions in footnote
21; (2) it responds to Rehnquist's assertions that the First
Amendment applies in a different manner on college campuses;
and (3) he underlines that the Court does not today approve
any particular prior affirmation rule as the CJ's concurrence
suggests.
There is nothing that we can do further to our opinion as
I see it that will further underline Brennan's concern to a

•

sufficient extent to make his statement unnecessary from his
point of view.

His focus is simply different than yours

although you both are in basic agreement.
I think his answer to Rehnquist is unnecessary since
in our opinion we alre~dy state unequivocally that there is
no room for the argument that the "First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses
than in the community at large."
On the Chief's point, I rather thought that in light of
our change made at Brennan's request the CJ might slighly
alter his concurrence.

If he does then that note is un-

necessary by Brennana if he does not then Brennan's comment
is fair.

•

At any rate, I do not think that such separate statements harm the opinion and I guess they are to be anticipated whenever one gathers a coalition in a close and
difficult First Amendment case.
LAH

No. 71-452 Healy v. James
This case involves a controversy/between Central
Connecticut State College/and a group of students who desired
to form a local chapte7 of students for a Democratic Society.
The student group applied for ~
campus organization.
privileges.

al recognitioryas a

Recognition would confer certain

-.

These included the right (i) to use campus facilities

-

for meetings, ( ii) to use various campus bulletin boards, and
( iii) to use the student newspaper for announcements of meetings
and activities.
The application for recognition was filed in September
1969.

At that time, a climate of unrest prevailed on many

college campuses.

Some SOS chapters had been actively
I

involved in the unrest. , A.t,:r.-(.

J...,...._«h,11 t-c.A,,

,

Although the student Affairs Committee/ recommended
granting official recognition, /he President of the College

-

denied it.

He was concerned with the group's relationship

wl,th J_DS;f e thought the philosophy of national SOS was abhorrent;
ard tH.aatPllaGf~Ji e jos of thu '1 eHoge; and he feared that a

~ • ,,_ ~ - "5~ e "-"

~-k.___
eL:&A' .. ,._~
,.,,,._

~a&v-t.A

Crdl-c.,,lcM-.,_

3.
The record in this case is ambiguouf

s to whether

t!!.i s collJ ge/imposed such a requiremeny and - if so - whether
this group/was willing to acknowledge its obligation to comply.
For reasons more fully stated in our opinion, we reverse
the decisionjand remand the case for reconsideration/ in light
of the standards we have set forth.

TL.- c..
~

~

+~~.: .
.;v.S

~
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Orts

J.,.
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local chapter would be a disruptive influence on the campus.
The District Courtjafter ordering further hearings, /
approved the President's decisiof

nd the Second Circuit Court

of Appeals affirmed.

-

---------

-

We hold that associational rights,/ protected by the First
AmendEJentf"ere infringed.

A state college may ;;2_t deny

recognition to a student grour/merely because it is associated
with an objectionable organization. Nor may denial be based
on an apprehensiorfas to f~e campus disruption.

The college presidenf ailed to dravjche c.Jjtical 1me/
between mere advocacy,/and advocacy directed to producing
imminent lawless action.

-

On the other hand, we also holf hat student activities

;1:e subjecf to reasonable

rules and regulations,/ and that a

college may impQ.Se a requirement that a group,/ seeking official
recognition,/ must affirm in advance/ its willingness to adhere
to reasonable campus law.
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIE:F JUSTICE

June 22 , 1972

Re:

No. 7 1-452 - Healy v . James

Dear. Lewis :
I have made changes on my conurrence as
per the attached .
Regards,

Mr . Justice Powell
Gopie s t o the C o nfe

~~

~/4;

.To: Mr. Justice DoU:tl~t!

-

Re:

Just:oe BronnAn
Justioo Stown~t
Justi oo \ihita
Just~oo L""rsha11
Justloe Blackmun
Justice Powell ✓
Mr. Justice Rehnquist

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

No. 71-452 - Healy v. James

From: The Ciliet' Justice
.C irculated:
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concur ring.
------Becirculated:
JUN 2 2
I am in agreement with what is said in the Court's opinion and I ·

197

join in it.

I do so because I read the basis of the remand as requiring that

student organizations seeking the privilege of official campus recognition
must be willing to a bide by valid rules of the institution applicable to all
such organizations.

This is a reasonable requirement so long as it

dis avows res ort to force and disruption or interference with the rights of
others.
The District Judge was troubled by the lack of a comprehensive
procedur a 1 scheme that would inform students of the steps to be ta ken to
secure acer edited standing and by the la ck of articulated criteria to be used
in evaluating eligibility for accreditation.

It was for this reason, as I read

the record, that he remanded the matter to the college for a factual inquiry
and for a more orderly processing in a de novo hearing within the college

---

administrative s true ture.

It is within that structure and with in the academic

community that problems such as these should be resolved.
state or federal, should be a last resort.

The courts,

Part of the educational experi-

ence of every college student should be an experience in responsible self-

-2-

;

•

government and this must be a joint enterprise of students and faculty.

It

should not be imposed unilaterally from above nor can the terms of the
relations hip be dictated by students.

Here, in spite of the wisdom of the

District Court in sending the case back to the college, the is sue identified
by the Court's opinion today was not adequately addressed in the hearing.
The relatively placid life of the college campus of the past has not
prepared either administrators or students for their respective responsibilities in maintaining an atmosphere in which diver gent views can be
asserted vigorously but civilly to the end that those who s eek to be heard
accord the same right to all others.

The "Statement of Rights, Freedoms

and Responsibilities of Students," sometimes called the "Colle ge Bill of
Rights, " in effect on this campus, and not questioned by petitioners, appear
to reflect a ra tiona 1 adjustment of the competing interests.

But it is im-

possible to know from the record in this case whether the student group
was willing to acknowledge an

obligation to abide by that "Bill of Rights."

Against this background the action of the Court in remanding on this
issue is appropriate.

•

f

~o: Mr. Justice Douglas
Mr. Just __ ce Brennan
\
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Mr.
Mr.

Re:

Mr.
Mr. Jusvlc
Mr. Justice
Mr. Justice

No. 71-452 - Healy v. James

From: The Chief Just~ce
Circulated: ________
MR . CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concur ring.

Recirculated: JUN 2 2 1972

I am in agreement with what is said in the Court's opinion and I
join in it.

I do so because Ir ead the basis of the remand as requiring that

student or ga niza tions seeking the privilege of officia 1 campus recognition
must be willing to a bide by valid rules of the institution applicable to all
such organizations .

This is a reasonable requirement so long as it

dis avows resort to force and disruption or interference with the rights of
others.
The District Judge was troubled by the la c k of a comprehensive
procedur a 1 scheme that would inform students of the steps to be ta ken to
secure acer edited standing and by the la ck of articulated criteria to be used
in evaluating eligibility £or accreditation.

It was for this reason, as I read

the record, that he remanded the matter to the college for a factual inquiry
and for a more orderly processing in a d e ~ hearing within the college
administrative s true ture .

It is within that structure and with in the academic

community that problems such as these should be resolved.
state or federal, should be a last resort .

The courts,

Part of the educational experi-

ence of every college student should be an experience in responsible self-

•

I

- 2government and this must be a joint enterprise of students and faculty.

It

should not be imposed unilaterally from above nor can the terms of the
relations hip be dictated by students.

Here, in spite of the wisdom of the

District Court in sending the case back to the college, the is sue identified
by the Court's opinion today was not adequately addressed in the hearing.
The relatively placid life of the college campus of the past has not
prepared either administrators or students for their respective responsibilities in maintaining an atmosphere in which diver gent views can be
asserted vigorously but civilly to the end that those who s eek to be heard
accord the same right to all others .
and Responsibilities of Students,

11

The "Statement of Rights, Freed oms

sometimes called the "College Bill of

Rights," in effect on this campus, and not questioned by petitioners, appear
to reflect a ra tiona 1 adjustment of the competing interests.

But it is im-

possible to know from the record in this case whether the student group
was willing to acknowledge an

obligation to abide by that "Bill of Rights."

Against this background the action of the Court in remanding on this
issue is appropriate .
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 71-452 - October Term 1971

Catherine J. Healy, et al.,
Petitioners;

)
)

)

F. Don James, et al.

~

)

)

v.

Jl'1-v..

On Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.

)

[ June_, 1972]
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring.

•

I join the opinion of the Court and address these few words to
certain statements made by my other concurring Brethren.
The gist of the Court's decision today is "that the effect of the
College's denial of recognition was a form of prior restraint, denying
to petitioners' organizat:in [ a] range of [ constitutionally protected]
associational activities . • •. " Ante, p, 15. As a result, certain
well-established First Amendment doctrines are implicated.

First,

as the Court states, "a 'heavy burden' rests on the college to demonstrate
the appropriateness of that action." Ibid. Secondly, as the Court further
states, the College "must demonstrate that the action taken is reasonably
related to protection of [ its legitimate interest in avoiding material
campus disruption] and that 'the incidental restriction on . . . First

•

Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essentail to the furtherance

.

•

- 2of that interest. ' 11 Ante, p. 20 n. 20.
Contrary to my Brother Rehnquist's view, these principles come
into play with full force, notwithstanding the fact that "the government
[ is acting] in its capacity as employer'' or college administrator rather
than "in its capacity as the sovereign executing criminal laws."

Post,

p. _ _ • Indeed, the very cases on which my Brother Rehnquist relies
for these distinctions -- Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S.
503, and Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 -- reject them.
In the first case public school students were suspended from school for
wearing armbands in protest of the Vietnam war, and in the second a

•

teacher was dis missed for writing and publishing in a newspaper a letter
critical of the school board's policies. In both cases the Court held that
no governmental interest overrode the impairment of First Amendment
rights caused by those actions.

See also, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v.

Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (informal administrative censorship scheme held
unconstitutional).

Thus, neither the role in which the government acts

nor the sanctions it seeks to impose lessen the for c e of our First Amendment principles.~/
Applying those principles to the facts of this case, the Court today
holds that the College has failed to sustain the "heavy burden" of justification for the denial of recognition to petitioners' organization with one

•

possible exception. The exception concerns (1) whether the College had
established a requirement for recognition that applicants affirm in

,r

•
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advance their willingness to abide by valid campus regulations and
(2), if so, whether petitioners were unwilling to comply with it.
Normally, the ambiguity in the record on the first question would,
I think, require outright reversal. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v.
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147; Staub v. Baxley, 355 U.S. 313.

Petitioners'

failure, however, to challenge the procedural or substantive aspects of
the college's established recognition scheme suggests that they might
not object to affirming their intent to follow valid campus rules. The
case is, accordingly, remanded to determine, first, whether the college
has an affirmation requirement; second, whether petitioners are willing

·•

to comply with it; and, third, if the answer to the first question is "yes"
and to the second, "no", whether the requirement, as drawn and applied,
is constitutionally permissible. Contrary to the Chief Justice's position,
the Court does not now decide whether any affirmation rule comports
with the First Amendment principles re-affirmed in the opinion and
certainly does not uphold a requirement "cast in broad general terms."

I

Ante, p. _ _ . As the Court states, "Since we do not have the terms of
a specific prior affirmation rule before us, we are not called on to decide
whether any particular formulation would or would not prove constitutionally
acceptable." Ante, p. 24.

•

_J

•

*/ This is not to say that subordinating governmental interests such
as concern for order on the campus or efficiency in the public service
do not exist. These interests may, of course, in appropriate circumstances justify some curtailment of First Amendment freedoms.

They

do so, however, not because the government's role or the sanctions
imposed are different, but because the interests themselves warrant it.
Moreover, even where those interests are at work, we have always insisted that they be implemented with the least impingement possible on
protected freedoms.

Here, again, the capacity in which the government

acts, though not the sanctions imposed, is immaterial to the inquiry.

•

•

f ;-, ." c,ha11,e.f' t711,; l) '-I>
"

JJJ

,s,

~OJ ;;.

.1/
;1

0 K, 11 IO, l J,
11

1
;~: The Chief Justice

I <. J 17J I 8', I 1,
.,

Jnd DRAFT

~

Justi ce Douglas
Mr. Just ice Br ennan
Mr. J ustice Stewart
Mr. JusLuc White
Mr. Just.-c .3 ga:cshall
Mr. Justi co B:..ackmun
Mr. Justice Behn~uist

l,{r.

From: Powell, J.. ,
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA,-TFJSi.la.t ed: _ _ _ __
hcoiroulated: _______
No. 71-452
Catherine J. Healy et al.,) On Writ of Certiorari to the
Petitioners,
United States Court of
v.
Appeals for the Second
F. Don James et al.
Circuit.
[June - , 1972]

~'/

MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the op1mon of the·
Court.
This case, arising out of a denial by a state college
of official recognition to a group of students who desired
to form a local chapter of Students for a D emocratic
Society (SDS), presents this Court with questions requiring the application of well-established First Amend-ment principles. While the factual l;>ackground of this
particular case raises these constitutional issues in a
manner not heretofore passed on by the Court, and only
infrequently presented to lower federal courts, our decision today is governed by existing precedent.
As the case involves delicate issues concerning the·
academic community, we approach our task with special
caution, recognizing the mutual interest of students, faculty members, and administrators in an environment free
from disruptive interference with the educatio1tprocess.
We also are mindful of the equally significant interest
in the widest latitude for free expression and debate
consonant with the maintenance of order. \Vhere these
interests appear to compete the First Amendment, made
binding on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment~
strikes the required balance.

~
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I
,ve mention briefly at the outset the setting in 19691970. A climate of unrest prevailed on many college
campuses in this country. There had been widespread
civil disobedience on some campuses, accompanied by
the seizure of buildings, vandalism, and arson. Some
colleges had been shut clown altogether, while at others
files were looted and manuscripts destroyed. SDS chapters on some of those campuses had been a catalytic
force during this period. 1 Although the causes of campus disruption were many and complex, one of the prime
consequences of such activities was the denial by the
few of the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights
to the majority of students. Indeed, many of the most
cherished characteristics long associated with institutions
of higher learning appeared to be endangered. J;"'ortunately, with the passage of time, a calmer atmosphere
and greater maturity now pervade our campuses. Yet,
it was in this climate of earlier unrest that this case
arose.
Petitioners are students attending Central Connecticut State College (CCSC), a state-supported institution
of higher learning. In September 1969 they undertook
to organize what they then referred to as a "local chapter" of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) . Pursuant to procedures established by the College, petitioners filed a request for official recognition as a. campus
organization with the Student Affairs Committee, a committee composed of four students, three faculty members
and the Dean of Student Affairs. The request specified three purposes for the proposed organization's existence. It would provide "a forum of discussion and
See Report of th r Prr~idrnt';;: Comm 'n on C:1rnpu, Umr~t (1070):
Report of the ABA Cornrn·11 on C:irnpu, Go,·'t ;ind St11cl('nt Di,,cnt
(1970).
1
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self-education for students developing an analysis of
American society"; it would serve as an "agency for
integrating thought with action so as to bring about
constructive changes"; and it would endeavor to provide a "coordinating body for relating the problems of
leftist students" with other interested groups on campus and in the community." The Committee, while
satisfied that the statement of purposes \Vas clear and
unobjectionable on its face, exhibited concern over the
relationship between the proposed local group and the
National SDS organization. In response to inquiries,
representatives of the proposed organization stated that
they would 11ot affiliate ,Yith any national organization and that their group would remain "completely
independent."
In response to other questions asked by Committee
members concerning SDS's reputation for campus disruption , the applicants made the following statements,
which proved significant during the later stages of these
proceedi11gs:
"Q. How would you respond to issues of violence
as other SDS chapters have?
"A. Our action "·ould have to be dependent upon
each issue.
"Q. Would you use any means possible?
"A. No I can't say that; "·ould not kno,Y until
"·e know what the issues are.
"Q. Could you env1s10n the S. D. S. interrupting a class?
"A. Impossible for me to say."
With this information before it, the Committee re~ The st:1tement of purposes is set out in full in the dissenting
opinion from the deci~ion of the Second Circuit. Healy Y. James, 445
F. 2<l 1112, 1136-1137 (1971).
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quested an additional filing by the applicants, including a formal statement regarding affiliations. The
amended application filed in response stated flatly that
"CCSC Students for a Democratic Society are not under
the dictates of any National organization." 3 At a second hearing before the Student Affairs Committee, the
question of relationship with the National organization
was raised again. One of the organizers explained that
the National SDS was divided into several "factional
groups," that the national-local relationship ,ms a. loose
one, and that the local organization accepted only "certain ideas" but not all of the National organization's
aims and philosophies.
By a vote of six to t,rn the Committee ultimately
approved the application and recommended to the President of the ,Qpllege, Dr. James, that the organization
be accorded official recognition. In approving the application, the majority indicated that its decision was
premised on the belief that varying vie·wpoints should
be represented on campus and that since the Young
Americans for Freedom, the Young Democrats, the
Young Republican s, and the Liberal Party all enjoyed
recognized status, a group should be available with which
"left wing" students might identify. The majority also
noted and relied on the organization's claim of independence. Finally, it admonished the organization that
immediate suspension would be considered if the group's
activities proved incompatible with the school's policies
against interference with the privacy of other students

-

3 445 F. 2d , at 1137.
During the Committee's consideration of
petitione~application, one of the group's representatives was asked
·why, if it indeed desired to remain independent, it chose to use a
nationally known name. The witnPss' response was that "the name
brings to mind the type of organization we wish to bring across,
that is a left-wing organization which will allow students interested
in such to express themselves."
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or destruction of property. The two dissenting members based their reservation primarily on the lack of
clarity regarding the organization's independence.
Several days later, the President rejected the Committee's rtcommendation, and issued a statement indicating that petitioners' organization ·was not to be accorded the benefits of official campus recognition. His
accompanying remarks, which are set out in full in the
margin,4 indicate several reasons for his action. He
The President stated:
"Though I have full appreciation for the action of the Student Affairs Committee and the reasons stated in their minutes for the
majority vot e recommending a pproval of a local chapter of Students
fo r a Democratic Society, it is my judgment t hat the statement of
purpose to form n !or-al chapter of Stu dent,, for a Dcmocrn1 ic f?ociety
ca nie.o full and unmistakable adherence to at lea$t somE' of the
mnjor tenets of the national organization. loo~e a nd divided though
that orgrrniza.tion may be. The published aims and 11hilo,ophy of
tbe Students for a Democrat ic Society, which in clude clisrnption
and violence, are cont rary to the approYed polic)· (b)· faculty,
students, and administ ration) of Central Connecticut State Collegfr
which stat es :
"'Students do not lrn Ye tlrn right to inva de the prime)· of others,
to damage the propert y of others, to disrupt the regular and essential operation of the college, or to interfere with th e rights of
others.'
"The further statement on the request for recognition that 'CCSC
Students for a Democratic Society are not under the dictates of any
National organization' in no way clarifies why if a group intends to,
follow the established policy of the college, they wish to become a
local chapter of an organization which openly repudiates such a
policy.
"Freedom of speech, academic freedom on the campus, the· freedom.
of establishing an open forum for the exchange of ideas, the freedoms
outlined in the Statement on Rights, Freedoms, and Responsibilities
of Students that 'college students and student organizations shall have
t he righ t to examine and discuss all questions of interest to them, to
express opinion publicly and privately, and t o support causes by
orderly means. They m:1y organize public demon~trations and protest gatherings and utilize t he right of petition'-these are all precious
4
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found that the organization's philosophy " ·as antithetical
to the school's policies," and that the group's ind ependence ,vas doubtful. He concluded that approval should
freedoms that we cherish and arc freedoms on which we stand. To
approve any organization or individual who joins with an org:mization which open!>· repudiatrs those principles is rontrary to those
freedoms and to the appron'ci 'Statement on the Rights, Freedoms,
and ReRponRibili t ie~ of Stud ent~• a t Centrnl.'"
5 In 1969, CCSC adopted . as have man>· other rolleges and unirnrsities, a Statement of Right", Freedom~. and R esponsibilities of
Students. This st.ntement , common!>· referred to 11s th r "R1urlent
Bill of Righ t,-," is print ed ns nn Appendix to the Second Circuit's
m ajority opinion in this case, H ealy Y. James, 445 F. 2d, at 1132-1136
(1971). Part Y of th[lt statement e~tnblishe~ the ~b nd,ucl~ for ::ipprornl of campus organizations and imposes se,·ern 1 b::t sic limita tions
on their c::impns activities:
"A. Care shall be taken in the establi~hment ::i nd organization
of c:unpus groups so that the ba-~ie rights, freedoms and responsibilities of students will be presen-ed.
"B . Student organizations sha ll submit a clea r statem ent of purpo~e. criteria for m embership, rule~ of procedurr~ and a li"t of
officers as a condition of institutionnl recogni tion. The>· shall not be
required to submi t a membership list as a condition of institu tional
recognition.
"C. l\Iembcrship in campus organiz:itions shall be limited to
mat ricula ted studrnts (d:1>· or eYening) at the college. M embership
shall not be rn,tricted b~- rnce. religion or nationalit>·· The members
shall ha ve sole power to determine organization polic>· consistent with
the regulations of the college.
" D . Each org;1nization is free to choose its own adYiser. AdYisers
to orgnnizations shall ach·i~e bu t not control t he orgnnizations and
their policies.
"E. College students and student organiza.tions shall have the right
to examine and cfocu ~~ [l II que~tions of interest to t hem . to express
opinion publicly and pri,·atrl>·, and to support causes by orderly
m ea ns. They ma>' organize public demonst rations nnd protest
gatherings and utilize the right of petition. Students do not have
the right to depriYe others of the opportunit>· to speak or be hea rd,
to invade the prime>' of others. to damage the propert>' of others,
1o di8rupt the re11:ula r and essenrial opcrntion of th r eollr~r; or to
intrrfere with the rights of others."
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not be granted to any group ~ "openly repudiates"
the ~ollege's dedication to academic freedom.
D~nial of official recognition posed serious problems
for the organization's existence and gro"·th. Its members \Yere depriYed of the opportunity to place announcements regarding meetings, rallies or other activities in
the student newspaper; they were precluded from using
various campus bulletin boards; and-most importantly-nonrecognition barred them from using campus
facilities for holdi11g meetings. This latter disability
was brought home to petitioners shortly after the President's announcement. Petitioners circulated a notice
calling a meeting to discuss ,yhat further action should
be taken in light of the group's official rejection. The
members met at the coffee shop in the Student Center
("Devil's Den") but ,rnre disbanded on the President's
order since nonrecognized groups ,Yere not entitled to
use such facilities. 6
Their efforts to gain recognition having proved ultimately unsuccessful, and having been made to feel the
burden of nonrecognition , petitioners resorted to the
courts. They filed a suit in the Federal District Court
in Connecticut, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the President of the ..college. other administrators, and the State Board of Trustees. Petitioners'
6 During the meeting petitioners were approached by two of the
,&.ollegr's clcnn,: who scrYed petitioners with a rncrnornnchun from
TI1e Presiclen t stating:
"Notice has been receiYed by this office of a meeting of the
'C. C. S. C.-S. D. S. on Thusrday-Nowmber 6 at 7:00 p. m. at
the Devils' Den.'
"Such meeting ma~· not take place in the DeYils Den of the Student Center nor in or on any other property of the college since the
C. C. S.~.-S. D. S. is not a duly recognized college organization.
"You are hereby notified by this action to cease and desist from
meeting on the college property."
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primary complaint centered on the denial of First Amendment rights of expression and association arising from
denial of campus recognition. The cause "·as submitted
initially on stipulated facts and, after a short hearing,
the judge ruled that petitioners had been denied pro'. V
cedural due process because the President had based
his decision on conclusions regarding tlrn applicant's
affiliation which "·ere outside the record before him.
The
court concluded that if the President wished to act
1nrrf>Ju,~ ev1Je,,,ce.
on the basis of material outside the application he must
a.-.s .,._" rh ~ ,·..,
at least provide petitioners a hearing and opportunity
r• •
,
~f
ho. r ,o-,,
~. ...__ _7..,_ t.._o....,~e fl.@IM'~ 311 F. Supp., at 1276, 1281. While retaining jurisdiction over the case, the District Court
ordered respondents to hold a hearing in order to clarify
the several ambiguities surrounding the President's dec1s1on. One of the matters to be explored was ·whether
the local organization, true to its repeated affirmations,
vms in fact independent of the National SDS. Id., at
1282. And if the hearing demonstrated that the two
were not separable. the respondents were instructed that
they might then review the "aims and philosophy" of
the National organization. Ibid.
Pursuant to the court's order, the President designated Dean Judd, the Dean of Student Affairs, to serve
as hearing officer and a hearing was scheduled. The
hearing, which spanned t\vo dates and lasted approximately two hours, added little in terms of objective
substantive evidence to the record in this case. Petitioners introduced a statement offering to change the
organization's name from "CCSC local chapter of SDS"
to "Students for a Democratic Society of Central Connecticut State College." They further reaffirmed that
they would "have no connection whatsoever to the
structure of an existing national organization." 7 Peti-

.;,.;

r,

'319 F. Supp., at 114. The hearing offi cer, owr petit ion er~' objection, ruled that the statement was inadmissible apparently on the
ground that it would constitute an amendment to the original appli-
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tioners also introduced the testimony of their faculty
adviser to the effect that some local SDS organizations
elsewhere were unaffiliated with any national organization. The hearing officer, in addition to introducing
the minutes from the two pertinent Student Affairs Committee meetings, also introduced sua sponte portions
of a transcript of hearings before the United States
House of Representatives Internal Security Committee
investigating the activities of SDS. Excerpts were offered both to prove that violent and disruptive activities
had been attributed to SDS elsewhere and to demonstrate that there existed a national organizat-ion that
recognized and cooperated with regional and local college
campus affiliates. Petitioners did not challenge the asserted existence of a National SDS, nor did they question that it did have a system of affiliations of some·
sort. Their contention was simply that their organization would not associate with that network. Throughout the hearing the parties were acting at cross purposes.
What seemed relevant to one appeared completely immaterial to the other. This failure of the hearing to•
advance the litigation was, at bottom, the consequence
of a more basic failure to join issue on the considerations that should control the President's ultimate decision, a problem to which we will return in the ensuing·
section .
Upon reviewing the hearing transcript and exhibits,
the P resident reaffirmed his prior decision to deny petitioners'? recognition as a campus organization. Thereasons stated, closely paralleling his initial reasons, were·
that the group would be a "disruptive influence" at
CCSC and that recognition would be "contrary to the
orderly process of change" on the campus.
cation and would be beyond t he permissible scope of t he hearing _
What enr the merits of t hi~ ruling, it was still in the record reYirwc<l by t he PresiJrnt and ,ms relied on in the subsequ ent Dist rict
Court opinion without reference to its prior exclusion. Ibid.
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After the President's second staternen t issued, the case
then returned to the District Court where it was ordered
dismissed. The court concluded, first, that the formal
requisites of procedural due process had been complied
"·ith, second, that petitioners had failed to meet their
burden of showing that they could function free from
the National organization, and, third , that the college's
refusal to place its stamp of approval on an o1ganization whose conduct it found "likely to cause violent acts
of disruption" did not violate petitioners' associational
rights. 319 F. Supp. 113.
Petitioners appealed to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals where, by a two-to-one vote, the District Court's
judgment was affirmed. The majority purported not
to reach the substantive First Amendment issues on the
theory that petitioners had failed to avail themselves
of the due process accorded them and had failed to meet
their burden of complying with the prevailing standards for recognition. 445 F . 2d, at 1131-1132. Judge
Smith dissented, disagreeing "·ith the majority's refusal
to address the merits and finding that petitioners had
been deprived of basic First Amendment rights. Id.,
at 1136. This Court granted certiorari and, for the
reasons follow, we conclude that the judgment
of the courts below must be reversed and the case remanded for reconsideration.

II

G

At the outset we note thaVcolleges and universities
re not enclaves immune from the s,Yeep of the First
Amendment. "It can hardly be argued that either student-s or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of expression at the schoolhouse ga.te." Tinker
v. Des Jvl oines Independent Conimunity School District, 393 U . S. 503, 506 (1969). Of course, as Mr. Justice Fort.as made clear in Tinker, First Amendment rights

sra..+e
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must always be applied "in light of the special characteristics of the .. . environment" in the pa.rticular case.
Ibid. And, where state-operated educational institutions are involved, this Court has long recognized "the
need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the
states and of school officials, consistent ,Yith fundamental
constitutional safeguards. to prescribe and control conduct in the schools." Id., at 507. ~ precedents of
this Court leave no room for the view that. because of
the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses than in the community at large. Quite to the
contrary, " [ t] he vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community
of American schools." Shelton v. Tucker, 314 U. S.
470. 487 ( 1960) . The college classroom ,Yith its surmunding environs is peculiarly the "market place of
ideas" and we break no new constitutional ground in
reaffirming this Kation's dedication to safeguarding academic freedom. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U. S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. J.V ew Hampshire, 354
U. S. 234, 249-250 (plurality opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Warren). 262 (1957) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion).
Among the rights protected by the First Amendment is
the right of individuals to associate to further their personal beliefs. While the freedom of association is not explicitly set out in the Amendment. it has long been held
to be implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly and
petition. See, e. g., Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401
U. S. 1, 6 (1971); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415,
430 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP,
366 U . S. 293, 296 ( 1961); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958) (Mr. Justice Harlan
for a unanimous Court). There can be no doubt that
denial without justification of official recognition to col-

, , e. +-,

rk
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lege organizations burdens or abridges that associational right:l. The primary impediment to free association flowing from nonrecognition is the denial of use of
campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate
purposes. The practical effect of nonrecognition was
demonstrated in this case ·when, several clays after the
President's decision was announced, petitioners were not
allowed to hold a meeting in the campus coffee shop
because ' they were not an approved group.
Petitioners' associational interests also were circumscribed by the denial of the use of campus bulletin boards
and the school newspaper. If an organization is to remain a viable entity in a campus community in which
new students enter on a regular basis, it must possess
the means of communicating with these students. Moreover, the organization's ability to participate in the in tellectual give and take of campus debate, and to pursue
its stated purposes, is limited by denial of access to the
customary media for communicating with the ~dministration, faculty members, and other students_?....--Such
impediments cannot be viewed as insubstantial.

8 ~ It

i~ unclectr on this re~d ,;.bet.br r rcc-ognition al~o carries 11·ith
it a right to seek funds from the school budget. Petitioners' counsel
at oral argument indicated that official recognition entitled the group
to "make application for use of student funds." Tr. of Oral Arg.,

/c

;g
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Respondents and the courts below appear to have
taken the view that denial of official recognition in this
case abridged no constitutional rights. The District
Court concluded that,
"President James' discretionary action in denying this application cannot be legitimately magnified and distorted into a constitutionally cognizable
interference with the personal ideas or beliefs of
any segment of the college students; neither does
his action deter in any material way the individual
advocacy of their personal beliefs; nor can his action
be reasonably construed to be an invasion of, or
have a chilling effect on academic freedom." 319·
F. Supp., at 116.
~

r

In that court's view all that was denied petitioners was
~~dministrative seal of official college respectability."...,;, Ibid. A majority of the Court of Appeals
agreed that petitioners had been denied only the "college's stamp of approval." 445 F . 2d, at. 1131. Respondents take that same position here, arguing that
petitioners st.ill may meet as a group off campus, that
they still may distribute written material off campus,
and that they still may meet together informally on
campus-as individuals but not as CCSC-SDS.
We do not agree with the characterization by thecourts below of the consequences of nonrecognition. Vi!e

at 4. The first District Court opinion, however, states flatly that
"[r]ecognition does not thereby entitle an organization to college·
financial support." 311 F. Supp., at 1277. Since it appears that,
at the least, recognition only entitles a group to apply for funds,
and since the record is silent as to the criteria used in allocating
such funds, we do not consider possible funding as an associational
aspect of nonrecognition in this case.
...._,.........\!'These stat ements are in contrast to ihe fir~t opinion by the
District Court, which reflected a full appreciation of the constitu-tional sign ificance of petitioners' claim. 311 F. Supp., at 1280-12S2 ..
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may concede, as did Mr. Justice Harlan in his unanimous
opinion for the Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 461 ( 1958), that the administration "has taken no direct a.ction .. . to restrict the
rights of petitioners' members to associate freely." But
the Constitution's protection is not limited to direct
interference with fundamental rights. The requirement
in Patterson that the NAACP disclose its membership
lists was found to be an impermissible, though indirect,
infringement of the members' associational rights. Likewise. in this case, the group's possible ability to exist
outside the campus community does not ameliorate significantly the disabilities imposed by the President's
action. ,Ve are not free to disregard the practical realities. MR. J u sTICE STEWART has made the salient point:
"Freedoms such as th ese are protected not only against
heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled
by more subtle governmental interference." Bates v.
City of Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 523 (1960). See
also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234. 263 ( 1957)
(Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring); Watkin s v. not- (;.h0:-llen 3e:.<.f
United States, 354 U. S. 178, 197 (1957 ) .
,Oi-cJc.eJt1,.._' I-CJ<11 • 4
The opinions below also assumed that petitioners had
e
/~ the QQ_rden of she.Ying entitlement to recognition by the
o olleg<''t WJ,ile petitimwcs have ""uocdod 1~,1 tb',iJI
;u·ere p1=operJy requirQ~ tijt file an application in con- ~ I I
ormity with the
rules of the iollegc,-'!hey°'- ~

+he.

"(: e.,, .,.. .;-),().,+- . ,._-~

:/

'""""""\?'

/0 ~
-+-+5 F. 2d , at 11 31: :119 F. Supp .. at 11G .
/ / ~ T h o stand:i rds for official recop:n i1ion req uire :ipplicnnb to
proYide a clear st:itement of purposes, crit eria for membership, rules
of procedure, and :i list of officers. Applicants must limit membership to "matriculated s tudents" and m::t~· not discrimin:ite on the
basis of race. religion or nationalit_,·. The standards fur ther state
that groups may "examine and discuss all questions of interest,"
they may conduct demonstrations and utilize their right of petition ,
but they are prohibited from int erfering with the rights of other

~

•
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el'it.dlon~ the view of the courts below that final rejection could rest on their failure to convince the administration that their organization ,ms unaffiliated with
the National SDS. For reasons to be stated later in
this opinion, ,Ye do not consider the issue of affiliation
to be a controlling one. But apart from any particular issue. once petitioners had filed an application in
conformity with college requirements, the burden was
upon the .£._ollege administration to justify its decision
of rejectio;. See, e. g., Law Studenf Civil R1'ghts Research Council Y. Tradmoncl, 401 U. S. 154. 162-163
(1971); United States Y. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-377
(1968); Speiser Y. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958). It
is to be remembered that the effect of the college's denial
of recognition was a form of prior restra~t, denying to
petitioners' organization the range of associational activities described above. While a college has a legitimate
interest in preventing disruption on the campus, ,Yhich
under circumstances requiring the rnfeguarding of that
interest may justify such restraint, a "heavy burden"
rests on the college to demonstrate the appropriateness
of that action. See Near v. lvlinnesota, 283 U. S. 697,
713-716 (1931); Orgam·.wtion for a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 402 U. S. 415, 418 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51, 57 (1965).

III
These fundamental errors-discounting the existence
of a cognizable First Amendment interest and misplacing the burden of proof-require that the judgments
below be reversed. But ,rn are unable to conclude that
no basis exists upon ,Yhich nonrecognition might be appropriate. Indeed, based on a reasonable reading of

,.,. ,.J.ty;

students. See n. 5, supra. Petitioners ha ,·e not challenged these
standards and their '.lOQGjllQ!; is not here in quest ion.

'4a.l,J 'o/
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the ambiguous facts of this case, there appears to be
at least one potentially acceptable ground for a denial
of recognition. Because of this ambiguous state of the
record we conclude that the case should be remanded,
aniin an effort to provide guidance to the lower courts
upob reconsideratior~ it is appropriate to discuss the
several bases of President James' decision. Four possible justifications for nonrecognition , all closely related,
might be derived from the record and his statements.
Three of those grounds are inadequate to substantiate
his decision: a fourth, ho-wever, has merit.

1/

1/

A
From the outset the controversy in this case has centered in large measure around the relationship, if any,
between petitioners' group and the National SDS. The
Student Affairs Committee meetings, as reflected in its
minutes, focused considerable attention on this issue;
the court-ordered hearing also ,rns directed primarily
to this question. Despite assurances from petitioners
and their counsel that the local group was in fact independent of the National organization, it is evident that
President James was significantly influenced by his apprehension that there was a connection. Aware of the
fact that some SDS chapters had been associated with
disruptive and violent campus activity, he apparently
considered that affiliation itself was sufficient just,i fica~ ~ /
tion for denying recognition.~ ____________,./
Although this precise issue has not come before the
Court heretofore, the Court has consistently disapproved
governmental action imposing criminal sanctions or denying rights and privileges solely because of a citizen's
association with an unpopular organization. See, e. g.,
United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967); K eyishian

/ J TSee n. 4,
~

supra, for the complete text of the Prc,:iclcnt 'E ,t :1tenwnt .

~
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Y. Board of R egents, 385 U. S. 589, 605-610 (1967);
Elfbran dt Y. Russell, 384 U. S. 11 (1966); Scales v.
Unit ed States, 367 U. S. 203 (1961). In these cases
it has been established that "guilt by association alone,
·w ithout [establishing] that an individual's association
poses the threat feared by the Government," is an impermissible basis upon which to deny First Amendment
rights. United States v. Robel, 389 U. S., at 265. The
Government has the burden of establishing a kno"·ing
affiliation with an organization possessing unlawful aims
and goals, and a specific intent to further those illegal

JJ

~

tr-- - -

J+ode>a+..s
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[) ~ ,.,.o<;. .. ca-+ ..e.

JrJe.1e-ly
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omc1a:
_
ause of its affiliation
1 ... gani~
; l'tM
edj,cated tQ JJJaJala1fi ;j 7Mt11Im)
as conceded by the College and the lower courts,.
is loosely organized, having various factions and pro- / "moting a number of diverse social and political views,J /
only some of which call for unlawful action."irf Not only
did petitioners proclaim their complete independence
from this orgamzafaon,liii but they also indicated that
they shared only some of the beliefs its leaders have

~ Tn addit ion t o t he cases cited in t he t ext above. see also Law

Students Civil R ights R esearch Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154,
164-166 (1971) ; In re Stolar, 401 U. S. 23 , 28 (1971); Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U. S. 500 (1964); N oto v. United States,.
367 u. S. 290, 299-300 (1961) .
..,____l!!See FBI, Appropriation 59-60 (1972), in which t he fo rmer Director of t he F ederal Bureau of Investigation , J. Edgar Hoover , states
t hat while violent fa ctions have spun off from SDS, its present
leadership is "critical of bombing and violence. "
P etitioners asserted t heir independence bot h orall:· and in a
written submission before t he Student Affairs Commit tee. They restated their nonaffiliation in a formal stat ement filed prior to the
court -ordered hearing. The onl:· indication t o the cont rary is t heir
unwillingness t o eschew use of t he SDS name alt ogether. But see
n. 3, supra.

/ ,5 .__.....--w
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JI,,

expressed."t- On this record it is clear that the relationship was not an adequate ground for the denial
of recognition.
B
Having concluded that petitioners were affiliated with,
or at least retained an affinity for, National SDS, President James attributed what he believed to be the philosophy of that organization to the local group. He
characterized the petitioning group as adlwr;»~ •- "
"f • L - -

p, .@(11P' ~
"philosophies"

I

He further emphasized that the petitioners'
were "ci0unter to the official policy of the college,"
__ .," ..,,:t1nes' responsibility,
of them would not justify the denial
of First Amendment rights. Whether petitioners did
in fact advocate a philosophy of "destruction" thus becomes immaterial. The JlOllege, acting here as the instrumenta.lity of the State, may not restrict speech or
association simply because it finds the views expressed
by any group to be abhorrent. As Mr. Justice Black
put it most simply and clearly:
"I do not believe tha.t it can be too often repeated
that the freedoms of speech, press, petition and

__ ---~· ~ ,_,,~1

J1

I

e:;:;1011

/ t~~ReprP~rnt:1ti1"C'., of the ·g roup ~btccl during: tlw Stud ent Affair~
Committee meetings that they did not identify with all of the K:1tionnl's statements, but " ·ished simply to "pick . . . C'ertain ideas "
from that organization.
1 ~ See n. 4; supra.
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assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must
be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later
they will be denied to the ideas we cherish." Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board,
367 U. S. 1, 137 (1961).
C

~;

As the litigation progressed in the District Court, a
third rationale for President James' decision-beyond
the questions of affiliation and philosophy-began to
emerge. His second statement, issued after the court0
rdered &dffiiRistFatize hearing, indicates that he based
J rejection on a conclusion that this particular group would
be a "disruptive influence at CCSC." This language
was underscored in the second District Court opinion.
In fact, the Court concluded that the President had
determined that CCSC-SDS's "prospective campus activities were likely to cause a disruptive influence at CCSC."
~19 F. Supp., at 116.
If this reason, directed at the organization's activities
rather than its philosophy, were factually supported by
the record, this Court's prior decisions would provide
a basis for considering the propriety of nonrecognition.
The critical line heretofore drawn for determining the
permissibility of regulation is the line between mere
advocacy and advocacy "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and ... likely to incite
or produce such action." Brandenberg Y. Ohio, 395 U. S.
444, 447 (1969) (unanimous per curiarn opinion). See
also Scales Y. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 230-232
(1961); Noto"· United States, 367 U.S. 289,298 (1961);
Yates Y. United States, 354 U. S. 298 ( 1957). In the
context of the "special characteristics of the school
environment,"~ the power of the government to pro-

/t '---

/K ___,,,--..T!fTinkcr
at 506.

Y.

Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist., 393 U.S.,
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hibit "lawless action" is not limited to acts of a criminal
nature. Also prohibitable are actions which "materially
and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the
school." Tink er v. D es lYI oines Independent Community School District, 393 U. S., at 513. Associational
activities need not be tolerated where they infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes or substantially
interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education.
The "Student Bill of Rights" at CCSC, upon which
great emphasis was placed by the President. dra,Ys precisely this distinction between advocacy and action. It
purports to impose no limitations on the right of college student organizations "to examine and discuss all
questions of interest to them." But it also states that
students have no right ( 1) "to deprive others of the opportunity to speak or be heard ," (2) "to invade the
privacy of others," (3) "to damage the property of
others," ( 4) "t,-0 disrupt the regular and essential operation of the college," or (5) "to interfere with the rights
of others."-$ The lin e between permissible speech and
impermissible conduct tracks the constitutional requirement, and if there were an evidential basis to suppor.t
the conclusion that CCSC-SDS posed a substantial threat
of material disruption in violation of that command the
President's decision should be a f f i r m e d ~ ;;l O

'-----=;:Seen. 5, supra.
~It m:1y not be sufficient merely to show the existence of a lrgitimate and substantial state interest. Where state action designed to
regulate prohibitable action also restricts associational rights-as
nonrecognition does-the State must demonstrate that the action
faken is reasonably related to protection of the State's interest and
that "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than essential to the furtherance of that interest.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,377 (1968). See also NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 337 U. S. 288 (1964); Gibson v. Florida
L egislative Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama

J
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The record, however, offers no substantial basis for
that conclusion. The only support for the vie,,- expressed by the President, other than the repudiated
affiliation w i t h ~ is to be found in the
ambivalent responses offered by the group's representatives at the Student Affairs Co1runittee hearing, during
which they stated that they did not know whether they
might respond to "issues of violence" in the same manner that other SDS chapters had on other campuses.
Nor would they state unequivocally that they could
never "envision . . . interrupting a class." Whateverforce these statements might be thought to have is
largely dissipated by the following exchange between
petitioners' counsel and the Dean of Student Affairs
during the court-ordered hearing:
"Counsel: I just read the document that you're
offering [minutes from Student Affairs Committee
meeting] and I can't see that there's anything in
it that intimates that these students contemplate
any illegal or disruptive practice.
"Dean: No. There's no question raised to that,
counsel."
Dean Judd's remark reaffirms, in accord with the full
record, that there was no substantial evidence that
these particular individuals acting together would constitute a disruptive force on campus. Therefore, insofar
as nonrecognition flowed from such fears, it constituted
little more than the sort of "undifferentiated fear -ei.
apprehension of disturbance [ v,·hich] is not enough to·
overcome the right of freedom of expression." Tinker
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 444 (1958). On this record, absent a
showing of any likelihood of disruption or um1·illingne;;;; to recognize
reasonable rules governing campus conduct, it is not necessary for
us to decide whether denial of recognition is an appropriately related
and narrow response.

/a r
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Des iv!oines Independent Community School D1·strict, 393 U. S., at 508.
D

Y.

These same references in t
record to the group's
equivocation regarding how i night respond to "issues
of violence" and whether · . could ever "envision
interrupting a class," sug est a fourth possible reason
why recognition might ha, been denied to these petitioners. These remarks rnigh well have been read as
announcing petitioners' unw· lingness to be bound by
reasonable school rules go erning conduct. 2 " The college's Statement of Rights Freedoms and Responsibilities of Students, contains,
,Ye have seen, an exp1icit
statement with respect to c mpus disruptioll. The regulation, carefully differen ating between advocacy and
action, is a reasonable one and petitioners have not
questioned it directly. 2 "
T et their statements raise considerable question whether they intend to abide by the
prohibitions contained th Tein/•
"" The Comt of _\ppenls read th0 record :1,: ~hrrn·ing th:1t petitioners "failed cnndidl>· to r ~pond to inquiries whether the>· would
resort to Yiolence and disruJ ion on the CCSC campus, including
interruption of rlasoe~." 44 F. 2d. at 1131. °\Yhile petitioner's
statements may be read :is · 1timnting a rejection of re::isonable college regubtions in adrn.nce. hrre is substantinl ambiguity on this
nrede the appropriateness of those
point. P etitioners appear to
standards and the Student AJfa · s Committee neyer asked specifically
wheth er they were willing to abide b_v these rules. l\Ioreornr, the
issue was not among t hose eferred b>· the Dist rict Court to the
administrative hearing and either part:,· pursued this problem at
that time. Indeed , the failur of the District Court to identify this
as a significant subject of ii uir>· lends support for the ,·iew that
remnnd is necessary.
"" S0e n . .5. supra.
"' -:'\or did the admini~tr:ttje hr:uing rhrif? this que~tion. It wns
then addressed only tnngenti. Hy ; the petitioners who had gi,·en the
ambiguous responses before the Student Affairs Committee failed

f);-; see.

\~a..+--t(LCheJ
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As we have already statectii1 Parts B and C, the
critical line for First -4-mend ent purposes must be
drawn between advocacy, w 1ch is entitled to full protection, and action, which i not. Petitioners may, if
they so choose, preach the
opriety of amending or
even doing away with any
all campus regulations.
They ma.y not, however, un ertake to flaunt these rules.
MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, a the time he was a circuit
judge on the Eighth Circuit stated:
"We ... hold that a col} ge has the inherent power
to promulgate rules al d regulations; that it has
the inherent power pr, perly to discipline; that it
has power appropriate y to protect itself and its
property; that it may e, )ect that its students adhere
to generally accepted tandards of conduct." Esteban v. Central Mu; uri State College, 415 F. 2d
1077, 1089 (CA8 19 ) , cert. denied, 398 U. S. 965,
(1970).

Just as in the communit at large, reasonable regulations with respect to the tiI ie, the place, and the manner
in which student groups conduct their speech-related
activities must be respect .~" A college administration
may impose a requiremen , such as the one apparently
imposed in this case, that group seeking official recognition affirm in advance its willingness to adhere to reasonable campus law.
h a requirement does not
impose an impermissible ondition on the students' associational rights. Their freedom to speak out, to as-

St

to clarify their position; andt
teir counsel, whose tactics were characterized as "disruptive" by t · Court of Appeals, elected to make
argumentative statements rath r than elicit relevant testimony. 445,
F. 2d, at 1126.
"·' See, e.g., City of Chicag1v. Mosley, - U.S.-, (19,2);
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. · . 39, 47-48 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana,.
379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965); ,ouisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP,
366 U.S. 293,397 (1961).

•
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sernble, or to petition for c nges in school rules is in
no sense infringed. It mer y constitutes an agreement
to conform with reasonabl standards respecting conduct. This is a miuimal quirement, in the interest
of the entire academic con rnnity, of any group seeking the privilege of offici recognition. Quite apart
from the question ,,.·h ether 1ese petitioners pose a present threat to campus order, ve conclude that they may
be denied the benefits of p ticipation in the internal
life of the college communi if on remand it becomes
clear that petitioners reserv the right to violate any
rules with which they disa

IV
We think the above discussion establishes the appropriate frame,rnrk for consideration of petition ers' request for campus recognition. Because respondents
failed to accord due recognition to First Amendment
principles, the judgment below approving respondents'
denial of recognition must be reversed. Since we cann ot conclude from this record that petitionerf: 1;1~et tih•
4ihi,:0i;iRe,td I e~.trer1<Jenb--~ " ·illing~ to abide by reasonable campus rules and regulation¾embg~iet"l it, ek "Stet;.
EloRt Ei.U gf Rig,ht.r " ·e order the case remanded for
reconsideration. We note. in so holding, that the wide
latitude accorded by the Constitution to the freedom s
~c In add ition to 1he coll ege a dmini,tr:1ti011 ·., broad rnl r rn a king
power to assure that t he traditional academic atmosphere is safeguarded, it may also impose sanctions on those who Yiolil te the rules.
·we find , for instmice, the Stud ent Affairs Committee's admonition to
petitioners in this case to suggest one permissible practice-recognition, once accorded, ma~· be withdrawn or suspended if petitioners
fa il to respect campus law. See, e. g., Mississippi Civil Liberties
Union Y. University of Southern Mississippi, No. 71-1801 (CA5
1971) ; American Civil L iberties Union Y. Rad/ord College, 315 F.
Supp. 893 (WD Va. 1970).

w~re.

,.
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of expression and association is not without its costs
in terms of the risk to the maintenance of civility and
an ordered society. Indeed , this latitude often has resulted, on the campus and elsewhere, in the infringement of the rights of others. Though we deplore the
tendency of some to abuse the very constitutional priYleges they invoke, and although the infringement of
rights of others certainly should not be tolerated, we
reaffirm this Court's dedication to the principles of the
Bill of Rights upon which our vigorous and free society
is founded.
Reversed and remanded.
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delivered the opuuon of the-

This case, arising out of a denial by a state college
of official recognition to a group of students who desired
to form a local chapter of Students for a Democratic
Society (SDS), presents this Court with questions re-quiring the application of well-established First Amendment principles. While the factual background of this
particular case raises these constitutional issues in a
manner not heretofore passed on by the Court, and only
infrequently presented to lower federal courts, our de-cision today is governed by existing precedent.
As the case involves delicate issues concerning the·
academic community, we approach our task with special
caution, recognizing the mutual interest of students, faculty members, and administrators in an environment free ·
from disruptive interference with the education process.
We also are mindful of the equally significant interest
in the widest latitude for free expression a11d debate
consonant with the maintenance of order. Where theseinterests appear to compete the First Amendment, made
binding on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,
strikes the required balance.
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I
We mention briefly at the outset the setting in 19691970. A climate of unrest prevailed 011 many college
campuses in this country. There had been widespread
civil disobedience on some campuses, accompanied by
the seizure of buildings, vandalism, and arson. Some
colleges had been shut clown altogether, while at others
files were looted and manuscripts destroyed. SDS chapters on some of those campuses had been a catalytic
force during this periocl. 1 Although the causes of campus disruption were many and complex. one of the prime
consequences of such activities was the denial by the
few of the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights
to the majority of students. Indeed, many of the most
cherished characteristics long associated with institutions
of higher learning appeared to be endangered. Fortunately, with the passage of time, a calmer atmosphere
and greater maturity now pervade our campuses. Yet,
it was in this climate of earlier unrest that this case
arose.
Petitioners are students attending Central Connecticut State College (CCSC), a state-supported institution
of higher learning. In September 1969 they undertook
to organize what they then referred to as a "local chapter" of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Pursuant to procedures established by the College, petitioners fil ed a request for official recognition as a campus
organization with th e Student Affairs Committee, a committee composed of four students. three faculty members
and the Dean of Student Affairs. The request specified three purposes for the proposeJ organization 's existence. It would provide "a forum of discussion and
Sec RC'pon of thr Prn::idcnt'~ Comm 'n on C:1m p11~ Unmst (19i0);
Rrport of t he AR .\ Comm 'n on Cmnpu~ Go,··t a nd Student Di~~cnt
1

(1970).
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self-education for students developing an analysis of
American society"; it ,vould serve as an "agency for
integrating thought with action so as to bring about
constructive changes"; and it would endeavor to provide a "coordinating body for relating the problems of
leftist students" with other interested groups on campus and in the community." The Committee, while
satisfied that the statement of purposes was clear and
unobjectionable on its face, exhibited concern over the
relationship betv,·een the proposed local group and the
National SDS organization. In response to inquiries,
representatives of the proposed organization stated that
they would not affiliate ,1·ith any national organization and that their group would remain "completely
independent."
In respon se to other questions asked by Committee
members concerning SDS's reputation for campus disruption , the applicants made the following statements,
,Yhich proved significant during the later stages of these
proceedillg:1:
"Q. How "·ould you respond to issues of violence
as other SDS chapters have?
"A. Our action would have to be dependent upon
each issue.
"Q. Would you use any means possible?
"A. No I can't say that; would not know until
we know what the issues are.
"Q. Could you envision the S. D. S. interrupting a class?
"A. Impossible for me to say."
With this information before it, th e Committee reThe statement of purposes is set out in full in the dissenting
opinion from the cleci~ion of the Second Circuit. H ealy Y. James, 445
F. 2d 1112, 1136-1137 (1971).
2
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quested an additional filing by the applicants, including a formal statement regarding affiliations. The
amended application filed in response stated flatly that
"CCSC Students for a Democratic Society are not w1der
the dictates of any National organization." 3 At a second hearing before the Student Affairs Committee, the
question of relationship with the National organization
was raised again. One of the organizers explained that
the National SDS was divided into several "factional
groups," that the national-local relationship was a loose
one, and that the local organization accepted only "certain ideas" but not all of the National organization's
aims and philosophies.
By a vote of six to two the Committee ultimately
approved the application and recommended to the President of the college, Dr. James, that the organization
be accorded official recognition. In approving the application, the majority indicated that its decision was
premised on the belief that varying viewpoints should
be represented on campus and that since the Young
Americans for Freedom, the Young Democrats, the
Young Republicans, and the Liberal Party all enjoyed
recognized status, a group should be available with ·which
"left wing" students might identify. The majority also
noted and relied on the organization's claim of independence. Finally, it admonished the organization that
immediate suspension would be considered if the group's
activities proved incompatible with the school's policies
against interference with the privacy of other students
3 445 F. 2d, at 1137.
During the Committee's consideration of
petitioner's application, one of the group's representatives was asked
why, if it indeed desired to remain independent, it chose to use a
nationally known name. The witness' response was that "the name
brings to mind the type of organization we wish to bring across,
that is a left-wing organization which will allow students interested
in such to express themselves."
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or destruction of property. The two dissenting members based their reservation primarily on the lack of
clarity regarding the organization's independence.
Several days later, the President rejected the Committee's rEocommendation, and issued a statement indicating that petitioners' organization was not to be accorded the benefits of official campus recognition. His
accompanying remarks, which are set out in full in the
margin,• indicate several reasons for his action. He
The President stated:
"Though I have full appreciation for the action of the Student Affairs Committee and the reasons stated in their minutes for the
majority vote recommending approval of a local chapter of Students
fo r a Democratic Society, it is my judgment t hat the statement of
purpose t o form n ]o('al chapter of Students for a Democratic Society
carries full and unmi,;takablc adherence to at le:1st some of t he
major tenets of the national organization, loose a nd divided though
that organization mny be. The published aims and philo,ophy of
the Students for a Democratic Society, which include disrupt ion
and violence, are contra ry to the approved polic~· (by faculty,
students, and administration) of Central Connecticut State CollegE;
which states:
"'Students do not have the right to inva de the privac~· of others,
to damage the property of ot hers, to disrupt the regular and essential operation of t he college, or to interfere with the rights of
others.'
"The further statement on the request for recognition that 'CCSC
Students for a Democratic Society are not under the dictates of any
National organization' in no way clarifies why if a group intends tofollow the established policy of the college, they wish to become a
local chapter of an organization which openly repudiates such a
policy.
"Freedom of speech, aeademic freedom on the campus, the freedom
of establishing an open forum for the exchange of ideas, the freedoms
outlined in the Statement on Rights, Freedoms, and R esponsibilities
of Students that 'college students and student organizations shall have
the right to examine and discuss all questions of interest to them, to
express opinion publicly and privately, and to support causes by
orderly menns. They mny organize publi c demonstrations and protest gatherings and ut ilize t he right of petition'-these are all precious
4
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found that the organization's philosophy was antithetical
to the school's policies/ and that the group's independence wa.s doubtful. He concluded that approval shou]d
freedoms that we cherish and arc frerdoms on which we stand. To
approve any organization or incli,·idual who joins with an organization which openly repudiates those prinriplcs is rontrary to those
freedoms and to the apprO\·ed 'Statement on the Rights , Freedoms,
:me! Respo nsihilitie~ of Students' ::it Central.'"
5 In 1969 , CCSC adopted. as haYc man_\· other colleges and uniYersities, a Statement of Rights, FrPedoms, and Responsibilities of
Stuclrntf'. This st.aterneJJ1, common I.'· referred to 118 the "Student
Bill of Rights," ir- printed ::is an Appcndi.'\ to the Second Circuit's
majority opinion in this cnse, Healy v. James, 445 F. 2d, at 1132-1136
(1971). Part V of that statement e~tabli8hcs the r-tandarcb for approv[ll of campus organization" [lnd imposes se,·era I b[lsic limitations
on their campns activities:
"A. Care shall be ta ken in 1he est.1 blishment and organization
of campus groups so that the basic rights, freedoms and responsibilities of students will be presen·cd.
"B. Student org[lniz:1tions shnll submit a clear statement of purpose, criteria for member~hip, rule.-; of procedures :ind a li~t of
officers as a condition of insti tutional recognition. The.'' shall not be
required to submit a membership list as a condition of institutional
recognition.
"C. l\fombership in campus organizations shall be limited to
matricnbted students (day or ewning) at the college. Membership
shall not be restricted by r:1cc , religion or nationalit)·. The members
shall have sole po1,·cr to determine organization policy consistent with
the regulations of the colJcge.
"D. Each organization is free to choose its own ad,·iser. Ach·isers
to organizatio11s shall advice but not control the organizations and
their policies.
"E. Colleire student,: and st udent organizations shall ham the right
to examine and discuss all que~tions of interest to them. to express
opinion publicly and privately, and to cupport causes by orderly
means. They may organize public demonst rations and protest
gatherings and utilize the right of petition. Students do not have
the right to deprive others of the opportunity to speak or be heard,
to invade the privacy of others, to damage the property of others,.
1o di3rupt the ref!,'ular and essential operation of the rollegc\ or to,
interfere with the rights of others."
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not be granted to any group which "openly repudiates"
the college's dedication to academic freedom.
Denial of official recognition posed serious problems
for the organization's existence and growth. Its members were deprived of the opportunity to place announcements regarding meetings, rallies or other activities in
the student newspaper; they were precluded from using
various campus bulletin boards; and-most importantly-nonrecognition barred them from using campus
facilities for holdillg meetings. This latt-er disability
was brought home to petitioners shortly after the President's announcement. Petitioners circulated a notice
calling a meeting to discuss "·hat further action should
be taken in light of the group's official rejection. The
members met at the coffee shop in the Student Center
("Devil's Den") but were disbanded on the President's
order since nonrecognized groups "·ere not entitled to
use such facilities."
Their efforts to gain recognition having proved ultimately unsuccessful, and having been made to feel the
burden of nonrecognition , petitioners resorted to the
courts. They filed a suit in the Federal District Court
in Connecticut, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the President of the college, other administrators. and the State Board of Trustees. Petitioners'
6 During the meeting petitioners were approached by two of the
coll ege's dcnns who scn·cd petitioner;; wit h ;:i memorandum from
1he President st:1ting:
"Kotice ha s been received by this office of a meeting of the
'C. C. S. C.-S. D. S. on Thusrda~·-Nowmber 6 at 7:00 p. m. at
the DeYils' Den.'
"Such meeting may not take place in the DeYils Den of the Student Center nor in or on an~r other property of the college since the
C. C. S. D.-S. D. S. is not a duly recognized college organization.
"You are hereby notified by this action to cease and desist from
meeting on the college property."
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primary complaint centered on the denial of First Amendment rights of expression and association arising from
denial of campus recognition. The cause ·was submitted
initially on stipulated facts and, after a short hearing,
the judge ruled that petitioners had been denied procedural due process because the President had based
his decision on conclusions regarding the applicant's
affiliation which "·ere outside the record before him.
The court concluded that if the President wished to act
on the basis of material outside the application he must
at least provide petitioners a hearing and opportunity
to be heard. 311 F. Supp. , at 1276, 1281. While retaining jurisdiction over the case, the District Court
ordered respondents to hold a hearing in order to clarify
the several ambiguities surrounding the President's dec1s10n. One of the matters to be explored was whether
the local organization, true to its repeated affirmations,
was in fact independent of the National SDS. Id., at
1282. And if the hearing demonstrated that the two
·were not separable, the respondents were instructed that
they might then revie,v the "aims and philosophy" of
the National organization. Ibid.
Pursuant to the court's order, the President designated Dean Judd, the Dean of Student Affairs, to serve
as hearing officer and a hearing was scheduled. The
hearing, which spanned two dates and lasted approximately two hours, added little in terms of objective
substantive evidence to the record in this case. Petitioners introduced a statement offering to change the
organization's name from "CCSC local chapter of SDS"
to "Students for a Democratic Society of Central Connecticut State College." They further reaffirmed that
they would "have no connection whatsoever to the
structure of an existing national organization." 7 Peti7
319 F. Supp., at 114. The hearing officer, owr petit ioner~' objection, ruled that the statement was inadmissible apparently on the
ground that it would constitute an amendment to the original appli-
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tioners also introduced the testimony of their faculty
adviser to the effect that some local SDS organizations
elsewhere were una.fliliated with any national organization. The hearing officer, in addition to introducing
the minutes from the two pertinent Student Affairs Committee meetings, also introduced sua sponte portions
of a transcript of hearings before the United States
House of Representatives Internal Security Committee·
investigating the activities of SDS. Excerpts were offered both to prove that violent and disruptive activities
had been attributed to SDS elsewhere and to demonstrate that there existed a national organization that
recognized and cooperated with regiona.1 and local collegecampus affiliates. Petitioners did not challenge the asserted existence of a National SDS, nor did they question that it did have a system of affiliations of somesort. Their contention was simply that their organization would not associate with that network. Through-out the hearing the parties were acting at cross purposes.
What seemed relevant to one appeared completely immaterial t o the other. This failure of the hearing to
advance the litigation was, at bottom, the consequence·
of a more basic failure to join issue on the considerations that should control the President's ultimate decision, a problem to which we will return in the ensuing·
section.
Upon reviewing the hearing transcript and exhibits,
the President reaffirmed his prior decision to deny peti-tioners' recognition as a campus organization. The
reasons stated, closely paralleling his initial reasons, ,vere
that the group would be a "disruptive influence" at
CCSC and that recognition would be "contrary to the
orderly process of change" on the campus.
cation and would be beyond the permissibl e scope of t he hea ring.
Whatever the merits of this ruling, it was still in the record re-Yirw ed by the PresiJent and was relied on in the sub~equcnt Dis.t rict
Court opinion without reference to its prior exclusion . Ibid.
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After the President's second statement issued, the case
then returned to the District Court where it ,vas ordered
dismissed. The court concluded, first, that the formal
requisit-es of procedural due process had been complied
with, second, that petitioners had failed to meet their
burden of showing that they could function free from
the Kational organization, and, third, that the college's
refusal to place its stamp of approval on an organization whose conduct it found "likely to cause violent acts
of disruption" did not viola.te petitioners' associational
rights. 319 F. Supp. 113.
Petitioners appealed to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals where, by a t,rn-to-one vote, the District Court's
judgment was affirmed . The majority purported not
to reach the substantive First Amendment issues on the
theory that petitioners had failed to avail themselves
of the due process accorded them and had failed to rneet
their burden of complying with the prevailing standards for recognition. 445 F. 2d, at 1131- 1132. Judge
Smith dissented, disagreeing with the majority's refusal
to address the merits and finding that petitioners had
been deprived of basic First Amendment rights. Id.,
at 1136. This Court granted certiorari and, for the
reasons which follo,v, we conclude that the judgment
of the courts below must be reversed and the case remanded for reconsideration.

II
At the outset we note that colleges and universities
are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First
Amendment. "It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of expression at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker
v. Des 111oin.es Independent Community School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). Of course, as Mr. Justice Fortas made clear in Tinker, First Amendment rights
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must always be applied "in light of the special characteristics of the ... environment" in the particular case.
Ibid. And, where state-operated educational institutions are involved, this Court has long recognized "the
need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the
states and of school officials, consistent "·ith fundamental
constitutional safeguards. to prescribe and control con duct in the schools." Id., at 507. The precedents of
this Court leave no room for the view that, because of
the acknO\dedged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply ,vith less force on college campuses than in the community at large. Quite to the
contrary, " [ t]he vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community
of American schools." Shelton v. Tucker, 314 U. S.
479. 487 (1960). The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the "market place of
ideas" and we break no new constitutional ground in
reaffirming this Nation's dedication to safeguarding academic freedom. Keyishicm v. Board of Regents, 385
U. S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hanipshire, 354
U. S. 234_, 249-250 (plurality opinion of Mr. Chief Justice ,Yarren) , 262 (1957) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion).
Among the rights protected by the First Amendment is
the right of individuals to associate to further their personal beliefs. While the freedom of association is not explicitly set out in the Amendment, it has long been held
to be implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly and
petition. See, e. g., Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401
U. S. 1, 6 (1971); NAACP v. Hutton, 371 U . S. 415,
430 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. 1VAACP,
366 U. S. 293, 296 (1961); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Pa.tterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958) (Mr. Justice Harlan
for a unanimous Court). There can be no doubt that
denial without justification of official recognition to col-
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lege organizations burdens or abridges that associational right. 8 The primary impediment to free association flowing from nonrecognition is the denial of use of
campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate
purposes. The practical effect of nonrecognition was
demonstrated in this case when, several days after the
President's decision was announced, petitioners ,vere not
allowed to hold a meeting in the campus coffee shop
because they were not an approved group.
Petitioners' associational interests also were circumscribed by the denial of the use of campus bulletin boards
and the school newspaper. If an organization is to remain a viable entity in a campus community in which
nev\' students enter on a regular basis, it must possess
the means of communicating with these students. Moreover, the organization's ability to participate in the intellectual give and take of campus debate, and to pursue
its stated purposes, is limited by denial of access to the
customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and other students. 9 Such
impediments cannot be viewed as insubstantial.
\Ve nerd not decide whet her a college or univer-,it~· might close
its campus to al,l student organizations since it is quite clear that
CCSC contemplated no such action , haYing accorded official status
to numerous other political organizations. Indeed, in the conte:ict
of the goal of full academic freedom which characterizes institutions
of higher education in this country, it is unlikely that we wlll be
called on to decide whether a school might close its doors to all
student associations . See Wright, The Constitution on the Campus,
22 Vand . L. R ev. 1027 (1969) ; D eYelopments in the Law-Academic
Freedom, 81 Harv. L. Re,·. 1045 (1969); Comment, Freedom of
Political Association on the Campus: The Right of Official R ecognition, 46 N. Y. U. L. 1149 (1971) .
!• It i;; unclea r on t his record whet.her recognition abo ca rries with
it a right to seek funds from the school budget. Petitioners' counsel
at oral argument indicated that official recognition entitled the group
to "make application for use of student funds." Tr. of Oral Arg.,
8
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Respondents and the courts below appear to have
taken the view that denial of official recognition in this
case abridged no constitutional rights. The District
Court concluded that,
"President James' discretionary action in denying this application cannot be legitimately magnified and distorted into a constitutionally cognizable
interference with the personal ideas or beliefs of
any segment of the college students; neither does
his action deter in any material way the individual
advocacy of their personal beliefs; nor can his action
be reasonably construed to be an invasion of, or
have a chilling effect on academic freedom." 3Hr
F. Supp., at 116.

In that court's view all that was denied petitioners was
the "administrative seal of official college respectability." 10 Ibid. A majority of the Court of Appeals
agreed that petitioners had been denied only the "college's stamp of approval." 445 F. 2d, at 1131. Respondents take that same position here, arguing that
petitioners still may meet as a group off campus, that
they still may distribute written material off campus,
and that they still may meet together informally on
campus-as individuals but not as CCSC-SDS.
We do not agree with the characterization by the
courts below of the consequences of nonrecognition. We
at 4. The first District Court opinion, however, states flatly that
"[r]ecognition docs not thereby entitle an organization to college·
financial support." 311 F. Supp., at 1277. Since it appears that,
at the least, recognition only entitles a group to apply for funds,
and since the record is silent as to the criteria used in allocating·
such funds, we do not consider possible funding as an associational
aspect of nonrecognition in this case.
10
These statements arc in contrast to the fir~t opillion by tbe
District Court, which reflected a full appreciation of the constitutional significance of petitioners' claim. 311 F. Supp., at 1280-1282 _
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may concede, as did Mr. Justice Harlan in his unanimous
opinion for the Court in NAACP \'. Alaba1na ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 461 ( 1958), that the administration "has taken no direct action ... to restrict the
rights of petitioners' members to associate freely. " But
the Constitution's protection is not limited to direct
interference with fundamental rights. The requirement
in Patterson that the NAACP disclose its membership
lists was found to be an impermissible, though indirect,
infringement of the members' associational rights. Likewise, in this case, the group's possible ability to exist
outside the campus community does not ameliorate significantly the disabilities imposed by the President's
action. vVe are not free t-o disregard the practical realities. MR. J"C"STICE STEWART has made the salient point:
"Freedoms such as these are protected not only against
heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled
by more subtle governmental interference." Bates Y.
City of Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 523 (1960). See
also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234. 263 (1957)
(Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring); Watkins v.
United States, 354 U. S. 178, 197 (1957).
The opinions below also assumed that petitioners had
the burden of showing entitlement to recognition by the
college.1 1 While petitioners ha ,·e conceded that they
\Yere properly required to file an application in conformity with the reasonable rules of the college,'" they
445 F. 2d , at 1131: 319 F . Supp .. at llG.
The l"tand:nds for offiria l rcrognition requirc- :tppliC'ant~ to
pro\·ide a clear st:1temcnt of purposes, criteria for membership , rules
of procedure, and a fr,t of officers. Applicants must limit membership to "mat ricuhtcd students" and may not discriminate on the
basis of race. religion or nationalit~·- The standards further state
that groups may ''examine and discuss nil questions of interest,"
they may conduct demonstrations and utilize their right of petition ,
but they are prohibited from interfering with the rights of other
11

1~
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challenge the view of the courts below that final rejection could rest on their failure to convince the administration that their organization was unaffiliated ·with
the Xational SDS. For reasons to be stated later in
this opinion , ,Ye do not consider the issue of affiliation
to be a controlling on e. But apart from any particular issue. once petitioners had filed an application in
conformity with college requirements, the burden was
upon the college administration to justify its decision
of rej ection. See, e. g., Law Student Civil Rights Research Council Y. Wadmond , 401 U. S. 154. 162-163
( 1971); United States Y. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376- 377
(1968); Speiser Y. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958). It
is to be remembered that the effect of the college's denial
of recognition ·was a form of prior restraint, denying to
petitioners' organization the range of associational activities described above. While a college has a legitimate
interest in preventing disruption on the campus, whirh
under circumstances requiring the safeguarding of that
interest may justify such restraint, a "heavy burden "
rests on the college to demonstrate the appropriateness
of that action. See Near v. 1\!linnesota, 283 U. S. 697,
713-716 ( 1931 ); Organi:zation for a B etter Austin v.
K eefe, 402 U. S. 415, 418 ( 1971 ) ; Freedman Y. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51, 57 ( 1965).

III
These fundamental errors--discounting the existence
of a cognizable First Amendment interest and misplacing the burden of proof-require tha.t the judgments
below be reversed. But we are unable to conclude that
no basis exists upon ,Yhich nonrecognition might be appropriate. Indeed, based on a reasonable reading of
students. See n. 5, supra. P etitioners h:l\"e not challenged these
standards and their adequac~· is not here in question .
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the ambiguous facts of this case, there appears to be
at least one potentially acceptable ground for a denial
of recognition. Because of this ambiguous state of the
record we conclude that the case should be remanded,
and in an effort to provide guidance to the lower courts
upon reconsideration it is appropriate to discuss the
several bases of President James' decision. Four possible justifications for nonrecognition , all closely related,
might be derived from the record and his statements.
Three of those grounds are inadequate to substantiate
his decision : a fourth , however, has merit.
A

From the outset the controversy in this case has centered in large measure around the relationship, if any,
between petitioners' group and the National SDS. The
Student Affairs Committee meetings, as reflected in its
minutes, focused considerable attention on this issue;
the court-ordered hearing also was directed primarily
to this question. Despite assurances from petitioners
and their counsel that the local group was in fact independent of the National organization, it is evident that
President James vrns significantly influenced by his apprehension that there ,,vas a connection. Aware of the
fact that some SDS chapters had been associated with
disruptive and violent campus activity, he apparently
considered that affiliation itself was sufficient justification for denying recognition. 1 3
Although this precise issue has not come before the
Court heretofore, the Court has consistently disapproved
governmental action imposing criminal sanctions or denying rights and privileges solely because of a citizen's
association with an unpopular organization. See, e. g.,
United States ,·. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 ( 1967); K eyishian
"' Seo n. 4, supra, for the complete text of the Pre~ident'~ stn tement.
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Y. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 605-610 (1967);
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11 (1966); Scales v.
United States, 367 U. S. 203 (1961). In these cases
it has been established that "guilt by association alone,
without [ establishing] that an individual's association
poses the threat feared by the Government," is an impermissible basis upon which to deny First Amendment
rights. United St.ates v. Robel, 389 U. S., at 265. The
Government has the burden of establishing a knowing
affiliation with an organization possessing unlawful aims
and goals, and a specific intent to further those illegal
aims. 14
We need not decide in this case whether a group might
be denied official recognition on a state college campus
solely because of its affiliation as a local chapter of a
national organization dedicated to unlawful conduct.
SDS, as conceded by the College and the lower courts,.
is loosely organized, having various factions and promoting a number of diverse social and political views,
only some of which call for unlawful action. 1 5 Not only
did petitioners proclaim their complete independencefrom this organization ,rn but they also indicated that
they shared only some of the beliefs. its leaders have

Tn addition to the cases cited in the text aboH. see also Law
Students Civil Rights R esearch Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154,
164-166 (1971); In re Stolar, 401 U. S. 23, 28 (1971); Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Noto v. United States, .
367 U. S. 290, 299-300 (1961).
15 See FBI, Appropriation 59-60 (1972) , in which the former Diroctor of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover, states
that while violent factions have spun off from SDS, its present
leadership is "critical of bombing and violence."
in P etitioners asserted their independence both orally 11 nd in a
written submission before the Student Affairs Committee. They restated their nonaffiliation in a formal statement filed prior to the
court-ordered hearing. The on!:, indication to the contrary is their
unwillingness to eschew use of the SDS name altoget her . But see·
n. 3, supra.
14
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expressed." On this record it is clear that the relationship was not an adequate ground for the denial
of recognition.

B
Having concluded that petitioners were affiliated with,
or at least retained an affinity for, National SDS, President James attributed "·hat he believed to be the philosophy of that organization to the local group. He
characterized the petitioning group as adhering to "some
of the major tenets of the national organization," including a philosophy of violence and disruption. 18 Understandably, he found that philosophy abhorrent. In an
article signed by President James in an alumni periodical, and made a part of the record belo,v, he announced
his mnvillingness to "sanction an organization that openly
advocates the destruction of the very ideals and freedoms
upon which the academic life is founded."
The mere disagreement of the President with the
group's philosophy affords no reason to deny it recognition. As repugnant as these views may have been,
especially to one with President James' responsibility,
the mere expression of them would not justify the denial
of First Amendment rights. Whether petitioners did
in fact advocate a philosophy of "destruction" thus becomes immaterial. The college, acting here as the instrumenta.lity of the State, may not restrict speech or
association simply because it finds the views expressed
by any group to be abhorrent. As Mr. Justice Black
put it most simply and clearly:
"I do not believe that it can be too often repeated
that the freedoms of speech, press, petition and
"Repre~entntiH·~ of the group ~t:11ed during the Stndf'nt Affoir~
Committee meetings that they did not identify with all of the National's statements, but wished simply to "pick ... certain ideas"
from that organization.
H See r1. 4, supra.
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assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must
be accorded to the ideas ",:e hate or sooner or later
they will be denied to the ideas ,ve cherish." Communist Party v. Subversive Act'ivities Control Board,
367 U. S. 1, 137 (1961).
C

As the litigation progressed in the District Court, a
third rationale for President James' decision-beyond
the questions of affiliation and philosophy-began to
emerge. His second statement, issued after the courtordered administrative hearing, indicates that he based
rejection on a conclusion that this particular group ·would
be a. "disruptive influence at CCSC." This language
was underscored in the second District Court opinion.
In fact, the Court concluded that the President had
determined that CCSC-SDS's "prospective campus activities were likely to cause a disruptive influence a.t CCSC."
319 F. Supp., at 116.
If this reason, directed at the organization's activities
rather than its philosophy, "·ere factually supported by
the record, this Court's prior decisions ,rnuld provide
a basis for considering the propriety of nonrecognition.
The critical line heretofore drawn for determining the
permissibility of regulation is the line between mere
advocacy and advocacy "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and ... likely to incite
or produce such action." Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U. S.
444, 447 (1969) (unanimous per curiam opinion). See
also Scales Y. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 230-232'
(1961); Noto Y. United States, 367 U.S. 289,298 (1961);
Yates Y. United States, 354 U. S. 208 (1957) . In the
context of the "special characteristics of the school
environment," 1 ~ the po,rnr of the government to pro1
~ Tink er
at 506.

Y.

D es Moin es Ind. Crmm,unitu School Dist., 393 U.S. ,
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hibit "lawless action" is not limited to acts of a criminal
nature. Also prohibitable are actions which "materially
and substantially disrupt the work and disciplin e of the
school." Tink er v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U. S., at 513. Associational
activities need not be tolerated where they infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes or substantially
interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education.
The "Student Bill of Rights" at CCSC, upon which
great emphasis ,ms placed by the President, dra,Ys precisely this distinction between advocacy and action. It
purports to impose no limitations on the right of college student organizations "to examine and discuss all
questions of interest to them." But it also states that
students have no right (1) "to deprive others of the opportunity to speak or be heard," (2) "to invade the
privacy of others," (3) "to damage the property of
others," ( 4) "to disrupt the regular and essential operation of the college," or (5) "to interfere with the rights
of others." w The line bet,veen permissible speech and
impermissible conduct tracks the constitutional requirement, and if there vvere an evidential basis to support
the conclusion that CCSC-SDS posed a substantial threat
of material disruption in violation of that command the
President's decision should be affirmed. 21
Seen. 5; supra.
It may not be sufficient merely to show the existrnce of a lrgitimate and substantial state interest. Where state action designed toregulate prohibitable action also restri cts associational rights-as
nonrecognition does-the State must demonstrate that the action
taken is reasonably related to protection of the State's interest and
t hat "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than essential to the furtherance of that interest.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). See also XAACJ>
v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 337 U. S. 288 (1964); Gibson v. Florida
L egislative Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama
co

21
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The record, however, offers no substantial basis for
that conclusion. The only support for the view expressed by the President, other than the repudiated
affiliation with SDS National, is to be found in the
ambivalent responses offered by the group's representatives at the Student Affairs Committee hearing, during·
which they stated that they did not know " ·hether they
might respond to "issues of violence" in the same manner that other SDS chapters had on other campuses ..
Nor would they state unequivocally that they could
never "envision . . . interrupting a class." Whateverforce these statements might be thought to have is
largely dissipated by the following exchange between
petitioners' counsel and the Dean of Student Affairs
during the court-ordered hearing:
"Counsel: I just read the document that you're
offering [minutes from Student Affairs Committee
meeting] and I can't see that there's anything in
it that intimates that these students contemplate
any illegal or disruptive practice.
"Dean : No. There's no question raised to that.
counsel."
Dean Judd's remark reaffirms, in accord ·with the full
record, that there was no substantial evidence that
these particular individuals acting together would constitute a disruptive force on campus. Therefore, insofar
as nonrecognition flowed from such fears, it constituted
little more than the sort of "undifferentiated fear of
apprehension of disturbance [ which] is not enough toovercome the right of freedom of expression." Tinker
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 444 (1958). On this record, absent a
showing of any likelihood of cli~ruption or mmilli11gnc::;s t o recognize
reasonable rules goYerning campus conduct, it is not necessary for
us to decide whether denial of recognition is an appropriately related
and narro\v response.

~-
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v. D es Jl,f oines Independent Comniunity School District, 393 U. S., at 508.

D
These same references in the record to the group's
equivocation regarding how it might respond to "issues
of violence" and whether it could ever "envision . . .
interrupting a class," suggest a fourth possible reason
why recognition might have been denied to these petitioners. These remarks might well have been read as
announcing petitioners' umYillingness to be bound by
reasonable school rules governing conduct."" The college's Statement of Rights, Freedoms and Responsibilities of Students, contains, as we have seen, an explicit
statement with respect to campus disruption. Th e regulation , carefully differentiating behveen advocacy a.nd
action, is a rea.sonable one and petitioners have not
questioned it directly. 2 " Yet th eir statements rajse considerable question whether they intend to abide by the
prohibitions contained therein. 24
cc ThP Court of Appmls mi d thr rC'l'ord n,: :::ho11·inl,! thnt pPtitioner~ "fo iled candid]~· to rrspond to inquiries whether t he~· would
resort to violence and disruption on the CCSC campus, including
interruption of cl::isses." 445 F. 2d, at 1131. While petitioner's
statements may be read ::is int imn ting a rejection of reasonable college regulations in nch·ance. t here is substantial ambiguity on this
point . Petitioners appea r to concede the appropriateness of those
standards and the Student AJfo irs Committee n eYer asked specifi cally
whether they were willing to abide b.v these rul e:=:. l\1ore0\·er, the
issue was not among those referred by the Dist rict Court to the
administrative hcn ring and neither part~· pursued this problem at
that time. Indeed. the failure of the Dist rict Court to identify this
as a signifi cant subj ect of inquir~· lends support for the Yiew that
remand is neeessar.\·.
20
Sec n. ii. sup ra.
4
"
:'\or did the adniini.-tr:1tiw hrnring chrif~· t his quc~tion. It ,rns
t hen addressed on!~· tangentiall)·; t he peti tion ers \\·ho had giwn the
nmbiguous responses b efore t he St udent Affairs Committee failed
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As we have already stated in Parts B and C, the
critical line for First Amendment purposes must be
drawn between advocacy, which is entitled to full protection, and action, which is not. Petitioners may, if
they so choose, preach the propriety of amending or
even doing away with any or all campus regulations.
They may not, however, undertake to flaunt these rules.
MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, at the time he was a circuit
judge on the Eighth Circuit, stated:
"We ... hold that a college has the inherent power
to promulgate rules and regulations; that it has
the inherent power properly to discipline; that it
has power appropriately to protect itself and its
property; that it may expect that its students adhere
to generally accepted standards of conduct." Esteban v. Central M-issouri State College, 415 F. 2d
1077, 1089 (CA8 1969), cert. denied, 398 U. S. 965
(1970).
Just as in the community at large, reasonable regulations with respect to the time, the place, and the manner
in which student groups conduct their speech-related
activities must be respected. 2 " A college administration
may impose a requirement, such as the one apparently
imposed in this case, that a group seeking official recognition affirm in advance its willingness to adhere to reasonable campus law. Such a requirement does not
impose an impermissible condition on the students' associational rights. Their freedom to speak out, to asto clarify their position; and their counsel, whose tactics were characterized as "disruptive" by the Court of Appeals, elected to make
argumentative statements rather than elicit relevant testimony. 445
F. 2d, at 1126.
(HJ72) ;
"' See, e.g., City of Chicag0 v. Mosley, - U.S.-, Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 47--48 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP,
366 U. S. 293, 397 (1961).
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semble, or to petition for changes in school rules is in
no sense infringed . It merely constitutes an agreem ent
to conform with reasonable standards respecting conduct. This is a millimal requirement, in the interest
of the entire academic community, of any group seeking the privilege of official recognition. Quite apart
from the question whether these petitioners pose a present threat to campus order, we conclude that they may
be denied the benefits of participation in the internal
life of the college community if on remand it becomes
clear that petitioners reserve the right to violate any
rules with which they disagree.2 c

IV
"\Ve think the above discussion establishes the appropriate fram ework for consideration of petitioners' request for campus recognition. Because respondents
failed t-0 accord due recognition to First Amendment
principles, the judgment below approving respondents'
denial of recognition must be reversed. Since "·e cannot conclude from this record that petitioners met the
threshold requirement of willingness to abide by reasonable campus rules and regulations embodied in the "Student Bill of Rights," we order the case ren1anded for
reconsideration. ·w e note, in so holding, that the wide
latitude accorded by the Constitution to the freedoms
20 Tn addit ion to the college :i drni11i8trnho n'~ broad rul cmak ing
power to assure that the traditional academic ntmosphere is safeguarded, it may :.d so impose sa nctions on those who Yiolnte the rul es.
We find , for instance, the Student Affairs Committee's admonition to
petitioners in this cnse to suggest one permissible practice-recognition , once accorded, may be withdrawn or suspended if petitioners
fail to respect campus law. See, e. g., Mississippi Civil Liberties
Union v. University of Southern M ississippi, No. 71-1801 (CA.5
1971); American Civil Liberties Union "· Radford College, 315 F.
Supp. 893 (WD Va . 1970) .
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of expression and associaticm is not without its costs
in terms of the risk to the maintenance of civility and
an ordered society. Indeed, this latitude often has resulted, on the campus and elsewhere, in the infringement of the rights of others. Though we deplore the
tendency of some to abuse the very constitutional privileges they invoke, and although the infringement of
rights of others certainly should not be tolerated, we
reaffirm this Court's dedication to the principles of the
Bill of Rights upon which our vigorous and free society
is founded.
Reversed and remanded.

D

These same references in the record to the group's
equivocation regarding how it might respond to "issues of
violence" and whether it could ever "envision . . . interrupting
a class, " suggest a fourth possible reason why recognition might
have been denied to these petitioners.

These remarks might

well have been read as announcing petitioners' unwillingness
to be bound by reasonable school rules governing conduct.
The <.College's Statement of Rights, Freedoms and Responsibilities

/
of Students, contains, as we have seen, an explicit statehlent

~

with respect to campus disruption.

The regulation, carefully

differentiating between advocacy and action, is a resonable
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one and petitioners have not questioned it directly.

Yet their

statements raise considerable question whether they intend
to abide by the prohibitions contained therein.
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As we have already stated in Parts Band C, the critical
line for First Amendment purposes must be drawn between
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advocacy, which is entitled to full protection, and action, which
is not.

Petitioners may, if they so choose, preach the propriety

of amending or even doing away with any or all campus regulations.
They may not, however, undertake to flout these rules.

MR.

a

JUSTICE BLACKMON, at the time he was/circuit judge on the
Eighth Circuit, stated:
"We ... hold that a college has the inherent power
to promulgate rules and regulations; that it has
the inherent power properly to discipline; that it
has power appropriately to protect itself and its
property; that it may expect that its students adhere
to generally accepted standards of conduct."
Esteban v. Central Missouri state College, 415
F. 2d .1077, 1089 (CAB 1969), cert denied,
398 u. s. 965 (1970).
Just as in the community at large, reasonable regulations with
respect to the time, the place, and the manner in which student
groups conduct their speech-related activities must be
~
respected. ~

A college administration may impose a requirement,

such as the one apparently imposed in this case, that a
group seeking official recognition affirm in advance its willingness
to adhere to reasonable campus law.

Such a requirement does

not impose an impermissible condition on the students'
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associational rights.

Their freedom to speak out, to assemble,

or to petition for changes in school rules is in no sense infringed.
It merely constitutes an agreement to conform with reasonable

standards respecting conduct.

This is a minimal requirement

in the interest of the entire academic community, of any group
seeking the privilege of official recognition.

~

Petitioners have not challenged in this litigation the
procedural or substantive aspects of the College's requirements
governing applications for official recognition.

Although the

record is unclear on this point, CCSC may have, among its
requirements for recognition, a rule that prospective groups
affirm that they intend to comply with reasonable campus
regulations.

Upon remand it should first be determined whether

the College recognition procedures contemplate any such
requirement.

If so, it should then be ascertained whether

petitioners intend to comply.

Since we do not have the terms

of a specific prior affirmation rule before us, we are not called

,,
on to decide whether any particular formulation would or vo..... uld

.
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not prove constitutionally acceptable.

Assuming the existence

of a valid rule, however, we do conclude that the benefits of
participation in the internal life of the college community may
be denied to any group that reserves the right to violate any
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campus rules with which they disagree. ~

~)
~

See n. 5, supra.
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'2l, The Court of Appeals found that petitioners "failed

candidly to respond to inquiries whether they would resort to
violence and disruption on the CCSC campus, including interruption
of classes." 445 F. 2d at 1131.

While petitioners' statements

may be read as intimating a rejection of reasonable regulations
in advance, there is in fact substantial ambiguity on this point.
The questions asked by members of the Student Affairs Committee
do not appear to have been propounded with any clear distinction
in mind between that which the petitioners might advocate and
the conduct in which they might engage.

Nor did the Student

Affairs Committee attempt to obtain a clarification of the
petitioners' ambiguous answers by asking specifically whether
the group was willing to abide by the Student Bill of Rights
governing all campus organizations.
Moreover, this question was not among those referred
by the District Court to the administrative hearing, and it was
there addressed only tangentially.

The group members who

ii.

had made statements before the Student Affairs Committee
did not testify and their position was not clarified.

Their

counsel, whose tactics were characterized as "disruptive"
by the Court :of Appeals, elected to make argumentative statements rather than elicit relevant testimony.

Id., at 1126.

Indeed, the District Court's failure to identify the question
of willingness to abide by the College's rules and regulations
as a significant subject of inquiry, coupled with the equivocation
on the part of the group's representatives, lend support to our
view that a remand is necessary.

~J
-2?J

See, ~- ~-, City of Chicago v. Mosley,

U.

s:

( 1972); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (19 66);

---'

Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965); Louisiana ex rel.
Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 397 (1961).
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In addition to the College administration's broad

rulemaking power to assure that the traditional academic
atmosphere is safeguarded, it may also impose sanctions on

~

.

~

'

iii.

those who violate the rules.

We find, for instance, that the

Student Affairs Committee's admonition to petitioners in this
case suggests one permissible practice--recognition, once
accorded~may be withdrawn or suspended if petitioners fail
to respect campus law.

See, ~- ~- Mississippi Civil Liberties

Union v. University of Southern Mississippi, No. 71-1801
(CA5 1971); American Civil Liberties Union v. Radford College,
315 F. Supp. 893 (WD Va. 1970).
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This case, arising out of a denial by a state college
o official recognition to a group of students who desire~
to form a- poli-tiea,l asseci:ttiie-n, presents this Court with
questions requiring the application of well-established
First Amendment principles. While the factual background of this particular case raises these constitutional
issues in a manner not heretofore passed on by the
Court, and only infrequently presented to lower fedtoday is
governed by
era courts, our ,·
existing precedent. ~
e-i~t1ie:t1s
correerning--f,lre--ma-mte:nooee--of..-.QFtHW-i~
aca ernic
community, we approach our task with special caution,
recogmzing the mutua mterest o stu ents and administrators in an environment free f r o r ~ ·
ference with the educational process. f We also are ~
· -eogci1~ant. of the equally significant interest ef studei,~ yan
dmin:istratorn alike in the widest latitude for free
expression and debate consonant with the maintenance
of order. Where these interests appear to compete the
First Amendment, made ~ inding on the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment, strikes the required balance. f_,~
a
review t e ~tuahnatrix--m:rt o_f _w
.whicli7
~~s as
\., .:,--a,uu fl'f,.LJ,j.J>n]me
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We mention briefly at the outset the setting in 1969-70.
A climate of unrest prevailed on many college campuses in this
country.

There had been widespread civil disobedience on some

campuses, accompanied by the seizure of buildings, vandalism
and arson.

Some colleges had been shut down altogether, while

at others files were looted and manuscripts destroyed.

SDS

chapters on some of those campuses had b e e n ~

1
~

a catalytic force during this period.

Although

the causes of campus disruption were many and complex, one of
the prime consequences of such activities was the denial by the
few of the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights to the majority
of students.

Indeed, many of the most cherished characteristics

long associated with institutions of higher learning appeared to be
endangered.

Fortunately, with the passage of time, a calmer

atmosphere and greater maturity now pervade our campuses.
Yet, it was in this climate of earlier unrest that this case arose.
t

l/See Report of the President's Comm'n on Campus Unrest (1970);
Report of the ABA Comm'n on Campus Gov't and Student DiBsent
(1970).

\
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I
Petitioners are students attending Central Connecticut State College (CCSC), a state-supported institution
of higher learning~ In September 1969, they undertook
to organize what they then referred to as a "local chapter" of Student for a Democratic Society (SDS). Pursuant to proc~dures established by the ~ollege, petitioners filed a request for official recognition as a campus
organization with the Student Affairs Committee, a committee composed of four students, three faculty members
and the Dean of Student Affairs. The request specified three purposes for the proposed organization's existence. It ,rnuld provide "a forum of discussion and_..,
self-educa.tion for students developing an analysis of
American society" ; it " ·ould serve as an "agency for
integrating thought with action so as to bring about
constructive changes"; and it ,yould endeavor to provide a "coordinating body for relating the problems of
leftist students" ,,..ith other interested groups on campus and in the comrnunity. 2 The Committee, while
satisfied that the statement of purposes ,ms clear a11d
unobjectionable on its face , exhibited concern over the
relationship between the proposed local group and the
National SDS organization. In response to inquiries,
representatives of the proposed organization stated that
~}~~1

·( L
\YO

oral argument in tills Csprt some
of the plnintiff,: were ,; till

of purposes is ~et out in full in the dis;,enting
opinion from the deeision of the Second Circuit. Healy v. Jam es, 445
F. 2d 1112, 1136-1137 (1971).
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they ,rnuld not affiliate with any national organization and that their group vvould remain "completely
independent."
In response to other questions asked by Committee
members concerning SDS's reputation for campus disruption, the applicants made the following statements,
which proved significant during the later stages of these
proceedi11gs :
"Q. How would you respond to issues of violence
as other SDS chapters have?
"A. Our action would have to be dependent upon
each issue.
"Q. Would you use any means possible?
"A. No I can't say that; would not know until
we know what the issues are.
"Q. Could you env1s10n the S. D. S. interrupting a class?
"A. Impossible for me to say."

;/
=/
~1

With this information before it, the Committee re:.,/
quested an additional filing by the applicants, including a formal statement regarding affiliations. The
amended application filed in response stated flatly that
"CCSC Students for°J)emocratic Society are not under
the dictates of any National organization." " At a second hearing before the Student Affairs Committee, the
question of relationship with the #national organization
was raised again. One of the organizers explained that.
the ~ational SDS was divided into several "factional
:i 445 F. 2d, at 1137.
During the Committee's consideration of
petitioner's application, one of the group's representatives was asked
why, if it indeed desired to remain independent , it chose to use a
nationally known name. The witness' response was that "the name
brings to mind the type of organization we wish to bring across,
that is a left-wing organization which will allow students interested
in such to express themselves."

-~~ '
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groups," that the national-local relationship ,vas a. loose
one, and that the local organization accepted only "certain ideas" but not all of the u.ational organization's
aims and philosophies.
By a vote of six to two the Committee ultimately
approved the application and recommended to the President of the college, Dr. James, that the organization
be accorded official recognition. In approving the application, the majority indicated that its decision was
premised on the belief that varying viewpoints should
be represented on campus and that since the Young
Americans for Freedom, the Young Democrats, the
Young Republicans, and the Liberal Party all enjoyed
recognized status, a group should be available with which
"left wing" students might identify. The majority also
noted and relied on the organization's claim of independence. Finally, it admonished the organization that
immediate suspension would be considered if the group's
activities proved incompatible with the school's policies
against interference with the privacy of other student~
or destruction of property. The two dissenting members based their reservation primarily on the lack of
clarity regarding the organization's independence.
Several days later, the President rejected the Committee's rtcommendation, and issued a statement indicating that petitioners' organization was not to be accorded the benefits of official campus recognition. His
accompanying remarks, which are set out in full in the
margin,• indicate several reasons for his action . He

~
The President stn t ed:
"Though I have full appreciation for the action of the Student Affairs Committee and the reasons stated in their minutes for the
!!¥!jority vote recommending approval of a local chapter of Students
for a Democratic Societ}~ carries full and unmistakable adherence to
nt. least some of the maJor tenets of the national organization, loose
and divided though that organization may be. The published aims
and philosophy of the Students for a Democratic Society, which in4
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found that the organization's philosophy was antithetical
to the school's policies,5 and that the group's independence was doubtful. He concluded that approval should
lude disruption and violence, are contrary to the approved policy
(by faculty, students, and administration) of Central Connecticut
State College which states:
"'Students do not have the right to invade the privacy of othrrs,
to damage the property of others, to disrupt the regular and es-•
sential operation of the college, or to interfere with the rights of
others.'
"The further statement on the request for recognition t hat 'CCSC
Students for a Democratic Society are not under the dictates of any
National organization' in no way clarifies why if a group intends to,
follow the established policy of the college, they wish to become a
local chapter of an organization which openly repudiates such a
policy.
"Freedom of speech, academic freedom on the campus, the freedom
of establishing an open forum for the exchange of ideas, the freedoms
outlined in the Statement on Rights, Freedoms, and Responsibilities
of Students that 'college students and student organizations shall have
the right to examine and discuss all questions of interest to them, to
express opinion publicly and privately, and to support causes by
orderly means. They may organize public demonstrations and protest gatherings and utilize the right of petition'-these are all preciouy
freedoms that we cherish and are freedoms on which we stand. To
approve any organization or individual who joins with an organization which openly repudiates those principles is contrary to those·
freedoms and to the approved 'Statement on the Rights, Freedoms,.
and Responsibilities of Students' at Central.' "
5
In 1969, CCSC adopted, as have many other colleges and universities, a Statement of Rights, Freedoms, and Responsibilities of
Students. This statement, commonly referred to as the '·Student
Bill of Rights," is printed as an Appendix to the Second Circuit's
majority opinion in thi~ case, Healy v. James, 445 F. 2d, at 1132-1136
(1971). Part V of that statement establishes the standards for approval of campus organizations and imposes several basic limitations
on their campus activities:
"A. Care shall be taken in the establishment and organization
of campus groups so that the basic rights, freedoms and responsibilities of students will be preserved.
"B. Student organizations shaJl submit a clear statement of purpose, criteria for membership, rules of procedures and a list of

U
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not be granted to any group which "openly repudiates"
the college 's dedication to academic freedom.
Denial of official recognition posed serious problems
for the organization's existence and growth. Its members were deprived of the opportunity to place announcements regarding meetings, rallies or other activities in
the student newspaper; they ,rnre precluded from using
various campus bulletin boards; and-most importantly-nonrecognition barred them from using campus
facilities for holding meetings. This latter disability
was brought home to petitioners shortly after the President's announcement. Petitioners circulated a notice
calling a meeting to discuss what further action should
be taken in light of the group's official rejection. The
members met at the coffee shop in the Student Center
("Devil's Den") but were disbanded on the President's
officers as n condition of institutionnl recognition . They shall not be
required to submit n membership list as a condition of institutional
recognition.
"C. Membership in campus organizntions shalJ be limited to
matriculated students ( day or evening) at the colJege. Membership
8hall not be restricted by race, religion or nationality. The members
shall have sole power to determine organiz::ition policy consistent with
the regulations of the college.
D. Each orgnnization is free to choose its own adviser. Ad,·isers
to organizations slrnll advise but not control the organizations nnd
their policies.
"E. College students and student orgnnizations shall hnve the right
to examine and discuss nlJ questions of int erest to them, to express
opinion publicly and privately, and to support causes by orderly
means. The~· may organize public demonstrations and protest.
gatherings and utilize t he right of petition. Students do not haYe
the right to deprin others of the oppo1iunity to spea k or be hea rd,
to invade the prirncy of others, to damage the property of others,
to disrupt the regular and e~senti:tl operation of t lie collc!l;C'; or to
interfere with the rights of others."

71-452-OPINION
HEALY v. JAMES

7

order since nonrecognized groups were not entitled to
use such facilities.G
Their efforts to gain recog111t1011 having proved ultimately unsuccessful, and having been made to feel the
burden of nonrecognition, petitioners resorted to the
courts. They filed a suit in the Federal District Court
in Connecticut, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the President of the college, other administrators, and the State Board of Trustees. Petitioners/
primary complaint centered on the denial of First Amendment rights of expression and association arising from
denial of campus recognition. The cause was submitted
initially on stipulated facts and, after a short hearing,
the judge ruled that petitioners had been denied procedural due process because the President had based
his decision on conclusions regarding the applicant's
affiliation which were outside the record before him.
The court concluded that if the President wished to act
on the basis of material outside the application he must
at least provide petitioners a hearing and opportunity
to be heard. 311 F. Supp., at 1276, 1281. While retaining jurisdiction over the case, the District Court
ordered respondents to hold a hearing in order to clarify
the several ambiguities surrounding the President's de6

1/

During the meeting petitioners were approached by two of the
rollege's demf who served petitioners with a memorandum from
the Pre~ident stating:
"Notice has been received by this office of a meeting of the
'C. C. S. C.-S. D. S. on Thusrday-November 6 at 7:00 p. m. at,
the Devils' Den.'
"Such meeting may not take place in the Devils Den of the Student Center nor in or on any other property of the college since the
C. C. S. D.-S. D. S. is not a duly recognized college organization.
"You are hereby notified by this action to cease and desist from
meeting on the college property."
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c1s10n. One of the matters to be explored was whether
the local organization, true to its repeated affirmations,
was in fact independent of the National SDS. I d., at
1282. And if the hearing demonstrated that the two
were not separable, the respondents were instructed that
they might then review the "aims and philosophy" of
the Nationa1 organization. I bid.
Pursuant to the court's order, the President designated Dean Judd, the Dean of Student Affairs, to serve
as hearing officer and a hearing was scheduled. The
hearing, which spanned two dates and lasted approximately two hours, added little in terms of objective
substantive evidence to the record in this case. Peti-/
tioners introduced a statement offering to change the
organization's name from "CCSC local chapter of SDS"
to "Students for a Democratic Society of Central Con necticut State College." They further reaffirmed t at
th0 1688¼; would "have no connection whatsoever to the
structure of an existing national organization.' 7
et~
tioners also introduced the testimony of their aculty
adviser to the effect tha.t some local SDS organizations
elsewhere were unaffiliated with any national organization. The ,hearing officer, in addition to introducing
the minutes from the two pertinent Student Affairs Committee meetings, also introduced sua sponte portions
of a transcript of hearings before the United States
House of Representatives Internal Security Committee
investigating the activities of SDS. Excerpts were offered both to prove that violent and disruptive activities
319 F. Supp., at 114. The hea ring officer, over petitioners' objection, ruled that the statement was inadmissible apparently on the/
ground that it would constitute an amendment to the original application and would be beyond the permissible scope of the hearing .
Whatever the merits of this ruling, it w~s still in the record reviewed by the President and was relied on. the subsequent District
Court opinion without reference to its prior exclusion. Ibid.
7

II

\t'
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had been attributed to SDS elsewhere and to demonstrate that there existed a national organization that
recognized and coopera.ted with regional and local college
campus affiliates. Petitioners did not challenge the asserted existence of a National SDS, nor did they question that it did have a system of affiliations of some
sort. Their contention was simply that their organization would not associate with that network. Throughout the hearing the parties were acting at cross purposes.
What seemed relevant to one appeared completely immaterial to the other. This failure of the hearing to,
advance the litigation was, at. bottom, the consequence
of a more basic failure to join issue on the considerations that should control the President's ultimate decision, a problem to which we will return in the ensuing
section.
Upon reviewing the hearing transcript and exhibits,
the President reaffirmed his prior decision to deny petitioners' recognition as a campus organization. The
reasons stated, closely paralleling his initial reasons, were
that the group would be a "disruptive influence" at
CCSC and that recognition would be "contrary to the
- - - - orderly process of change" on the campus. In the cli
liYmteof i:inrest 6n'"m
' al 1y ·colle'ge "'Ca:mpuse 111 1969, Presi
dent James' concern was not unfounded. There ha
been widespread civil disobedience on some campuses
accompanied by the seizure of buildings, vandalism and1
arson. Some colleges had been shut down altogether,
while at others files were looted and manuscripts de-==i
stroyed. SDS chapters on some of those campuses ha,
been a catalytic force during this period. 8 Althoug
the causes of campus disruption were many and comple
8 See Report of the President's Comm'n on Campus Unrest (1970)
R eport of the ABA Comm'n on Campus Gov't and Student Disse
(1970) .

,
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ne- of-t-he,»·ime mrneequcrrces of such activitie~ was
1e denial by the few of lawful exercise of First Amenclnent rights to the majority of students. Indeed, many
of the privileges long and peculiarly associa.tecl with
institutions of higher learning were jeopardized: the
rights to attend classes, to hear a broad spectrum of
vie,Ypoints, and to enjoy the pursuit of truth and knowledge were obstructed." In view of the experience on
other campuses, and in an atmosphere referred to by
the Second Circuit majority in this case as one of "ticking tirnebombs," '0 tl

j

=/

-q
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Afte_l)-. second statement issued, the case then reo - turned to the District Court where it was ordered dismissed. The court concluded, first, that the formal
requisites of procedural due process had been complied
with, second, that petitioners had failed to meet their
burden of showing that they could function free from
the i3-,tional orga.nization, and, third, that the college's
refusal to place its stamp of approval on an organization whose conduct it found "likely to cause violent acts
of disruption" did not violate petitioners' associational
rights. 319 F . Supp. 113.
Petitioners appealed to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals where, by a two-to-one vote, the District Court's
judgment was affirmed. The majority purported not
to reach the substantive First Amendment issues on the
theory that petitioners had failed to avail themselves
of the clue process accorded them and had failed to meet
their burden of complying with the prevailing standards for recognition. 445 F. 2d, at 1131-1132. Judge
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Smith dissented, disagreeing with the majority's refusal
to address the merits and finding that petitioners had
been deprived of basic First Amendment rights. Id.,
at 1136. This Court granted certiorari and, for the
reasons which follow, we conclude tha.t the judgment
of the courts below must be reversed and the case remanded for reconsideration.

II
At the outset we note that colleges and universities
are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First
Amendment. "It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of expression at the schoolhouse gate. " Tinker
v. D es Moines Independent C01nmunity School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). Of course, as Mr. Jus~
tice Fortas made clear in Tinker, First Amendment rights
must ahvays be applied "in light of the special charac.:teristics of the .. . environment" in the particular case.
Ibid. And, where state-operated educational institutions are involved , this Court has long recognized "the
need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the
states and of school officials, consistent with fundamental
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools." Id., at 507. The precedents of
this Court leave no room for the view that, because of
the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college 9ampuses than in the community at large. Quite to the
contrary, "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community
of American schools." Shelton v. Tucker, 314 U. S.
479, 487 (1960). The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the "market place of
ideas" and we break no new constitutional ground in
reaffirming this Nation's dedication to safeguarding aca-

71---452-0PINION
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demic freedom. Keyi,shian v. Board of Regents, 385
U. S. 589, 603 ( 1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U. S. 234, 249- 250 (plurality opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Warren) , 262 ( 1957 ) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion) .
? J. o f e. c..f e
J. y_
Among the ~
ights comprehended u-i1v the
First Amendment1 :;u;i,d. wade Qi.Meling 8tt tho ~b"e&.
th.rough the Frn1rtoo1,1th "1uondmo~ is the right of individuals to associate to further their personal beliefs.
While the freedom of association is not explicitly set
out in the Amendmenut, it has long been held to be
implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly and petition. See, e. g., Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 40.!.-U. S. 1, 6 ( 1971); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415,
430 ( 1963); Loui,siana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP,
366 U. S. 293, 296 (1961); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 ( 1958) (Mr. Justice Harlan
for a unanimous Court). There can be ro doubt tnat O
denial without justification of official recognition to college organizations burdens or "abridges,. £hat asSocia:-~
tional right.¼: The primary impediment to free association flowing from nonrecognition is the denial of use of
campus facili ties for meetings and other appropriate
purposes. The practical effect of nonrecognition was
demonstrated in this case when, several days after the

c£

-r/

8 '-

-

g',
~

We need not decide whether a college or university might close
its campus to all student organizations since it is quite clear that
CCSC contemplated no such action, having accorded official status
t o numerous other political organizations. Indeed, in the conteA't
of the goal of full aca demic freedom which charact erizes institutions
of higher edu cation in this count ry, it is unlikely that we wIII be
called on to decide whether a school might close its doors to all
student associations. See Wright , The Constit ution on the Campus,
22 Vand . L. R ev. 1027 (1969 ) ; Developments in t he Law-Academic
Freedom, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1045 (1969); Comment, Freedom of
Polit ical Association on the Campus : The Right of Official R ecognition, 46 N . Y. U. L. 1149 (1971) .

6)
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President's decision was announced, petitioners were not
allowed to hold a meeting in the campus co:ffee shop
because they were not an approved group.
~ Petitioners' associational interests also J°"'circumscribed by the denial of the use of campus bulletin boards .rand the school newspaper. If an organization is to remain a viable entity in a campus community in which
new students enter on a regular basis, it must possess
the means of communicating with these students. Moreover, the organization's ability to participate in the intellectual give and take of campus debate, and to pursue
its stated purposes, is limited by denial of access to the
customary media for communicating with the a_QmiE..::J
istration, faculty members, and other students.~
h/
impediments cannot be viewed as insubstantial.
Respondents and the courts below appear to have
taken the view that denial of official recognition in this
case abridged no constitutional rights. The District
Court concluded that,
"President James' discretionary action in denying this application cannot be legitimately magnified and distorted into a constitutionally cognizable
interference with the personal ideas or beliefs of
any segment of the college students; neither does
his action deter in any material way the individual
advocacy of their personal beliefs; nor can his action

1

~

r

'--=;:i:; It

is unclea r on t his record whether recognition also carries with
it a right t o seek func!'s from t he school budget. Petit ioners' counsel ~
at oral argument indicat ed that official recognition entitled the group
to "make application for use of student funds." Tr. of Oral Arg .,
at 4. The first District Court opinion , however, stat es flatly that _
" [ r] ecognition docs not t hereby entitle an organi zation to college
financial support ." 311 F . Supp., at 1277. Since it appears that ,
at the least, recognition only entitles a group to apply for funds,
and since t he record is silent as to the criteria used in allocat ing
such funds, we do not consider possible funding as an associational
aspect of nonrecognit ion in this case.
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be reasonably construed to be an invasion of, or
have a chilling effect on academic freedom." 319
F. Supp., at 116.

In that court's view all that was denied petitioners was
the "administrative seal of official college respectabil~
Ibid. A ma.jority of the Court of Appeals_
agreed that petitioners had been denied only the "college's stamp of approval." 445 F. 2d, at 1131. Respondents ~'U'ii~@ Hu~,t 1eorn@ -eomsEXhere, argmng that _
petitioners still may meet as a group off campus, that
they still may distribute written material off campus,
and that they still may meet together informally on
campus-as individuals but not as CCSC-SDS.
We do not agree with the characterization by the:-courts below of the consequences of nonrecognition. We
may concede, as did lVIr. Justice Harlan in his unanimous_
opinion for the Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 461 ( 1958) , that the administration "has taken no direct action .. . to restrict the
rights of petitioners' members to associate freely." But
the Constitution's protection is not limited to direct
interference with fundamental rights. The requirement
in Patterson that the NAACP disclose its membership
lists was found to be an impermissible, though indirect,
infringement of the members' associational rights. Likewise, in this case, the group's possible ability to exist
outside the campus community does not ameliorate significantly the disabilities imposed by the President's
action. We are not free to disregard the practical realities. MR. JUSTICE STEWART has made the salient point:
"Freedoms such as these are protected not only against
heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled
I()
by more subtle governmental interference." Bates v. _

/0

'---==; These statements are in

contrast to the first opinion by the.....
District Court, which reflected a full appreciation of the constitutional significance of petitioner~' claim. 311 F. Supp., at 1280-1282.
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City of Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 523 (1960) . See
also Sweezy v. N ew Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 ( 1957)
(Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring); Watkins v.
United States, 354 U. S. 178, 197 ( 19·5 7).
.-The opinions below also assumed that petitioners ha.cl
} ) '--0e bu~den of showing entitlement to recognition by the _
college."'e While petitioners have conceded that they
were properly required to file a.n application in .£_On-~ / l..
formity with the reasonable rules of the college , ~
---challenge the view of the courts below that final rejec-.
tion could rest on their failure to convince the administration that their organization was unaffiliated with
the National SDS. For reasons to be stated later in
this opinion , we do not consider the issue of affiliation
to be a controlling one. But apart from any particular issue, once petitioners had filed an application in
conformity ,vith college requirements, the burden was
upon the college administration to justify its decision
of rejection. See, e. g., Law Student Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmcmd, 401 U. S. 154. 162-163
(1971 ) ; United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376- 377
( 1968); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958 ) . It
is to be remembered that the effect of the college's denial
of recognition was a form of prior restraint, denying to
petitioners' organization the range of associational activities described above. While a college has a legitimate ~
/ /

/ 2._

"'ft 445 F. 2d , nt 1131; 319 F. Supp., at 116.

__,
~ The sta ndnrds for official recognit ion require applicnnts to ./
provide a clc:ir sb trment of purposes, crit eria for m embership , rules
of procedure, and n list of officers. Applicants must limit member- _
ship to "matriculntcd students" and may not discriminate on the
bnsis of rnce, religion or 1rntionality. The standa rds further state
that groups m ay "examine and discuss all questions of interest,"
t hey may conduct demonst rations and utilize their right of petition,
but they ar e prohibited from interfering with the rights of other
students. See n. 5, supra. Petitioners have not challenged thesestandards and their adequacy is not here in question .

-----
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interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which
under circumstances requiring the safeguarding of that
interest may justify such restraint, a "heavy burden"
rests on the college to demonstrate the appropriateness
of ~ action. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697,
713-716 (1931); Organization for a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 402 U. S. 415, 418 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51, 57 (1965).

r

III
These fundamental errors-discounting the existence
of a cognizable First Amendment interest and misplac- .._
ing the burden of proof-require that the judgments
below be reversed . But we are unable to conclude that
no basis exists upon which nonrecognition might be appropriate. Indeed, based on a reasonable reading of
the ambiguous facts of this case, there appears to be - at least one potentially acceptable ground for a denial _
of recognition. Because of this ambiguous state of the
record we conclude that the case should be remanded,
and in an effort to provide guidance to the lower courts
upon reconsideration it is appropriate to discuss the
several bases of President James' decision. Four possible justifications for nonrecognition, all closely related,
might be derived from the record and his statements.
Three of those grounds are inadequate to substantiate
his decision: a fourth, however, has merit.
A

;/

From the outset the controversy in this case has cen--t ered in large measure around the relationship, if any,
between petitioners' group and the National SDS. The
Student Affairs Committee meetings, as reflected in its
minutes, focu sed considerable attention on this issue;
the courtAordered hearing also was directed primarily-=to this question. Despite assurances from petitioners
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and their counsel that the local group was in fact independent of the .uational organization, it is evident that
President James=was significantly influenced by his ap- prehension that there was a connection. Aware of the fact that some SDS chapters had been associated with ·
disruptive and violent campus activity, he apparently
considered that affiliation itself was sufficient justifiv
/
tion for denying recognition.""" _...._
Although this precise issue has not come before the
Court heretofore, the Court has consistently disapproved
governmental action imposing criminal sanctions or denying rights and privileges solely because of a citizen's
association with an unpopular organization. See, e. g.,
United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967); Keyishian/
v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 605-610 (1967);
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11 (1966); Scales v.
United States, 367 U. S. 203 (1961). In these cases
it has been established that "guilt by association alone,
without [ establishing] that an individual's association
poses the threat feared by the Government," is an impermissible basis upon which to deny First Amendment
rights. United States v. Robel, 389 U. S., at 265. The
Government has the burden of establishing a knowing
affiliation with an organization posseSl5ing unlawful aims
and goals, and a specific intent to further those illegal

~
We need not decide in this case whether a group might

be denied official recognition on a state college campus
solely because of its affiliation as a local chapter of a
national organization dedicated to unlawful conduct.

~
IL ' - - - - •

Seen. 4, supra, for t he complete te:,,.1; of the President's sta tement .
addition to the cases cited in the t ext above, see also Law
Students Civil Rights R esearch Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154,
164-166 (1971) ; In re Stolar, 401 U. S. 23, 28 (1971) ; Aptheker
v. Secretary of Stat e, 378 U . S. 500 (1964) ; Noto v. Unit ed States,.
367 U . S. 290, 299-300 (1961) .

} T ......__..- -S:: In

3
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SDS, as conceded by the ~Hege and the lower courts,
is loosely organized, havirig various factions and promoting a number of diverse social and p o ~
ouly some of ,Yhich call for unlawful action. · Not only
did petitioners proclaim their complete independence
from tfilsorgamzafaon,"'" but they also indicated that
they shared only some of the beliefs its leaders havy
expressed~ On this record it is clear that the relationship ·was not an adequate ground for the denial
of recognition.
B

/.S'

Having concluded that petitioners ·ere affiliated with .
or at least retained an affinity for, SDS National resident James attributed what he believed to be the philosophy of that organization to the local group. Hecharacterized the petitioning group as adhering to "some
of the major tenets of the national organization,~ /
ing a philosophy of violence a!1d disruption.""t. Under-__..,. . --standably, he found that philosophy abhorrent. In an·
article signed by President James in an alumni periodical , and made a part of the record below, he a1mounced
his unwillingness to "sanction an organization that openly

/s~~ P..cc FBI, Appropriation 59-60 (1972). in whi<'h the former Director of the Federal Bureau of Im·estigat ion, .T. Edgar Hooyer , states
that while Yiolent fact ions have spun off from SDS, its present
leadership is "critical of bombing and Yiolence."
/(. WPetitioners asserted their independence both orall~• and in a
written submission before the Student _Affairs Committee. They resta.ted their nonaffiliation in a formal statement filed prior to the
court-ordered hearing. The only indiration to the contrary is their
unwillingness to eschew use of the SDS name altogether. But see
n. 3, supra.
/ / ✓ ,_,, Representati ,·es of the group stated during the Student Affairs
Committee meetings that the.,· did not identify with all of the Na- tional's statements, but wished simply to "pick ... certain ideas"'
from that organization.
t!See n. 4, supra. ..._.,

/ {I

f'
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The mere disagreement of the President with the group's

.®
y'

philslophy affords -aBSd · •,~, no reason to deny it recognition.
As repugnant as these views may have been, especially to one
with President James' responsibility, the mere expression
of them would not justify the denial of First Amendment rights.

\

Whether petitioners did in fact advocate a ~ philosophy of
"destruction" thus becomes immaterial.

The College, acting

here as the instrumentality of the state, may not restrict speech
or association simply because it finds the views expressed by
any group to be abhorrent.
simply and clearly:

367

u. s.

V

1, 137 (1961).

As Mr. Justice Black put it most
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As the litigation progressed in the District Court, a _
third rationale for President Ja.mes' decision-beyond
the questions of affiliation and philosophy-began to
emerge. His second statement, issued after the courtordered administrative hearing, indicates that he based
rejection on a conclusion that this particular group would
be a "disruptive influence at CCSC." This language
was underscored in the second District Court opinion.
In fact, the Court concluded that the President had
determined that CCSC-SDS's "prospective campus activities were likely to cause a disruptive influence at CCSC."
319 F . Supp., at 116.
If this reason, directed at the organization's activities
rather than its philosophy, were factually supported by
the record, this Court's prior decisions would provide
a basis for considering the propriety of nonrecognition.
. The critical line heretofore drawn for determining the
permissibility of regulation is the line between mere
advocacy and advocacy "directed to inciting or pro-_....-ducing imminent lawless action and . .. likely to incite
or produce such action." Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U. S.
444, 447 (1969) (unanimous per curiam opinion). See
also Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 230-232
(1961); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 289, 298 (1961);
Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 (1957). In the
context of the "special characteristics of the school
'-.!;_nvironme~~ the power of the government to pro- -:::
hibit "lawless action" is not limited to acts of a criminal
-n Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community School Dist ., 393 U.S .,
at 506.

j

71-452-0PINION
HEALY v. JAMES

21

nature. Also prohibitable are actions which "materially
and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the
school." Tinker v. Des Af oines Independent Community School District, 393 U. S., at 513. Associational
activities need not be tolerated where they infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes or substantially
interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education.
The "Student Bill of Rights" at CCSC, upon which_
great emphasis was placed by the President, draws precisely this distinction between advocacy and action. It
purports to impose no limitations on the right of college student organizations "to examine and discuss all
questions of interest to them." But it also states that
students have no right ( 1) "to deprive others of the opportunity to speak or be heard," (2) "to invade the
privacy of others," (3) "to damage the property of
others," ( 4) "to disrupt the regular and essential opera'
tion of the college," or ( 5) "to interfere with the rights_.,
'20 , ~ The line between permissible speech and_
impermissible conduct tracks the constitutional requirement, and if there were an evidential basis to support
the conclusion that CCSC-SDS posed a substantial threat
of material disruption in violation of that command the·
President's decision
e affirmed:"!. - - - -

2CI -

z.. j

-·,~It

it!-See n. 5, supra.
may not be sufficient merely to show the existence of a legiti-.......
mate and substantial state interest. Where state action designed to
regulate prohibitable action also restricts associational rights-as
nonrecognition does-the State must demonstrate that the action
taken is reasonably related to protection of the State's interest and
that "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than essential to the furtherance of that interest.'
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,377 (1968). See also NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 337 U. S. 288 (1964); Gibson v. Florida
L egislative Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama
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The record, however, offers no substantial basis for
that conclusion. The only support for the view expressed by the President, other than the repudiated
affiliation with SDS National, is to be found in the
ambivalent responses offered by the group's representatives at the Student Affairs Committee hearing, during
which they stated that they did not know whether they
might respond to "issues of violence" in the same manner that other SDS chapters had on other campuses.
Nor would they state unequivocally that they could
never "envision . . . interrupting a class." Whatever
force these statements might be thought to have is
largely dissipated by the following exchange between
petitioners' counsel and the Dean of Student Affairs
during the court-ordered hearing:
"Counsel: I just read the document that you 're
offering [minutes from Student Affairs Committee
meeting] and I can't see that there's anything in
it that inti.mates that these students contemplate
any illegal or disruptive practice.
"Dean: No. There's no question raised to that,
counsel."
Dean Judd's remark
record, that,, - - these particular individuals acting together would constitute a disruptive force on campus. Therefore, insofar
as nonrecognition flowed from such fears, it constituted
little more than the S'Ort of "undifferentiated fear of
apprehension of disturbance [ which] is not enough to
overcome the right of freedom of expression." Tinker
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 444 (1958). On this record , absent a
sho\\'ing of an~· likelihood of disruption or unwilli1ign0:;,; to rerog11ize
reasonable rules governing cmnpus conduct, it is not necessa ry for
us to decide whether denial of recognition is an appropriately related'.
and narrow response.

l 4& t 1-t..t., •~ ~

4-4, L..~,'1~

~
~

l
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v. Des Moines Independent Conimunity School District, 393 U. S., at 508.

~

D
These same references in the record to the group's
equivocation regarding how it might respond to "issues
of violence" and whether it could ever "envision . . .
interrupting a class," suggest a fourth possible reason
why recognition might have been denied to these petitioners. These remarks might well have been read as.
announcing petitioners' unwillingness to be b ~ Z. l.
reasonable school rules governing conduct.~The co:r=-lege's Statement of Rights, Freedoms and Responsibili-ties of Students, contains, as we have seen, an explicit
statement with respect to campus disruption . The regulation, carefully differentiating between advocacy and
action, is a reasonable one and petitioners have not
questioned 1£ ctll'ectly~ Yet their statements raise con- siderable question whether they intend to abide by the
prohibitions contained therein_-...__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-,,,'.-- 2..

l.

J

?L. -

z_J
1-

f

'"CI'he Court of Appeals read the rerord as showing tha.t peti- _
tioners "foiled candidly to respond to inquiries whether they would _,,
resort to violence and disruption on the CCSC campus, including
interruption of clas8e~." 445 F. 2d , at 1131. While petitioner's
statements may be read as intimating a rejection of reasonable college regulations in advnnce, there is substantial ambiguity on this
point. Petitioners appear to concede the appropriateness of those
standards and the Student Affairs Committee never asked specifically
whether they were willing to abide by these rules. Moreover, the
issue was not among those referred by the District Court to the
administrative hearing and neither party pursued this problem at
that time. Indeed, the failure of the District Court to identify this
as a significant subj ect of inquiry lends support for the view that
remand is necessary.

__....--,.csee

/"'1' Nor

11.

5, supra.

did the administrative hearing clarify this question. It wa s
__,,,,then addressed only tangentiall)·; the petitioners who had given the :-ambiguous responses before the Student Affairs Committee failed
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As we have already stated in Parts B and C, the
critical line for First Amendment purposes must be
drawn between advocacy, which is entitled to full protection, and action, which is not. Petitioners may, if
they so choose, preach the propriety of amending or
even doing away with any or all campus regulations.
They may not, however, undertake to flaunt these rules.
MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, at the time he \vas a circuit
judge on the Eighth Circuit, stated:
"We ... hold that a college has the inherent power
to promulgate rules and regulations; that it has
the inherent power properly to discipline; that it
has power appropriately to protect itself and its
property; that it may expect that its students adhere
to generally accepted standards of conduct." Esteban v. Central M'issouri State College, 415 F. 2d
1077, 1089 (CA8 1969), cert. denied, 398 U . S. 965
(1970) .
Just as in the community at large, reasonable regulations with respect to the time, the place, and the manner
in which student groups conduct their s eech-relate
activities must be respected.
uc a requirement oes
not impose an impermissible condition on the students'
associational rights. Their freedom to speak out, to assemble, or to petition for changes in school rules is in
no sense infringed. It merely constitutes an agreement
to conform with reasonable standards respecting con-duct. This is a minimal requirement, in the :interest

L,

~

to clarify their position; and their counsel, whose tactics were char-.
acterized as "disruptive" by the Court of Appeals, elected to make
argumentative statements rather than elicit relevant testimony. 445
F. 2d, at 1126.
::JB See, e. g., City of Chicago v. Mosley, U. S. - , (1972);
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 47-48 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965) ; Louisiana e.-i; rel. Gremillion v. NAACPr
366 U.S. 293, 397 (1961).

2.S

71-452- 0PINION

HEALY v . JAMES

25-

of the entire academic community, of any group seeking the privilege of official recognition . Quite apart
from the question whether these petitioners pose a present threat to campus order, we conclude that they may
be denied the benefits of participation in the internal
life of the college community if on remand it becomes
clear that petitioners reserve the right to violate a.n y.,.,.
rules with which they disagree.

--z.C

IV
We think the above discussion establishes the appropriate framework for consideration of petitioners' re- .___
quest for campus recognition. Because respondents
failed to accord clue recognition to First Amendment
principles, the judgment below approving respondents'
denial of recognition must be reven~ed. Since we cannot conclude from this record that petitioners met the
threshold requirement of willingness to abide by reasonable campus rules and regulations embodied in the "Student Bill of Rights," we order the case remanded for
reconsideration. We note, in so holding, that the wide
latitude accorded by the Constitution to the freedoms
of expression and association is not without its costs
in terms of the risk to the maintenance of civility and
an ordered society. Indeed, this latitude often has resulted, on the campus and elsewhere, in the infringe___,,

'2 '

~,

rn addition to t he college administration's broad rulemaking·
power to assure that the t radit ional academic atmosphere is safe-~
guarded, it may also impose sanctions on t hose who violate t he rules.
We find , fo r instance, the Student Affairs Committee's admonit ion to
petit ioners in this case to suggest one permissible practice-recogni-t ion, once accorded, may be wit hdrawn or suspended if petit ioners
fa il to respect campus law. See, e. g., M ississippi Civil Liberties
Union v. Universit y of Southern Mississippi, No. 71-1801 (CA5
1971) ; American Civil L iberties Union v. Radford College, 315 F _
Supp. 893 (WD Va . 1970) .
'-

.,
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ment of the rights of others. Though we deplore the
tendency of some to abuse the very constitutional priviiege"s they invoke1,we reaffirm this Court's dedication
to the principles of the Bill of Rights upon which our
vigorous and free society is founded.
D -

Rider A, p. 26
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Petitioners,
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F. Don James et al.
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[June -, 1972]
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MR. JusTICE POWELL delivered the opnuon of the
Court.
This case, arising out of a denial by a state college
of official recognition to a group of students who desired
to form a local chapter of Students for a Democratic
Society (SDS), presents this Court with questions requiring the application of well-established First Amendment principles. While the factual background of this
particular case raises these constitutional issues in a
manner not heretofore passed on by the Court, and only
infrequently presented to lower federal courts, our decision today is governed by existing precedent.
As the case involves delicate issues concerning the
academic community, we approach our task with special
caution, recognizing the mutual interest of students, faculty members, and administrators in an environment free
from disruptive interference with the educational process.
We also are mindful of the equally significant interest
in the widest latitude for free expression and debate
consonant with the maintenance of order. Where these
interests appear to compete the First Amendment, made
binding on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,
strikes the required balance.
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We mention briefly at the outset the setting in 19691970. A climate of unrest prevailed on many college
campuses in this country. There had been widespread
civil disobedience on some campuses, accompanied by
the seizure of buildings, vandalism, and arson. Some
colleges had been shut down altogether, while at others
files were looted and manuscripts destroyed . SDS chapters on some of those campuses had been a catalytic
force during this period. 1 Although the causes of campus disruption were many and complex, one of the P-..:.r:..;.
in.::.1.:::.
:. e-&-c:--1
consequences of such activities was the denial ~~~
~ of the lawful exerci~e._, of First Amendment rights
'\:it otl:e majority of _st~dent~ Inde_ed, mar:y ~f tl:e m...o_s_t _ _
,_ chenshed characteristics long associated with mshtutions
of higher learning appeared to be endangered. Fortunately, with the passage of time, a calmer atmosphere
and greater maturity now pervade our campuses. Yet,
it was in this climate of earlier unrest that this case
arose.
Petitioners are students attending Central Connecticut State College (CCSC), a state-supported institution
of higher learning. In September 1969 they undertook
to organize what they then referred to as a "local chapter" of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Pursuant to procedures established by the ColJege, petitioners filed a request for official recognition as a campus
organization with the Student Affairs Committee, a committee composed of four students, three faculty members
and the Dean of Student Affairs. The request specified three purposes for the proposed organization's existence. It would provide "a forum of discussion and
Sec Report. of the ]~rc;:idcnt';:: Comm'n on Camp11~ Unrp,.:t (1070):
Report of the ABA Comm ·n on Cmnpu;: GoY't and Stucknt Di~~cnt
(1970).
1
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self-education for students developing an analysis of
American society"; it would serve as an "agency for
integrating thought "·ith action so as to bring about
constructive changes"; and it would endeavor to provide a "coordinating body for relating the problems of
leftist students" with other interested groups on campus and in the comrnunity. 2 The Committee, while
satisfied that the statement of purposes was clear and
unobjectionable on its face, exhibited concern over the
relationship between the proposed local group and the
~ational SDS organization. In response to inquiries,
representatives of the proposed organization stated that
they ,rnuld not affiliate with any national organization and that their group would remain "completely
independent."
In response to other questions asked by Committee
members concerning SDS's reputation for campus disruption, the applicants made the following statements,
which proved significant during the later stages of these
proceeding::1:
"Q. HmY would you respond to issues of violence
as other SDS chapters have?
"A. Our action ,rnuld have to be dependent upon
each issue.
"Q. Would you use any means possible?
"A. No I can't say that; would not know until
we knmY what the issues arc.
"Q. Could you env1s10n the S. D. S. interrupting a class?
"A. Impossible for me to say."
With this information before it, the Committee re-

~

~nt-mr-

~ The statement of purposes is set out in full in the
pinicm}from the clcci.,ion of the Second Circuit. Healy v. James, 445F . 2d TI12, 1136-1137 (1971).
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quested an additional filing by the applicants, including a formal statement regarding affiliations. The
amended application filed in response stated flatly that
"CCSC Students for a Democratic Society are not under
the dictates of any National organization." 3 At a second hearing before the Student Affairs Committee, the
question of relationship with the National organization
was raised again. One of the organizers explained that
the National SDS was divided into several "factional
groups," tha.t the national-local relationship was a loose
one, and that the local organization accepted 011ly "certain ideas" but not all of the National organization's·
aims and philosophies.
By a vote of six to two the Committee ultimately
approved the application and recommended to the President of the College, Dr. James, that. the orga.nization
be accorded official recognition. In approving the ap-plication, the majority indicated that its decision ""as
premised on the belief that varying viewpoints should
be represented on campus and that since the Young
Americans for Freedom, the Young Democrats, the
Young Republicans, and the Liberal Party all enjoyed
recognized status, a group should be available with which
"left wing" students might identify. The majority also
noted and relied on the organization's claim of independence. Finally, it admonished the organization that
immediate suspension would be considered if the group's
activities proved incompatible with the school's policies
against interference with the privacy of other students
445 F. 2d, at 1137. During the Committee's consideration of
1,etitioners' application, one of the group's representat ive"' ,rn~ :vkcd
why, if it indeed desired to remain independent, it chose to use a
nationally known name. The witness' response was that "the name·
brings to mind the type of organization we wish to bring across,
that is a left-wing organization which will allow students interested
in such to express themselves."
3
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or destruction of property. The two dissenting members based their reservation primarily on the lack of
clarity regarding the organization's independence.
Several days later, the President rejected the Committee's rtcommendation, and issued a statement indi-cating that petitioners' organization was not to be accorded the benefits of official campus recognition. His
accompanying remarks, which are set out in full in the·
margin,4 indicate several reasons for his action. He
The President stated:
"Though I have full appreciation for the action of the Student Affairs Committee and the reasons stated in their minutes for themajority vote recommending approval of a local chapter of Students
for a Democratic Socict>·, it is m>· judgment that the statement of
purpose to form a local ch::iptcr of Students for a Democratic Soriet>·
carries full and unmistak::ible adherence to at !C'a~t ~ome of the
major tenets of the national organization , loose and divided though
that org::111ization ma>· be. The published aims and philo,oph>· of
the Students for a Democratic Societr, which include di~ruption
nnd violence, are contrar>· to the ::i.pproved polic>· (by forult>·,
students, and administrntion) of Central Connecticut State Colleg0
which states:
"'St udents do not have the right to invade the prime>· of others,
to damage the property of others, to disrupt the regular and essential operation of the college, or to interfere with the rights of
others.'
"The further statement on the request for recognition that 'CCSC'
Students for a Democratic Society are not under the dictates of any
National organization' in no way clarifies why if a group intends tofollow the established policy of the college, they wish to become a
local chapter of an organization which openly repudiates such a
policy.
"Freedom of speech, academic freedom on the cnmpus, the freedom
of establishing an open forum for the exchange of ideas, the freedoms
outlined in the Statement on Rights, Freedoms, and Responsibilities
of Students that 'college students and student organizations shall have
the right to examine and discuss all questions of interest to them, to
express opinion publicly and privately, and to support causes by
orderly means. They may organize public demonstrations and protest gatherings and utilize the right of petition'-these are all precious
4
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found that th e organization's philosophy ,ms antithetical
to the school's policies,5 and that the group's independence was doubtful. He concluded that approval should
freedoms that "·e cherish and are freedoms on which we stand. To
approve any organization or indiYidual who joins with an org:mization which openly repudiates those principles is contrary to those
freedoms and to the approved 'Stat ement on the Rights, Freedoms,
a nd nr~ponsibilitir.,;; of St udent~' at Cr ntral. '"
5 In 1969, CCSC adopted. as han m:rny other colleges and universities , a Statement of Rights, Freedoms. and Responsibilities of
Student• . This st.at rrnrn t, common\~, referrl'd to as the "Studrnt
Bill of Rights," is printed as an Appendix t o the Second Cirruit',:
majori t~· opinion in this cnse, H ealy v. James, 445 F . 2d, at 1132-1136
(1971). Pmi Y of t hat statement establishr.• the sta ndards fo r npproval of campus organizations and imposes se,·eral ba sic limitations
on their campus actiYities :
''A. Cnre shall be taken in the establishment and organization
of campus groups so that the basic rights, freedoms and responsibilities of students will be preserved.
"B. Student orgnni zations shall submi t a clea r statement of purpo~e. cri teria for membr r~hip, rulrs of prorrdurcs a nd a li~t of
officers as a condition of inst itu tional recognition. They shall not be
required to submi t a membership list ns a condition of institut ional
rcco~nition.
"C. Membership in rampus organizations shall be limited t o
mat riculated studrnts ( da? or evening) at the college. M embershipshall not be rest ricted b~· race, religion or nationalit~'. The members
shall haYe sole power to det ermine orgnniza tion polic~, consistent with
the regulations of the collrge.
"D . Each organizntion is free to choose its own adviser. AdYisers
to organizations sh:1 11 ach·ise but not control the organizations and
their policies .
"E. Collrge students :ind student organizations shall have the right
t o examine and discuss all questions of int erest to t hem. t o express
opinion publicl)' and pri,·atel)·, and to suppo rt causes b~· orderly
means. The)· ma)· org:rni 3r public demonst rations and protest
gatherings and utilize the right of petition. Students do not ham·
the right to depri,·c others of the opportunit)' t o speak or be heard ,
t o invade the privac)' of ot hers, to damage th e proper t~· of others,
10 di~ru pt the regular and essential opera tion of t he col lrgr, or to
in terfere with the rights of ot hers."
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not be granted to any group that "openly repudiates"
the College's dedication to academic freedom.
Denial of official recognition posed serious problems
for the organization's existence and growth . Its members were deprived of the opportunity to place announcements regarding meetings, rallies or other activities in
the student newspaper; they were precluded from using
various campus bulletin boards; and-most importantly-nonrecognition barred them from using campus
facilities for holding meetings. This latter disability
was brought home to petitioners shortly a.ftBr the President's announcement. Petitioners circulated a notice
calling a meeting to discuss what fu rther action should
be taken in light of the group's official rejection . The
members met at the coffee shop in the Student Center
("Devi~ Den ") but were disbanded on the President's
lr" .... ,
order since nonrecognized groups were not entitled to
use such facilities.6
Their efforts to gain recognition having proved ultimately unsuccessful, and having been mad e to feel the
burden of nonrecognition, petitioners resorted to the
?ourts. They filed a suit in the FedF l District=Court
~ Connecticut, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the President of the College, other administrators, and the State Board of Trustees. Petitioners'

l

m'l

6 During the meeting petitioners were approached by t\rn of the
Collr_gc',; dcn n, who ~c1Tecl pet itioner, "·i1 h a mrmornndum from
the Preside11t stating:
"Notice has been reccind by t his office of a meeting of the
'C. C. S. C.-S. D. S. on Thusrcla.~·-NoYember 6 at 7:00 p. Ill . at
t he De\·ils' Den.'
"Such meeting rnny not t ake pla ce in the Devils Den of the Student Center nor in or on :rny other property of the college since the
C. C. S. C.-S . D. S. i, not n du!~- rccoµ:ni7. ed rollcgr org:rnization.
"You are hcreb~ notified by this action to cease and desist from
meeting on the coJlege property ."
0
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prima.ry complaint centered on the denial of First Amendment rights of expression and association arising from
denial of campus recognition. The ca.use was submitted
imtially on stipulated facts l and, after a short hearing,
the judge ruled that petitioners had been denied procedural due process because the President had based
his decision on conclusions regarding the applicant's
affiliation which "·ere outside the record before him.
The court concluded that if the President wished to act
on the basis of material outside the application he must
at least provide petitioners a hearing and opportunity
to introduce evidence as to their affiliations. 311 F.
Supp., at 1276, 1281. While retaining jurisdiction over
the case, the District Court ordered respondents to hold
a hearing in order to clarify the several ambiguities surrounding the President's decision. One of the matters to
be explored was whether the local organization, true to its
repeated affirmations, was in fact independent of the National SDS. Id., at 1282. And if the hearing demonstrated that the two were not separable, the respondellts
were instructed that they might then revie"· the "aims
and philosophy" of the K ationa1 organization. Ibid.
Pursuant to the court's order, the President designated Dean Judd, the Dean of Student Affairs, to serve
as hearing officer and a hearing was scheduled. The
hearing, which spanned two dates and lasted approximately two hours, added little in terms of objective
substantive evidence to the record in this case. Petitioners introduced a statement offering to change the
organization's name from "CCSC local chapter of SDS"
to "Students for a Democratic Society of Central Connecticut State College." They further reaffirmed that
they would "have no connection whatsoever to the
structure of an existing national organization." 7 Peti7
319 F. Supp ., at 114. The hearing officer, oYcr petitioner;;' objection, ruled that the statement was inadmissible apparently on the
ground that it would constitute an amendment to the original appli-
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tioners also introduced the testimony of their faculty
adviser to the effect that some local SDS organizations
elsewhere were unaffiliated with any national organization. The hearing officer, in addition to introducing
the minutes from the two pertinent Student Affairs Committee meetings, also introduced sua sponte portions
of a transcript of hearings before the United States
House of Representatives Internal Security Committeeinvestigating the activities of SDS. Excerpts were offered both to prove that violent and disruptive activities.
had been attributed to SDS elsewhere and to demonstrate that there existed a national organization that
recognized and cooperated with regional and local collegecampus affiliates. Petitioners did not challenge the asserted existence of a National SDS, nor did they question that it did have a system of affiliations of some
sort. Their contention was simply that their organization would not associate with that net·work. Throughout the hearing the parties were acting at cross purposes.
What seemed relevant to one appeared completely immaterial to the other. This failure of the hearing to·
advance the litigation was, at bottom, the consequence
of a more basic failure to join issue on the considerations that should control the President's ultimate decision , a problem to which we will return in the ensuing
section.
Upon reviewing the hearing transcript and exhibits,
the President reaffirmed his prior decision to deny petitioners recognition as a campus organization. The
reasons stated, closely paralleling his initial reasons, werethat the group would be a "disruptive influence" at
CCSC and that recognition would be "contrary to the
orderly process of change" on the campus.
cation and would be be~1 ond the permissible scope of the hearing.
-wfia'tever the merits of this ruling, ~ j ; j ll in the record re- viewed b1:.J he l?l·esiucnt and ,ms relied ou in the sub,:cquent District
''ourt opinion without reference to its prior exclusion. Ibid.
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After the President's second statement issued, the case
then returned to the District Court where it was ordered
dismissed . The court concluded, first, that the formal
requisites of procedural due process had been complied
with, second, that petitioners had failed to meet their
burden of showing that they could function free from
the Ka.tional organization, and, third, that the College's
refusal to place its stamp of approval on an organization whose conduct it found "likely to cause violent acts
of disruption" did not violate petitioners' associational
rights. 319 F. Supp. 113.
Petitioners appealed to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals where, by a t,rn-to-one vote, the District Court's
judgment was affirmed. The majority purported not
to reach the substantive First Amendment issues on the
theory that petitioners had failed to avail themselves
of the due process accorded them and had failed to meet
their burden of complying with the prevailing standards for recognition . 445 F . 2d, at 1131-1132. Judge
Smith dissented, disagreeing with the majority's refusal
to address the merits and finding that petitioners had
been deprived of basic First Amendment rights. Id.,
at 1136. This Court granted certiorari and, for the
reasons that follO\Y, \Ye conclude that the judgment
of the courts below must be reversed and the case remanded for reconsideration.

II
At the outset we note that state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from the S\Yeep of the First
Amendment. "It can hardly be argued that eith er students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of expression at the schoolhouse gate." T·i nker
"· Des J.1Joines Independent Community School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). Of course, as Mr. Justice Fortas made clear in Tink er, First Amendment rights
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must always be applied "in light of the special charact eristics of the ... environment" in the particular case.
Ibid. And, " ·here state-operated educational institutions are involved, this Court has long recognized "the
need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the
states and of school officials, consistent ,Yith fundamental
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools." Id .. at 507. Yet, the precedents of
this Court leave no room for the view that, because of
the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply ,vith less force on college campuses than in the community at large. Quite to the
contrary, " [ t] he vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community
of American schools." Shelton v. Tuck er, 314 U. S.
479, 487 ( 1960) . The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the "market place of
ideas" and ·ffe break no ne,Y constitutional ground in
reaffirming this Nation's dedication to safeguarding academic freedom. K eyishian Y. Board of R egents, 385
U. S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U . S. 234, 249-250 (plurality opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Warren ), 262 (1957) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion).
Among the rights protected by the First Amendment is
the right of individuals to associate to further their personal beliefs. While the freedom of association is not explicitly set out in the Amendment, it has long been held
to be implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly and
petition. See, e. g. , Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401
U. S. 1, 6 (1971); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415,
430 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP,
366 U. S. 293, 296 ( 1961 ); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 ( 1958) (Mr. Justice Harlan
for a unanimous Court). There can be no doubt that
;---...."'<"'--:::i,. . e 1uazwit.hout justificationE f o f f i c i a l ~ col-

@
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lege organizations burdens or abridges that associational right. The primary impediment to free association flowing from nonrecognition is the denial of use of
campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate
purposes. The practical effect of nonrecognition was
demonstrated in this case when, several days after the
President's decision ,ms announced, petitioners were not
allowed to hold a meeting in the campus coffee shop
because they were not an approved group.
Petitioners' associational interests also ,vere circumscribed by the denial of the use of campus bulletin boards
and the school ne"·spaper. If an organization is to remain a viable entity in a campus community in which
ne,v students enter on a regular basis, it must possess
the means of communicating with these students. Moreover, the organization's ability to participate in the intellectual give and take of campus debate, and to pursue
its stated purposes, is limited by denial of access to the
customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and other students. 8 Such
impediments cannot be viewed as insubstantial.
Respondents and the courts below appear to have
taken the view that denial of official recognition in this
case abridged no constitutional rights. The District
Court concluded that,-'L"President James' discretionary action in denys It is unclear on this record whetlwr recognition al~o carric::: "·ith
it a right to seek funds from the school budget. Petitioners' counsel
at oral argument indicated that official recognition entitl ed the group
to "make application for use of student funds." Tr. of Oral Arg.,.
at 4. The first District Court opinion, however, states flatly that
" [ r] ecognition docs not thereby entitle an organization to college·
financial support." 311 F. Supp., at 1277. Since it appears that,
at the least, recognition only entitles a group to apply for funds,
and since the record is silent as to the criteria. used in allocatingsuch funds, we do not consider possible funding as an associational
aspect of nonrecognition in this case.

~
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ing this application cannot be legitimately magnified and distorted into a constitutionally cognizable
interference with the personal ideas or beliefs of
any segment of the college students; neither does
his action deter in any material way the individual
advocacy of their personal beliefs; nor can his action
be reasonably construed to be an invasion of, or
have a chilling effect on academic freedom." 319'
F. Supp., at 116.

In that court's view all that was denied petitioners was
the "administrative seal of official college respectability. " 9 Ibid. A majority of the Court of Appeals
agreed that petitioners had been denied only the "college's stamp of approval." 445 F. 2d, at 1131. Respondents take that same position here, arguing that
petitioners still may meet as a group off campus, that
they still may distribute written material off campus,.
and that they still may meet together informally on
campus-as individuals but not as CCSC-SDS.
We do not agree with the characterization by the
courts below of the consequences of nonrecognition. We
may concede, as did Mr. Justice Harlan in his unanimous
opinion for the Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 461 (1958), that the administration "has taken no direct action . . . to restrict the
rights of petitioners' members to associate freely." But
the Constitution's protection is not limited to direct
interference with fundamental rights. The requirement
in Patterson that the NAACP disclose its membership
lists was found to be an impermissible, though indirect,
infringement of the members' associational rights. Like-wise, in this case, the group's possible ability to exist
outside the campus community does not ameliorate sig" The.;e stn,tement.s arc in contrast to the fir~t op imo n by t he
District Court, which reflected a full appreciation of the constitutional sign ificance of petitioners' claim. 311 F. Supp., at 1280-12S2 ._
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nificantly the disabilities imposed by the President's
action. We are not free to disregard the practical realities. MR. JUSTICE STE\VAHT has made the salient point:
"Freedoms such as these are protected not only against
heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled
by more subtle governmental interference." Bates v.
City of Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 523 (1960) . See
also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 263 (1957)
(Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring); Watkins v.
United States, 354 U . S. 178, 197 (1957).
The opinions below also assumed that petitioners had
the burden of showing entitlement to recognition by the
fpllege. 10 While petitioners have not challenged the
procedural requirement that they file an application
in conformity ,,·itli'I rules of the College, 11 they do
question the view of the courts belo"· that final rejection could rest on their failure to convince the administration that their organization was unaffiliated with
the National SDS. For reasons to be stated later in
this opinion , we do not consider the issue of affiliation
to be a controlling one. But apart from any particular issue, once petitioners had filed an application in
conformity ,vith college requirements, the burden was
upon the College administration to justify its decision
"'-!-1-:'5 F. 2d. at 1131: 319 F. Supp ., at 116.
Thr ~t:11Jd:1nl~ fo r official recognition rrq uirr. .ipplicant~ to
prO\·ide a clear st.itcment of purposes, criteria for membership , rules
of procedure, and a li,t of officers. Applicants must limit membership to "matriculated students" and ma:v not discriminate on the
ba sis of race, religion or nationalit_v. The standards further state
that groups may "examine and discuss all questions of interest,"
they may conduct demonstrations and utilize their right of petition ,
but they are prohibited from interfering with the rights of other
students. See n . 5, supra. Petitioners have not challenged these
~tnnchrcl., and t heir rnlidit.>- i~ not, here in qurHion.
11
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of rejection. See, e. g., Law Students Civil Rights R esearch Council v. TVadmond, 401 U. S. 154, 162-163
( 1971); United Stat es Y. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-377
( 1968); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958). It
is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial
of recognition was a form of prior restraint, denying to
petitioners' organization the range of associational activities described above. While a college has a legitimate
interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which
under circumstances requiring the safeguarding of that
interest may justify such restraint, a "heavy burden"
rests on the college to demonstrate the appropriateness
of that action. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697,
713-716 (1931); Organization for a Better Austin v.
K eefe, 402 U. S. 415, 418 (1971); Freedman Y. Maryland, 380 U . S. 51 , 57 (1965).

III
These fundamental errors-discounting the existence
of a cognizable First Amendment interest and misplacing the burden of proof-require that the judgments
belo"· be reversed. But we are unable to conclude that
no basis exists upon ·which nonrecognition might be appropriate. Indeed, based on a reasonable reading of
the ambiguous facts of this case, there appears to be
at least one potentially acceptable ground for a denial
of recognition. Because of this ambiguous state of the
record we conclude that the case should be remanded,
and, in an effort to provide guidance to the lower courts
upon reconsideration, it is appropriate to discuss the
several bases of President James' decision. Four possible justifications for nonrecognition , an closely related,
might be derived from the record and his statements.
Three of those grounds are inadequate to substantiate
his decision: a fourth , however, has merit.
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A

From the outset the controversy in this case has centered in large measure around the relationship, if any,
between petitioners' group and the National SDS. The
Student Affairs Committee meetings, as reflected in its
minutes, focused considerable attention on this issue;
the court-ordered hearing also was directed primarily
to this question. Despite assurances from petitioners
and their counsel that the local group ,,vas in fact independent of the K ational organization, it is evident that
President James was significantly influenced by his apprehension that there was a connection. Aware of the
fact that some SDS chapters had been associated with
disruptive and violent campus activity, he apparently
considered that affiliation itself was sufficient justification for denying recognition. 1 2
Although this precise issue has not come before the
Court heretofore, the Court has consistently disapproved
governmental action imposing criminal sanctions or denying rights and privileges solely because of a citizen's
association with an unpopular organization. See, e. g. ,
United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 ( 1967); Keyishian
v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 605-610 (1967);
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11 (1966); Scales v.
United States, 367 U. S. 203 (1961) . In these cases
it has been established that. "guilt by association alone,
without [establishing] that an individual's association
poses the threat feared by the Government," is an impermissible basis upon which to deny First Amendment
rights. United St.ates v. Robel, 389 U. S., at 265. The
Government has the burden of establishing a knowing
affiliation with an organization possessing unlawful aims
1

"

See 11. 4, supra, for the complete text of the Prc~idcnt',, statement ..
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and goals, and a specific intent to further those illegal
aims.1 3
Students for a Democratic Society, as conceded by the
College and the lower courts, is loosely organized, having
various factions and promoting a number of diverse social
and political views, only some of which call for unlawful
action. 14 Not only did petitioners proclaim their complete independence from this organization, 15 but they also
indicated that they shared only some of the beliefs its
leaders have expressed.rn On this record it is clear that
the relationship was not an adequate ground for the
denial of recognition.

B
Having concluded that petitioners were affiliated with,
or at least retained an affinity for, National SDS, President James attributed what he believed to be the philosophy of that organization to the local group. He
1

" In .1-ddition to the cases cited in the text abow,, see also Law
Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154,
164-166 (1971); In re Stolar, 401 U. S. 23, 28 (1971); Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Noto v. United States,
367 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1961).
14
See FBI, Appropriation 59-60 (1972), in which the former Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover, states
that while violent factions have spun off from SDS, its present
leadership is "critical of bombing and violence."
15
Petitio11ers asserted their independence both oral!>· :rnd in a
written submission before the Student Affairs Committee. They restated their nonaffiliation in a formal statement filed prior to the
court-ordered hearing. The only indication to the contrary is their·
unwillingness to eschew use of the SDS name altogether. But see·
n. 3, supra.
16
Representatives of the group stated during the Student Affair,;
Committee meetings that they did not identify with all of the National's statements, but wished simply to "pick . . . certain ideas"·
from that organization.
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characterized the petitioning group as adhering to "some
of the major tenets of the national organization," including a philosophy of violence and disruption. 11 Understandably, he found that philosophy abhorrent. In an
article signed by President James in an alumni periodical, and made a part of the record belovY, he announced
his mrn·illingness to "sanction an organization that openly
advocates the destruction of the very ideals and freedoms
upon "·hich the aca.demic life is founded." He further
emphasized that the petitioners' "philosophies" were
"counter to the official policy of the college."
The mere disagreement of the President \\·ith the
group's philosophy affords no reason to deny it recognition. As repugnant as these views may have been,
especially to one with President James' responsibility,
the mere expression of them would not justify the denial
of First Amendment rights. Whether petitioners did
in fact advocate a philosophy of "destruction" thus becomes immaterial. The College, acting here as the instrumentality of the State, may not restrict speech or
association simply because it finds the views expressed
by any group to be abhorrent. As Mr. Justice Black
put it most simply and clearly:
"I do not believe that it can be too often repeated
that the freedoms of speech, press. petition and
assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must
be accorded to the ideas "·e hate or sooner or later
they will be denied to the ideas we cherish." Communist Party,·. Subversive Activities Control Board,
367 u. s. 1, 137 (1961).
C

As the litigation progressed in the District Court, a
third rationale for President James' decision-beyond
17

See n. 4, supra.
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the questions of affiliation and philosophy-began to
emerge. His second statement, issued after the courtordered hearing. indicates that he based rejection on
a conclusion that this particular group would be a "disruptive influence at CCSC." This language ,vas underscored in the second District Court opinion. In fact,
the Court concluded tha.t the President had determined
that CCSC-SDS's "prospective campus a.ctivities were
likely to cause a disruptive influence at CCSC." 319
F. Supp., at 116.
If this reason, directed at the organization's activities
rather than its philosophy, were factually supported by
the record , this Court's prior decisions would provide
a basis for considering the propriety of nonrecognition.
The critical line heretofore drawn for determining the
permissibility of regulation is the line between mere
advocacy and advocacy "directed to inciting or producing imminent la"·less action and ... likely to incite
or produce such action." Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U. S.
444. 447 (1969) (unanimous per curiam opinion). See
also Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 230-232
(1961); Noto v. Unit ed States, 367 U.S. 289, 298 (1961);
Yates Y. United States, 354 U. S. 298 (1957). In the
context of the "special characteristics of the school
environment~' l R the po,Yer of the government to prohibit "la,vless action" is not limited to acts of a criminal
nature. Also prohibitable are actions " ·hich "materially
and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the
school." T'inker v. Des J.vf oines Independent Community School District, 393 U. S., at 513. Associational
activities need not be tolerated where they infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes or substantially
interfere v.:ith the opportunity of other students to obtain an education.
' ' Tink er

at 506.

Y.

D es Moines Ind. Commun ity School Dist., 393 U . S.,
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The "Student Bill of Rights" at CCSC, upon which
great emphasis was placed by the President, draws precisely this distinction between advocacy and action . It
purports to impose no limitations on the right of college student organizations "to examine and discuss all
questions of interest to them." But it also states that
students have no right ( 1) "to deprive others of the opportunity to speak or be heard," (2) "to invade the
privacy of others," (3) "to damage the property of
others," ( 4) "to disrupt the regular and essential or:ieration of the colle e" or (5) "to interfere with the rights
o o ers." rn The Iii between permissible speech and
impermissible conduct racks the constitutional requirement, and if there were an evidential basis to support
the conclusion that CCSC-SDS posed a substantial threat
of material disruption in violation of that command the
President's decision should be affirmed.~ 0
The record, however, offers no substantial basis for
that conclusion. The only support for the view expressed by the President, other than the repu~ted
affiliation with Kational SDS, is to be found in the

/
A
. · ,,_ -c-p v f ecf
r

rn Seen. 5,. supra.
00
It, may not be sufficient merely t,o show the existence of a le~iti-

mate and substantial state interest. Where state action designed to·
regulate prohibitable action also restricts associational rights- as
nonrecognition does- the State must demonstrate that the action
taken is reasonably related to protection of the State's interest and
that "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms~
rs no greater than ~ssential to the furtherance of that interest.~ '--..,/
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U . S. 367,377 (1968). See also NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 337 U. S. 288 (1964); Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539,546 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel . Patterson, 357 U. S. 444 (1958). On this record, absent a
showing of any likelihood of disruption or unwillingne~s to recognize
reasonable rules governing campus conduct, it is not necessary for
us to decide whether denial of recognition is an appropriately related
and narrow response.
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ambivalent responses offered by the group's representatives at the Student Affairs Committee hearing, during
which they stated that they did not know whether they
might respond to "issues of violence" in the same manner that other SDS chapters had on other campuses.
Nor would they state unequivocally that they could
never "envision . . . interrupting a class." Whatever
force these statements might be thought to have is
largely dissipated by the following exchange between
petitioners' counsel and the Dean of Student Affairs
during the court-ordered hearing:
"Counsel: I just read the document that you're
offering [minutes from Student Affairs Committee
meeting] and I can't see that there's anything in
it that intimates that these students contemplate
any illegal or disruptive practice.
"Dean: No. There's no question raised to that,
counsel."
Dean Judd's remark reaffirms, in accord with the full
record, that there was no substantial evidence that
these particular individuals acting together would constitute a disruptive force on campus. Therefore, insofar
as nonrecognition flowed from such fears, it constituted
little more than the sort of "undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance [ which] is not enough toovercome the right of freedom of expression." Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U. S., at 508.
D
These same references in the record to the group's
equivocation regarding how it might respond to "issues
of violence" and ·whether it could ever "envision . . .
interrupting a class," suggest a fourth possible reason why
recognition might have been denied to these petitioners.
These remarks might well have been read as announcing-

71-452-0PINION

HEALY v. JAMES

22

petitioners' unwillingness to be bound by reasonable
school rules governing conduct. The College's Statement of Rights, Freedoms and Responsibilities of Students, contains, as we have seen, an explicit statement
with res,pect to campus disruption . The regulation,
carefully differentiating between advocacy and action, is
a reasonable one}and petitioners have not questioned
it directly. "1 Yet their statements raise considerable
question whether they intend to abide by the prohibitions contained therein. 2 2
As we have already stated in Parts B and C, the critica.l line for First Amendment purposes must be drawn
between advocacy, 1Yhich is entitled to full protection,
1
See 11. 5. supra.
"" The Court of A )pe:1ls found th:1t petit,ioner, "failed cnndidl_\·
to respon
o inqui s whether they would resort to Yiolenre and
cli:;;ruption on the CC ... C rmnpus, including interruption of rlni',e.,."
4--J..5 F. 2d, at 1131. 1''hile pet ii ion er:;' stntRmeuts mn_\· be read ns
intim:1ting ::i. rejection of ren,onnblc regulntion~ in ndrnnce, 1here is
in fact substantinl ambiguity on t,his point. The que~ tion~ :1,ked
by member,:; of the Student Affoirs Committee do not appear to ban
been propounded ,rith a.n_\· clear di81inction in mind be.h,·ern thnt
"·hich the pet-itioner, might ndrncn,te n.nd the conduct in whirh
th\j)might. eng,1ge. ::'\or did the St,udent Aff:1.ir,:; Committee attempt.
to obt.:.in :1. clarification of the petitioner~' :1.rnbiguous ans,rers b_\·
n~king speci.fic:tll_\' whether the group "·:is willing to :1bide b_\· tl w
Student Bill of Rights gm·erning a.II campus org,1nizations.
:\Ioreon:r, this question was not among t.hol'e referred h_\· thr,
District Court to the admini~tratiYe hearing. and it m1s tlwre addressed onl_,. taug;entiall:1·. The group mrmber~ who had
st:.tements before the Student Affair~ Commit,t ee did not, testif~·
:.ml their posihon wn s not clnrified. Their counsel, "·hose tac-tics
were characterized as "clisruptiye" by the Court of Appe:ils, elected
to nmke argumcntat.i\·e st:1.t.ements rather th:rn elicit rcle,·ant 1r~t imon>·· Id., at 1126. Indeed. the District Court's failure to identif~t.he que.;:tion of willingness to a.bide b.\- tJ,e College'~ rul es and regula1ions :1s a, signifirnnt subject of inquiry, coupled ,Yit.h the eqnirnrat,ion on the part of the group's represent.at iYes, lend support to our
Yiew that a rem:1nd is nece.,:sa r_\·.
"

P1

m
:.den f)
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and action , which is not. Petitioners may, if they so
choose, preach the propriety of amending or even doing
away ,Yith any or all campus regulations. They may
not, however, undertake to flout these rules. MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, at the time he was a circuit judge on
the Eighth Circuit, stated:
"We . . . hold that a college has the inherent power
to promulgate rules and regulations; that it has
the inherent po,rnr properly to discipline; that it
has power appropriately to protect itself and its
property; that it ma.y expect that its students adhere to generally accepted standards of conduct."
Esteban Y. Central Mi.ssouri State College, 415 F.
2d 1077, 1089 (CA8 1969), cert. denied, 398 U. S.
965 (1970).
Just as in the community at large, reasonable regulations ,Yith respect to the time, the place. and the manner
in which student groups conduct their speech-related
activities must be respected. 2 'i A college administration may impose a requirement, such as tfis QJJe Pppa.e:., ?7>"-'f
~ imposed in this case, that a group seeking official
recognition affirm in advance its willingness to adhere
to reasonable campus law. Such a requirement does
not impose an impermissible condition on the students'
associational rights. Their freedom to speak out, to
assemble, or to petition for changes in school rules is
in no sense infringed . It merely constitutes an agreement to conform with reasonable standards, respecting
conduct. This is a minimal requirement in the interest ~ ·
of the entire academic community, of
group seek}
ing the privilege of official recognition.
M;. e1-y.,,, a.d. v. C.il·y a -5, !f',er~ /.r;._ )

lity

J ,

"" Srr, e.g., OiY!f"~! Oliieago •. tl.,!;ose,,-g- U. S. - , (1972):
Adderley Y. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 47-48 (1966) ; Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP,
:36G U. S. 293, 397 ( 1961).
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V.

J A~rns

Petitioners have not challenged in this litigation the
procedural or substantive aspects of the College's requirements governing applications for official recognition.
Although the record is unclear on this point, CCSC may
have, among its requirements, for recognition, a rule
that prospective groups affirm that they intend to comply with rea~onable campus regulations. Upon remand
it should first be determined whether the College recognition procedures contemplate any such requirement.
If so, it should then be ascertained whether petitioners
intend to comply. Since we do not have the terms of
a specific prior affirmation rule before us, we are not
called on to decide whether any particular formulation
would or would not prove constitutionally acceptable.
Assuming the existence of a valid rule, however, we do
conclude that the benefits of participation in the internal
life of the college community may be denied to any ·
group that reserves the right to violate any Acampus "
, ,
rules with which they disagree. 24

IV
We think the above discussion establishes the appropriate framework for consideration of petitioners' request for campus recognition. Because respondents
failed to accord due recognition to First Amendment
principles, the judgment below approving respondents'
denial of recognition must be reversed. Since we can4

In addition to the College administration's broad rulcmaking
power to assure that the traditional academic atmo~phrre is s:tfeguarded, it m ay also impose sanct,ions on those \\·ho ,-iolat.c tJ1c
rules. We find, for insta nce, tl1a.t. the St.udent Affairs Committee's
admonition to pet.itioners in this case suggests one permis~iblc practice--recognit.ion, once accorded, may be withdra\\"11 or rnspended
if pet,itioners fail to respect campus lmL See, e. g., Mississippi Civil
Liberties Union v. Un iversity of Southern Mississip pi, Ko. 71-1801
(CA5 1971); American Civil Liberties Unio11 v. Radford College,
315 F. Supp. 893 (\VD Va. 1970).
"
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not conclude from this record that petitioners were willing to abide by reasonable campus rules and regulations,
we order the case remanded for reconsideration . We note,
in so holding, that the wide latitude accorded by the Constitution to the freedoms of expression and association is
not without its costs in terms of the risk to the maintenance of civility and an ordered society. Indeed, this
latitude often has resulted, on the campus and elsewhere,
in the infringement of the rights of others. Though wedeplore the tendency of some to abuse the very constitutional privilges they invoke, and although the infringement of rights of others certainly should not be tolerated,
we reaffirm this, Court's dedication to the principles of the
Bill of Rights upon which our vigorous and free society
is founded.
Reversed and remanded_
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MR. J usTICE POWELL delivered the opm10n of the
Court.
This case, arising out of a denial by a state college
of official recognition to a group of students who desired
to form a local chapter of Students for a Democratic
Society (SDS) , presents this Court with questions requiring the application of ,Yell-established First Amendment principles. While the factual background of this
particular case raises these constitutional issues in a
manner not heretofore passed on by the Court, and only
infrequently presented to lower fed eral courts, our decision today is governed by existing precedent.
As the case involves delicate issues concerning the
academic community, we approach our task with special
caution, recognizing the mutual interest of students, faculty members, and administrators in an environment free
from disruptive interference with the educational process.
We also are mindful of the equally significant interest
in the widest latitude for fre e expression and debate
consonant with the maintenance of order. Where these
interests appear to compete the First Amendment, made
binding on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,
strikes the required balance.
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We mention briefly at the outset the setting in 19691970. A climate of unrest prevailed on many college
campuses in this country. There had been widespread
civil disobedience on some campuses, accompanied by
the seizure of buildings. vandalism, and arson. Some
colleges had been shut down altogether, while at others
files were looted and manuscripts destroyed. SDS chapters on some of those campuses had been a catalytic
force during this period. 1 Although the causes of campus disruption were many and complex, one of the prime
consequences of such activities was the denial by the
few of the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights
to the majority of students. Indeed, many of the most
cherished characteristics long associated with institutions
of higher learning appeared to be endangered. Fortunately, with the passage of time, a calmer atmosphere
and greater maturity now pervade our campuses. Yet,
it was in this climate of earlier unrest that this case
arose.
Petitioners are students attending Central Connecticut State College (CCSC), a state-supported institution
of higher learning. In September 1969 they undertook
to organize what they then referred to as a "local chapter" of Students for a Democratic Society ( SDS ) . Pursuant to procedures established by the College, petitioners filed a request for official recognition as a campus
organization ,vith the Student Affairs Committee, a committee composed of four students, three faculty members
and the Dean of Student Affairs. The request specified three purposes for the proposed organization 's existence. It would provide "a forum of discussion and
' SPc R eport of the Prr~idellt'~ Conun 'n on C:.i rnpH, Unrest (1970) :
R epor t of the ABA Comm·n on C::un pu~ Go \·'t nnd Student Di~~rnt
(1970) .
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self-education for students developing an analysis of
American society"; it would serve as an "agency for
integrating thought ,vith action so as to bring about
constructive changes"; and it would endeavor to provide a "coordinating body for relating the problems of
leftist students" with other interested groups on campus and in the community.2 The Committee, while
satisfied that the statement of purposes ,va.s clear and
unobjectionable on its face, exhibited concern over the
relationship between the proposed local group and the
National SDS organization. In response to inquiries,
representatives of the proposed organization stated that
they would not affiliate with any national orga.nization and that their group would remain "completely
independent."
In response to other questions asked by Committee
members concerning SDS's reputation for campus disruption, the applicants made the following statements,
which proved significant during the later stages of these
proceedi11g~:
"Q. How would you respond to issues of violence
as other SDS chapters have?
"A. Our action would have to be dependent upon
each issue.
"Q. Would you use any means possible?
"A. No I can't say that; would not know untiJ
we know what the issues are.
"Q. Could you env1s10n the S. D. S. interrupt-ing a class?
"A. Impossible for me to say."
With this information before it, the Committee reThe statement of purposes is set out in full in the dissentingopinion from the deci~ion of the Second Circuit. Healy v. James, 445
F. 2d 1112, 1136-1137 (1971).
2
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quested an additiona.l filing by the applicants, including a formal statement regarding affiliations. The
amended application filed in response stated flatly that
"CCSC Students for a Democratic Society are not under
the dictates of any National organization." 3 At a second hearing before the Student Affairs Committee, the·
question of relationship with the National organization
was raised again. One of the organizers explained that
the National SDS was divided into several "factional
groups," that the national-local relationship was a loose
one, and that the local organization accepted only "certain ideas" but not all of the National organization's
aims and philosophies.
By a vote of six to two the Committee ultimately
approved the application and recommended to the President of the College, Dr. James, that, the organization
be accorded official recognition. In approving the application, the majority indicated that its decision was
premised on the belief that varying viewpoints should
be represented on campus and that since the Young
Americans for Freedom, the Young Democrats, the
Young Republicans, and the Liberal Party all enjoyed
recognized status, a group should be available with which
"left wing" students might identify. The majority also•
noted and relied on the organization's claim of independence. Finally, it admonished the organization that
immediate suspension would be considered if the group's
activities proved incompatible with the school's policies
against interference with the privacy of other students
3 445 F. 2d, at 1137.
During the Committee's consideration of
1ictitioners' appli cation , one of the group's representRtivc" \\'a,i as ked
why, if it indeed desired to remain independent, it chose to use a
nationally known name. The witness' response was that "the name
brings to mind the type of organization we wish to bring across,
that is a left-wing organization which will allow students interested
in such to express themselves."
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or destruction of property. The two dissenting members based their reservation primarily on the lack of
clarity regarding the organization's independence.
Several days later, the President rejected the Committee's n:commendation, and issued a statement indicating that petitioners' organization v.-as not to be accorded the benefits of official campus recognition. His
accompanying remarks, which are set out in full in the
margin,4 indicate several reasons for his action. He
The President stated:
"Though I have full appreciation for the action of the Student Affairs Committee and the reasons stated in their minutes for the·
majority vote recommending approval of a local chapter of Students
for a Democratic Society, it is my judgment that the statement of
purpose to form n ]o('al chapter of Students for a Democrntic Societ~·
carries full and unmistakable adherence to at least ~orne of the
major tenets of the national organization. loose and dividPd though
that org:rnization ma~- be. The published aims and philosoph~- of
the Students for a Democra.tic Society, which include disruption
and violence, are contrary to the approved policy (by faculty,
students, and administration) of Central Connecticut State Collegt
which states :
"'Students do not have the right to invade the privac~- of others,
to damage the property of others, to disrupt the regular and essential operation of the college, or to interfere with the rights of
others.'
"The further statement on the request for recognition that 'CCSG
Students for a Democratic Society are not under the dictates of any
National organization' in no way clarifies why if a group intends to,
follow the established policy of the college, they wish to become a
local chapter of an organization which openly repudiates such a
policy.
"Freedom of speech, academic freedom on the campus, the freedom
of establishing an open forum for the exchange of ideas, the freedoms
outlined in the Statement on Rights, Freedoms, and Responsibilities
of Students that 'college students and student organizations shall have
the right to examine and discuss all questions of interest to them, to
express opinion publicly and privately, and to support causes by
orderly means. They may organize public demonstrations and protest gatherings and utilize the right of petition'-these are all precious
4
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found that the organization's philosophy was antithetical
to the school's policies,5 and that the group's independence was doubtful. He concluded that approval should
freedoms that we cherish and are freedoms on which we stand. To
approve any organization or individual who joins with an organization which openly repudiates those principles is contrary to those
freedoms and to the apprO\·ed 'Statement on the Rights, Freedom~,
and Rr;;ponsibilities of Students' at Cen1 ral.'"
5 In 1969 , CCSC adopted, as have many other colleges and universities, a Sta.tcment of Rights, Freedoms, and Responsibilities of
Rtudents . This statement , commonly referred to ::is the "Student
Bill of Rights," is printed as an Appendix to the Rcconcl Circuit's
majority opinion in this case, H ealy v. James, 445 F. 2d, at 1132-1136
( 1971). Part Y of that statement e~ta blishcs t he stancb,rds fo r approval of campus organizations and imposes several basic limitations
on their campus activities:
"A, Care shall be taken in the establishment and organization
of campus groups so that the basic rights, freedoms and responsibilities of students will be preserved.
"B. Student organizations shall submit a clc:ir statement of purpose, criteri:1. for membrrship, rules of proredurrs ::ind a fo t of
offirers as a condition of institutional recognition. They shall not be
required to submit a membership list as a condition of inst itutional
recognition.
"C. Membership in campus organizations shall be limited to
mat riculated students (day or evening) at the college. Membershipshall not be restrict ed by race, religion or nationalit~-- The members
shall have sole power to determine organization policy consistent wit h
the regulations of the college,
"D, Each organization is free to choose its own adviser. Advisers
to organizations shall advise but not control the organizations and
their policies,
"E. College students and student organizations shall have the right
t o examine and discuss all questions of interest to them , to express
opinion public]~· and private!~·, and to suppor t causes b~· orderly
means, The~· may organizr public demonstrations and protest
gatherings and utilize the right of pet ition. Students do not havethe right to deprive others of the opportunity to speak or be heard,
to invade the prime~• of others, to damage the property of others,.
10 disrupt the regular and essential operation of the eollcgr , or to
intrrfere with the rights of others."
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))Ot be granted to any group that "openly repudiates"
the College's dedication to academic freedom.
Denial of official recognition posed serious problems
for the organization's existence and growth. Its members \Vere deprived of the opportunity to place announcements regarding meetings, rallies or other activities in
the student newspaper; they were precluded from using
various campus bulletin boards; and-most importantly-nonrecognition barred them from using campus
facilities for holding meetings. This latter disability
was brought home to petitioners shortly after the President's announcement. Petitioners circulated a notice
calling a meeting to discuss ,vhat further action should
be taken in light of the group's official rejection. The
members met at the coffee shop in the Student Center
("Devil's Den") but were disbanded on the President's
order since nonrecognized groups were not entitled to
use such facilities. ~
Their efforts to gain recognition having proved ultimately unsuccessful, and having been made to feel the
burden of nonrecognition, petitioners resorted to the
courts. They filed a suit in the Federal District Court
in Connecticut, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the President of the College, other administrators, and the State Board of Trustees. Petitioners'
6
During the meeting petitioners were approached by two of the
Coltrgc'.- dc:m, 1\·ho f'CJTed pctitio rH'r,- wirh a mcmor:,ndum from
the President stating:
" Notice has been receiYed by this office of a meeting of the
'C. C. S. C.-S. D. S. on Thusrda.y -November 6 at 7 :00 p. m. at
the Devils' Den.'
"Such meeting may not take place in the Devils Den of the Student Center nor in or on any other property of the college since the
C. C. S. C.-S .. D. S. if' not a chrl~· recognized rollcgc organization.
"You are hereb)· notified by this action to cease and desist from
meeting on the college property."
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primary complaint centered on the denial of First Amendment rights of expression and association arising from
denial of campus recognition. The cause was submitted
initially on stipulated facts and, after a short hearing,
the judge ruled that petitioners had been denied procedural due process because the President had based
his decision on conclusions regarding the applicant's
affiliation which were outside the record before him.
The court concluded that if the President ,vi.shed to act
on the basis of material outside the application he must
at least provide petitioners a hearing and opportunity J
to introduce evidence as to their affiliations. 311 F.
Supp., at 1276, 1281. While retaining jurisdiction over
the case, the District Court ordered respondents to hold
a hearing in order to clarify the several ambiguities surrounding the President's decision. One of the matters to
be explored was whether the local organization , true to its
repeated affirmations, was in fact independent of the National SDS. Id., at 1282. And if the hearing demonstrated that the two were not separable, the respondents
were instructed that they might then review the "aims
and philosophy" of the National organization. Ibid.
Pursuant to the court's order, the President designated Dean Judd, the Dean of Student Affairs, to serve
as hearing officer and a hearing was scheduled. The
hearing, which spanned two dates and lasted approximately two hours, added little in terms of objective
substantive evidence to the record in this case. Petitioners introduced a statement offering to change the
organization's name from "CCSC local chapter of SDS"
to "Students for a Democratic Society of Central Connecticut State College." They further reaffirmed that
they would "have no connection whatsoever to the
structure of an existing national organization." 7 Peti7

319 F. Supp., at 114. The hearing officer, o,-er petitioners' objection, ruled that the statement was inadmissible apparently on the·
ground that it would constitute an amendment to the original appli-
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tioners also introduced the testimony of their faculty
adviser to the effect that some local SDS organizations
elsewhere were unaffiliated with any national organization. The hearing officer, in addition to introducing
the minutes from the two pertinent Student Affairs Committee meetings, also introduced sua sponte portions
of a transcript of hearings before the United States
House of Representatives Internal Security Committee
investigating the activities of SDS. Excerpts ,vere offered both to prove that violent and disruptive activities
had been attributed to SDS elsewhere and to demonstrate that there existed a national organization that
recognized and cooperated with regional and local collegecampus affiliates. Petitioners did not challenge the asserted existence of a National SDS, nor did they ques-tion that it did have a system of affiliations of somesort. Their contention was simply that their organization would not associate with that network. Throughout the hearing the parties were acting at cross purposes.
What seemed relevant to one appeared completely immaterial to the other. This failure of the hearing to
advance the litigation was, at bottom, the consequence·
of a more basic failure to join issue on the considerations that should control the President's ultimate decision, a problem to which we will return in the ensuing·
section .
Upon reviewing the hearing transcript and exhibits,
the President reaffirmed his prior decision to deny petitioners recognition as a campus organization. The·
reasons stated, closely paralleling his initial reasons, were
that the group would be a "disruptive influence" at
CCSC and that recognition would be "contrary to the
orderly process of change" on the campus.
cation and would be beyond the permissible scope of the hearing.
Whatever the merits of this ruling, it was still in the record re-Yiewcr! by the President and ,ms relied on in t he subsequent District
Court opinion without reference to its prior exclusion. Ibid.
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After the President's second statement issued, the case
then returned to the District Court where it was ordered
dismissed. The court concluded, first, that the formal
requisites of procedural due process had been complied
with, second, that petitioners had failed to meet their
burden of showing that they could function free from
the Kational organization, and, third, that the College's
refusal to place its stamp of approval on an organization whose conduct it found "likely to cause violent acts
of disruption" did not violate petitioners' associa.tional
rights. 319 F. Supp. 113.
Petitioners appealed to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals where, by a two-to-one vote, the District Court's
judgment was affirmed. The majority purported not
to reach the substantive First Amendment issues on the
theory that petitioners had failed to avail themselves
of the due process accorded them and had failed to meet
their burden of complying with the prevailing standards for recognition. 445 F. 2d, at 1131-1132. Judge
Smith dissented, disagreeing with the majority's refusal
to address the merits and finding that petitioners had
been deprived of basic First Amendment rights. Id.,
at 1136. This Court granted certiorari and, for the
reasons that follow, ,ye conclude that the judgment
of the courts below must be reversed and the case renrn.nded for reconsideration.

II
At the outset we note that state colleges and universi-f
ties are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First
Amendment. "It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of expression at the schoolhouse ga.te." Tinker
Y. Des J.11 oines Independent Community School D1·strict, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). Of course, as Mr. Justice Fort.as made clear in Tinker, First Amendment rjghts
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must always be applied "in light of the special characteristics of the . .. environment" in the particular case.
Ibid. And, "·here state-operated educational institutions are involved , this Court has long recognized "the
need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the
states and of school officials, consistent with fundamental
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control con duct in the schools." Id., at 507. Yet, the precedents of
this Court leave no room for the vie"· that, because of
the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply ,vith less force on college campuses than in the community at large. Quite to the
contrary, " [ t] he vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is no,Yhere more vital than in the community
of American schools." Shelton v. 'Pucker, 314 U . S.
479, 487 (1960) . The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the "market place of
ideas" and n·e break no ncn· constitutional ground in
reaffirming this Nation's ded ication to safeguarding academic freedom . K ey-ishian Y. Board of Regents, 385
U. S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U. S. 234, 249-250 (plurality opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Warren) , 262 (1957) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion) .
Among the rights protected by the First Amendment is
the right of individuals to associate to further their personal beliefs. While the freedom of association is not explicitly set out in the Amendment, it has long been held
to be implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly and
petition. See, e. g., Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401
U. S. 1, 6 (1971); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415,
430 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP,
36G U. S. 293, 296 (1961); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958) (Mr. Justice Harlan
for a unanimous Court). There can be no doubt that
denial without justification of official recognition to col-
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lege organizations burdens or abridges that associational right. The primary impediment to free association flowing from nonrecognition is the denial of use of
campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate
purposes. The practical effect of nonrecognition v.:as
demonstrated in this case when, several days after the
President's decision was announced, petitioners were not
allowed to hold a meeting in the campus coffee shop
because they were not an approved group .
Petitioners' associational interests also were circumscribed by the denial of the use of campus bulletin boards
and the school newspaper. If an organization is to remain a viable entity in a campus community in which
new students enter on a regular basis, it must possess
the means of communicating with these students. Moreover, the organization's ability to participate in the intellectual give and take of campus debate, and to pursue
its stated purposes, is limited by denial of access to the
customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and other students. 8 Such
impediments cannot be viewed as insubstantial.
Respondents and the courts below appear to have
taken the view that denial of official recognition in this
case abridged no constitutional rights. The District
Court concluded that,
"President James' discretionary action in deny-

-~~~

' It is uncle:ir on this record whether recognition also carri es with
it a right to seek funds from the school budget. Petitioners' counsel
at oral argument indicated that official recognition entitled the group
to "make application for use of student funds." Tr. of Oral Arg.,
at 4. The first District Court opinion, however, states flatly that
"[r]ecognition does not thereby entitle an organization to college
financial support." 311 F. Supp., at 1277. Since it appears that,
at the least, recognition only entitles a group to apply for funds,
and since the record is silent as to the criteria used in allocating
such funds, we do not consider possible funding as an associational
aspect of nonrecognition in this case.
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ing this application cannot be legitimately magnified and distorted into a constitutionally cognizable
interference with the personal ideas or beliefs of
any segment of the college students; neither does
his action deter in any material way the individual
advocacy of their personal beliefs; nor can his action
be reasonably construed to be an invasion of, or
have a chilling effect on academic freedom." 319'
F. Supp., at 116.

In that court's view all that was denied petitioners was
the "administrative seal of official college respectability." 9 Ibid. A majority of the Court of Appeals,
agreed that petitioners had been denied only the "college's stamp of approval." 445 F . 2d, at 1131. Respondents take that same position here, arguing that
petitioners still may meet as a group off campus, that
they still may distribute written material off campus,.
and that they still may meet together informally on
campus-as individuals but not as CCSC-SDS.
We do not agree with the characterization by the
courts below of the consequences of nonrecognition. We
may concede, as did Mr. Justice Harlan in his unanimous
opinion for the Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 461 (1958), that the administration "has taken no direct action . . . to restrict the
rights of petitioners' members to associate freely." But
the Constitution's protection is not limited to direct
interference with fundamental rights. The requirement
in Patterson that the NAACP disclose its membership
lists was found to be an impermissible, though indirect,
infringement of the members' associational rights. Likewise, in this case, the group's possible ability to exist
outside the campus community does not ameliorate sigu These sta tements are in contrast to th e fir~t opinion by t he
District Court, which reflected a full appreciation of the constitutional significance of p etitioners' claim. 311 F. Supp ., at 1280-1282._
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nificantly the disabilities imposed by the President's
action. We are not free to disregard the practical realities. MR. JusTICE STEWART has made the salient point:
"Freedoms such as these are protected not only against
heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled
by more subtle governmental interference." Bates Y.
City of Little Rock, 361 U . S. 516, 523 ( 1960). See
also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,263 (1957)
(Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring); ·w atkins v.
United States, 354 U. S. 178, 197 ( 1957) .
The opinions below also as.5umed that petitioners had
the burden of showing entitlement to recognition by the
college. 10 While petitioners have not cha.llenged the)
procedural requirement that they file an application
in conformity "·ith rules of the College,1 1 they do
question the view of the courts below that final rejection could rest on their failure to convince the administration that their organization was unaffiliated with
the National SDS. For reasons to be stated later in
this opinion, we do not consider the issue of affiliation
to be a controlling one. But a.part from any particular issue, once petitioners had filed an application in
conformity ,,·ith college requirements, the burden was
upon the College administration t-o justify its decision
'" 445 F. 2d. nt 11:n : 319 F . Su pp. , [ It 116.
The ~t:rnrlnnb fo r officinl rcrogn ition rerp1 irc nppli r·:rnt~ to
provide a dear st:itemen t of purposes, cri teria for m embership , rules
of procedure, and a list of officers. Applicants must limit m embership to "matriculated students" and m a~, not discriminate on t he
basis of race, religion or nationality. The standa rds further state
that groups may "examine and discuss all questions of interest,"
they may conduct demonst rations and utilize their right of petition,
but they are prohibited from interfering wit h the righ ts of other
students. See n. 5, supra. P etitioners haYe not challenged these
~ta11dard.3 and their ntlidity is not, hPre in qucstio11.
11

I
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of rejection. See, e. g., Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U. S. 154, 162-163
(1971); United States v . O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-377
(1968); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958). It
is to be remembered that the effect of the College's denial
of recognition ,ms a form of prior restraint, denying to
petitioners' organization the range of associational activities described above. While a college has a legitimate
interest in preventing disruption on the campus, which
under circumstances requiring the safeguarding of that
interest may justify such restraint, a "heavy burden"
rests on the college to demonstrate the appropriateness
of that action. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697,
713-716 (1931); Organization for a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 402 U. S. 415, 418 (1971); Freednian v. J.v laryland, 380 U. S. 51, 57 (1965).

III
These fundamental errors-discounting the existence
of a cognizable First Amendment interest and misplacing the burden of proof-require that the judgments
below be reversed. But we are unable to conclude that
no basis exists upon which nonrecognition might be appropriate. Indeed, based on a reasonable reading of
the ambiguous facts of this case, there appears to be
at least one potentially acceptable ground for a denial
of recognition . Because of this ambiguous state of the
record we conclude that the case should be remanded,
and. in an effort to provide guidance to the lower courts
upon reconsideration, it is a.ppropriate to discuss the
several bases of President James' decision. Four possible justifications for nonrecognition, all closely related,
might be derived from the record and his statements.
Three of those grounds are inadequate to substantiate
his decision: a fourth, however, has merit.
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A
From the outset the controversy in this case has centered in large measure around the relationship, if any,
between petitioners' group and the National SDS. The
Student Affairs Committee meetings, as reflected in its
minutes, focused considerable attention on this issue;
the court-ordered hearing also was directed primarily
to this question. Despite assurances from petitioners
and their counsel that the local group was in fact independent of the Kational organization, it is evident that
President James was significantly influenced by his apprehension that there was a connection. Aware of the
fact that some SDS chapters had been associated with
disruptive and violent campus activity, he apparently
considered that affiliation itself was sufficient justification for denying recognition. 1 2
Although this precise issue has not come before the
Court heretofore, the Court has consistently disapproved
government-al action imposing criminal sanctions or denying rights and privileges solely because of a citizen's
association ·with an unpopular organization. See, e. g.,
United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967); Keyishian
v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 605- 610 (1967);
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11 (1966); Scales v.
United States, 367 U. S. 203 (1961) . In these cases
it has been established that "guilt by association alone,
without [ establishing] that an individual's association
poses the threat feared by the Government," is an impermissible basis upon which to deny First Amendment
rights. United St.ates v. Robel, 389 U. S., at 265. The
Government has the burden of establishing a knowing
affiliation with an organization possessing unlawful aims
1

"

Seen. 4, supra, for the complete text of the Prc~idcnt'Rst/\tement ..
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and goals, and a specific intent to further those illegal
,
•
13
aims.
- ~
Students for a Democratic Society, as conceded by the
College and the lower courts, is loosely organized, having
various factions and promoting a number of diverse social
and political views, only some of which call for unlawful
action. 14 Not only did, petitioners procla.im their complete independence from tllis organization,1 5 but they also
indicated that they shared only some of the beliefs its
leaders have expressed. 16 On this record it is clear that
the relationship was not an adequate ground for the
denial of recognition.
B
Having concluded that petitioners were affiliated with,
or at least retained an affinity for, National SDS, President James attributed what he believed to be the philosophy of that organization to the local group. He
" In :cddition to the cases cited in t he text above,. see also Law
Students Civil R ights R esearch Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154,
164-166 (1971); In re Stolar, 401 U. S. 23, 28 (1971); Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) ; Noto v. Unit ed States,
367 U. S. 290, 299-300 (1961).
14
See FBI , Appropriation 59-60 (1972), in which the fo rmer Director of the F ederal Bureau of Investigation, J . Edgar Hoover, states
that while violent factions have spun off from SDS, its present
leadership is "critical of bombing and violence."
15
P etitioners a.%erted their independence both orally a nd in a
written submission before t he Student Affairs Committee. They restated their nonaffiliation in a formal statement filed prior to the
court-ordered hearing. The only indication to the contrary is their
unwillingness to eschew use of the SDS name altogether. But see
n. 3, supra.
J G Representatives of the group stated during the Student Affair~
Committee meetings that they did not identify with all of the National's statements, but wished simply to "pick . . . certain ideas"·
from that organization.
1
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characterized the petitioning group as adhering to "some
of the major tenets of the national organization," including a philosophy of violence and disruption. 17 Understandably, he found that philosophy abhorrent. In an
article signed by President James in an alumni periodical, and made a part of the record below, he announced
his unwillingness to "sanction an organization that openly
advocates the destruction of the very ideals and freedoms
upon which the academic life is founded." He further \
emphasized that the petitioners' "philosophies" were J
"counter to the official policy of the college."
The mere disagreement of the President "·ith the
group's philosophy affords no reason to deny it recognition. As repugnant as these views may have been,
especially to one with President James' responsibility,
the mere expression of them would not justify the denial
of First Amendment rights. Whether petitioners did
in fact advocate a philosophy of "destruction" thus becomes immaterial The College, acting here as the instrumentality of the State, may not restrict speech or
association simply because it finds the views expressed
by any group to be abhorrent. As Mr. Justice Black
put it most simply and clearly:
"I do not believe that it can be too often repeated
that the freedoms of speech, press, petition and
assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must
be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later
they will be denied to the ideas we cherish." Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board,
367 U. S. 1, 137 (1961).

C
As the litigation progressed in the District Court. a
third rationale for President James' decision-beyond
17

See n. 4, supra.
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the questions of affiliation and philosophy-began to
emerge. His second statement, issued after the courtordered hearing, indicates that he based rejection on
a conclusion that this particular group would be a "disruptive influence at CCSC." This la.nguage was underscored in the second District Court opinion. In fact,
the Court concluded tha.t the President had determined
that CCSC-SDS's "prospective campus activities were
likely to cause a disruptive influence at CCSC." 319
F. Supp., at 116.
If this reason, directed at the organization's activities
rather than its philosophy, were factually supported by
the record, this Court's prior decisions would provide
a basis for considering the propriety of nonrecognition.
The critical line heretofore drawn for determining the
permissibility of regulation is the line between mere
advocacy and advocacy "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and ... likely to incite
or produce such action." Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U. S.
444, 447 (1969) (unanimous per curiani opinion). See
also Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 230-232
(1961); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 289,298 (1961);
Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 (1957). In the
context of the "special characteristics of the school
environment." 1 8 the power of the government to prohibit "lawless action" is not limited to acts of a criminal
nature. Also prohibitable are actions which "materially
and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the
school." Tinker v. Des Afoines Independent Community School District, 393 U. S., at 513. Associational
activities need not be tolerated "·here they infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes or substantially
interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education.
18

Tinker

at 506.

Y.

Des Moines Incl. Community School Dist., 393 U. S.,
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The "Student Bill of Rights" at CCSC, upon ,Yhich
great emphasis was placed by the President, dra,Ys precisely this distinction between advocacy and action. It
purports to impose no limitations on the right of college student organizations "to examine and discuss all
questions of interest to them." But it also states that
students have no right ( 1) "to deprive others of the opportunity to speak or be heard," (2) "to invade the
privacy of others," (3) "to damage the property of
others," ( 4) "to disrupt the regular and essential operation of the college," or ( 5) "to interfere with the rights
of others." rn The lin bet,veen permissible speech and
impermissible conduct tracks the constitutional requirement, and if there were an evidential basis to support
the conclusion that CCSC-SDS posed a substantial threat
of material disruption in violation of that command the
President's decision should be affirmed.20
The record, however, offers no substantial basis for
that conclusion. The only support for the vie"· expressed by the President, other than the repudiated
affiliation with National SDS, is to be found in the
See n. 5;. supra.
It may not be sufficient merely t,o show the. exis1cnce of a legitimate and substantial state interest. Where state action designed to
regulate prohibitable action also restricts associational rights-as
nonrecognition does-the State must demonstrate that the action
faken is reasonably related to protection of the State's interest and
that "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than essential to the furtheran ce of that interest.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U . S. 367,377 (1968). See also NAACP·
v. Alabama ex rel. Flow ers, 337 U. S. 288 (1964); Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Cornrn'n, 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 444 (1958). On this record, absent a
showing of any likelihood of disruption or unwillingness to recog11izc
reasonable rules go\·erning campus conduct, it is not necessary for
us to decide whether denial of recognition is an appropriately related
and narrow response.
rn
~

0
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ambivalent responses offered by the group's representatives at the Student Affairs Committee hearing, during
which they stated that they did not know whether they
might respond to "issues of violence" in the same manner that other SDS chapters had on other campuses.
Nor would they state unequivocally that they could
never "envision . . . interrupting a class." Whatever
force these statements might be thought to have is
largely dissipated by the following exchange between
petitioners' counsel and the Dean of Student Affairs
during the court-ordered hearing:
"Counsel: I just read the document that you're
offering [minutes from Student Affairs Committee
meeting] and I can't see that there's anything in
it that intimates that these students contemplate
any illegal or disruptive practice.
"Dean: No. There's no question raised to that.
counsel."
Dean Judd's remark reaffirms, in accord with the full
record, that there was no substantial evidence that
these particular individuals acting together would constitute a disruptive force on campus. Therefore, insofar
as nonrecognition flowed from such fears, it constituted
little more than the sort of "undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance [ which] is not enough to•
overcome t.he right of freedom of expression." Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U. S., at 508.
D
These same references in the record to the group's
equivocation regarding how it might respond to "issues
of violence" and whether it could ever "envision . . .
interrupting a class," suggest a fourth possible reason why
recognition might have been denied to these petitioners.
These remarks might well have been read as announcing·

/
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petitioners' unwillingness to be bound by reasonable
school rules governing conduct. The College's Statement of Rights, Freedoms and Responsibilities of Students, contains, as we have seen , an explicit statement
with res,pect to campus disruption. The regulation,
carefully differentiating between advocacy and action , is
a reasonable one and petitioners have not questioned
it directly. 2 1 Yet their statements raise considerable
question whether they intend to abide by the prohibitions contained therein. 22
As we have already stated in Parts B and C, the critica.l line for First Amendment purposes must be drawn
bet,rnen advocacy, which is entitled to full protection,
~, See n. 5. supra .
22 The Court of ApJ)c:i!s found that p C't it,ionn~ "fo iled ca ndidly
to respond to inquire~ whether the)· ,rnuld resort to ,·iolen ce and
disruption on the CCSC campu s, in cludin g interru pt.ion of clas~e'3."
4+5 F . 2d, n.t 1131. While iw tit ioners' stat,cmen ts nta)· be rc':td as
intimating a rejection of rea,-onabl e regu lat ions in advance, t here is.
in fa ct substantial ambiguity on t,his point. The que~t ion~ 11,ked
b)' members of the Student Affairs Committee do not nppea r to have
been propou nded wit.h a.n)' clea r distin ction in mind betwee n t hat
whirh the pet-itione r~ migh t adrncat e aml t he rondn rt in "·hieh
lh>·e m ight engage. Kor did t he St,udent Affo.irs Committee attemp t
to obt.ain a. clarifica tion of the petitioners' ambiguous ans,H•rs b)·
a, king specifica ll y whet her th e group " ·as w.illing to abide by tlw
St udent Bill of Rights go,·erning all campus orga niza6ons.
:\Ioreon !S, t his question was not am ong t.J10se referred by th e
Diot rict Com t to t he admi ni~trative hea ri ng . and it m1s there addrc.,scd onl y tangenti::tll)·. The grou p member:; who had m:1 dc
statements before the Student Affairs Committee did not, t estify
and their posibon was not cla.rified . Their coun sel, whose taet irs
were characterized as " disrupt.iye" b_,· the Cour t of Appea l,:, elec ted
to ma.k e argument at,i,·e sta.t.cmcnts rat her t ha.n elicit. rclc,·a nt t e,:t.imon)·. I d., at 1126. Indeed. the District Cour t's fa ilme to ident ify
t he que.st ion of willingnc.~s t o abide b>' the College'~ rul es and regulat ion:, as a significant subj ect of inquir>·, coupled wit,h t he equi Yora t,ion on the pa rt of the group's represent:,ti,·es, !cud support to our
Yic,1· tkit a remand is necessa ry.

\
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and action , which is not. Petitioners may, if they so
choose, preach the propriety of amending or even doing
away with any or all campus regulations. They may
not. however, undertake to flout these rules. MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, at the time he ,rns a circuit judge on
the Eighth Circuit, stated:
"We . .. hold that a college has the inherent po,rnr
to promulgate rules and regula.tions; that it has
the inherent power properly to discip line; that it
has power appropriately to protect itself and its
property; that it ma.y expect that its students adhere to generally accepted standards of conduct."
Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F_
2d 1077, 1089 (CA8 1969), cert. denied, 398 U. S_
965 (1970).
Just as in the community at large, reasonable regulations with respect to the time, the place. a,nd the manner
in which student groups conduct their speech-related
activities must be respected.~" A college administra.tion may impose a requirement, such as the one apparently imposed in this case, that a group seeking official
recognition affirm in advance its willingness to adhere
to reasonable campus law. Such a requirement does
not impose an impermissible condition on the students'
associational rights. Their freedom to speak out, to
assemble, or to petition for changes in school rules is
in no sense infringed. It merely constitutes an agreement to conform with reasonable standards, respecting
conduct. This is a minimal requirement in the interest
of the entire academic community, of any group seeking the privilege of official recognition.
"" Sec, e. g., City of Chicago Y. Mosley, U. S. - , (1972) ;
Adderley Y. Florido, 385 U. S. 39, 47-48 (19GG) ; Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 53G, 558 (1965); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP,
;355 U. S. 293,397 (1961).
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Petitioners have not challenged in this litigation the
procedural or substantive aspects of the College's requirements governing applications for official recognition.
Although the record is unclear on this point, CCSC may
have, among its requirements for recognition, a rule
that prospective groups affirm that they intend to comply with reasonable campus regulations. Upon remand
it should first be determined whether the College recognition procedures contemplate any such requirement.
If so, it should then be ascertained whether petitioners
intend to comply. Since we do not haNe the terms of
a specific prior affirmation rule before us, we are not
called on to decide whether any particular formulation
would or would not prove constitutionally acceptable.
Assuming the existence of a valid rule, however, we do
conclude that the benefits of participation in the internal
life of the college community may be denied to any
group that reserves the right to violate any campus
rules with which they disagree. 24

IV
We think the above discussion establishes the appropriate framew·ork for consideration of petitioners' request for campus recognition . Because respondents
failed to accord due recognition to First Amendment
principles, the judgment below approving respondents'
denial of recognition must be reversed. Since we canIn addition to tJ10 College administ ration 's broad rulcm nking
1,ower t o assure that t he t raditional academic at mosphere is safeguarded , it may also impose sa.nct,ions on those \vho violnte th e
rules. We find, for irntan ce, that t he Studen t Affa irs Commi tt ee's
admonit ion to p etitioners in this case suggests one p ermissible practice--recognit,ion, once accorded, may be withdrawn or suspended
if pet,itioners fail t o respect campus law. See, e. g., M ississippi Civil
Liberties Union v. Universit y of Southern Mississippi, No. 71-1S01
(CA5 1971) ; American Civil Liberties Uni011 v. Radford Colle ge,
315 F. Supp. 893 CWD Va . 1970) .
24
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not conclude from this record that petitioners were will-,
ing to abide by reasonable campus rules and regulations,
we order the case remanded for reconsideration. We noter
in so holding, that the wide latitude accorded by the Constitution to the freedoms of expression and association is
not without its costs in terms of the risk to the maintenance of civility and an ordered society. Indeed , this
latitude often has resulted, on the campus and elsewhere,
in the infringement of the rights of others. Though we
deplore the tendency of some to abuse the very constitutional privilges they invoke, and although the infringement of rights of others certainly should not be tolerated,
we reaffirm this, Court's dedication to the principles of the
Bill of Rights upon which our vigorous and free society
is founded.
Reversed and remanded ..
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the op1mon of the·
Court.
This case, arising out of a denial by a state college
of official recognition to a group of students who desired
to form a local chapter of Students for a Democratic
Society (SDS) , presents this Court with questions requiring the application of well-established First Amendment principles. While the factual background of this
particular case raises these constitutional issues in a
manner not heretofore passed on by the Court, and only
infrequently presented to lower federal courts, our decision today is governed by existing precedent.
As the case involves delicate issues concerning the·
academic community, we approach our task with special
caution, recognizing the mutual interest of students, faculty members, and administrators in an environment free·
from disruptive interference with the educatio~process.
We also are mindful of the equally significant interest
in the widest latitude for free expression and debate
consonant with the maintenance of order. Where these
interests appear to compete the First Amendment, made
binding on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,
strikes the required balance.

\
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We mention briefly at the outset the setting in 19691970. A climate of unrest prevailed on many college
campuses in this country. There had been widespread
civil disobedience on some campuses, accompanied by
the seizure of buildings, vandalism, and arson. Some
colleges had been shut down altogether, while a.t others
files were looted and manuscripts destroyed. SDS chapters on some of those campuses had been a ca.talytic
force during this period. 1 Although the causes of campus disruption ,vere many and complex, one of the prime
consequences of such activities v,·as the denial by the
few of the lawful exercise of First Amendment rights
to the majority of students. Indeed, many of the most
cherished characteristics long associated with institutions
of higher learning appeared to be endangered. Fortunately, with the passage of time, a calmer atmosphere
and greater maturity now pervade our campuses. Yet,
it was in this climate of earlier unrest that this case
arose.
Petitioners are students attending Central Connecticut State College (CCSC), a state-supported institution
of higher learning. In September 1969 they undertook
to organize what they then referred to as a "local chapter" of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Pursuant to procedures established by the College, petitioners filed a request for official recognition as a campus
organization with the Student Affairs Cornmitt,ee, a committee composed of four students. three faculty members
and the Dean of Student Affairs. The request specified three purposes for the proposed organization 's existence. It would provide "a forum of discussion and
1
See R e1>ort of the Prc:0id cnt ':0 Comm'n on C:1mp11~ U nrest (1970) ;
R eport, of the ABA Cornm'n on C:i mpm Gov't. and St udent Di:0sent,
(1970).

--
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self-education for students developing an analysis of
American society"; it \Yould serve as an "agency for
integrating thought with action so as to bring about
constructive changes"; and it would endeavor to provide a "coordinating body for relating the problems of
leftist students" with other interested groups on campus and in the community." The Committee, while
satisfied that the statement of purposes was clear and
unobjectionable on its face, exhibited concern over the
relationship between the proposed local group and the
National SDS organization. In response to inquiries,
represe11tatives of the proposed organization stated that
they would not affiliate ,Yith any national organization and that their group would remain "completely
independent."
In response to other questions asked by Committee
members concerning SDS's reputation for campus dis~
ruption , the applicants made the following statements,
which proved significant during the later stages of these
proceedings:
"Q. How \\·ould you respond to issues of violence
as other SDS chapters ha.ve?
"A. Our action would have to be dependent upon
each issue.
"Q. Would you use any means possible?
"A. No I can't say that; would not kno\\· until
,rn know what the issues are.
"Q. Could you env1s10n the S. D. S. interrupting a class?
"A. Impossible for me to say."
With this information before it, the Committee reThe statement of purposes is set out in full in the dissenting
opinion from the decision of the Second Circuit. H ealy v. James, 445
F. 2d 1112, 1136-1137 (1971).
2
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quested an additional filing by the applicants, including a formal statement regarding affiliations. The
amended application filed in response stated flatly that
"CCSC Students for a Democratic Society are not under
the dictates of any National organization." 3 At a second hearing before the Student Affairs Committee, the
question of relationship with the National organization
was raised again . One of the organizers explained that
the National SDS was divided into several "factional
groups," that the national-local relationship was a loose
one, and that the local organization accepted only "certain ideas" but not all of the National organization's
aims and philosophies.
By a vote of six to two the Committee ultimately
approved the application and recommended to the President of the z,llege, Dr. James, that the organization
be accorded official recognition. In approving the application, the majority indicated that its decision was
premised on the belief that varying viewpoints should
be represented on campus and that since the Young
Americans for Freedom, the Young Democrats, the
Young Republicans, and the Liberal Party all enjoyed
recognized status, a group should be available with which
"left wing" students might identify. The majority also
noted and relied on the organization's claim of independence. Finally, it admonished the organization that
immediate suspension would be considered if the group's
activities proved incompatible with the school's policies
against interference with the privacy of other students
445 F. 2d, at 1137. During the Committee's consideration of
petitione~application, one of the group's representatives was asked
why, if it indeed desired to remain independent, it chose to use a
nationally known name. The witness' response was that "the name
brings to mind the type of organization we wish to bring across,
that is a left-wing organization which will allow students interested
in such to express themselves."
3

~1/
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or destruction of property. The two dissenting members based their reservation primarily on the lack of
clarity regarding the organization's independence.
Several days later, the President rejected the Committee's ncommendation, and issued a statement indicating that petitioners' organization ,rns not to be accorded the benefits of official campus recognition. His
accompanying remarks, which are set out in full in the
margin,4 indicate several reasons for his action. He
The President stated:
"Though I have full appreciation for the action of the Student Affairs Committee and the reasons stated in their minutes for the
majority vote recommending approval of a local chapter of St udents
for a Democrat ic Society, it is my judgment that t he sta t ement of
purpose to form a local chapter of Student~ for a D emocra tic Society
carries full an d unmistakabl e adherence to at lca~t some of the
major tenets of the national organi zation , loose and divided though
t hat organization may be. The published aims and philosophy of
t he Students for a Democratic Society, which in clude disruption
and violence, are contrary to the approved policy (by fac ult y,
students, and administ ration) of Central Connect icut Sta te Colleg0
which stat es :
" 'Students do not have the right to invade the privac~· of others,
to damage the property of others, to disrupt the regular and es-sential operation of the college, or to interfere with t he rights of
others.'
"The furt her statement on the request for recognition that 'CCSG
Students for a Democratic Society are not under the dict at es of any
National organization' in no way clarifies why if a group intends to,
follow the established policy of t he college, they wish to become a
local chapter of an organization which openly repudiates such a
policy.
"Freedom of speech, aca demic freedom on the campus, the freedom
of establishing an open forum for the exchange of ideas, the freedoms
outlined in the Statement on Rights, Freedoms, and R esponsibilities
of Students that 'college students and student organizations shall have
the righ t to examine and discuss all questions of interest t o them, to
express opinion publicly and privately, and t o support causes by
orderly means. They ffi[l y organize publi c demonst rations 1111d prot est gatherings and utilize t he right of petit ion'-these are all precious
4
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found that the organization's philosophy was antithetical
to the school's policies." and that the group's independence was doubtful. He concluded that approval should
freedoms that we cherish and arc freedoms on which we stand. To
approve any organization or individual who joins with an organization which openly repudiates those principles is contrary to those
freedoms and to the apprond 'Stntemcnt on the Rights, Freedoms,
alld Re~ponsibilities of Student,' at Ceunal.'"
5 In 1969, CCSC adopted. ns ham mrtn)· other colleges and universities , a Stntement of Right8, Freedoms, and Responsibilities of
Students . This sfaternent , commonly referred to as tJ1e '·Srncle11t
Bill of Rights," i~ printed ns an Appendix to the Second Circuit's
majority opinion in this cnse, H ealy v. Jam es, 445 F. 2d, at 1132-1136
(1971). Part Y of that sratement e~t;1bli~he,: the ~1nuclarcb for approval of cnmpus orgnnizations nncl imposes se,·eral ba sic limitations
on their cnmpus activitie~:
"A. Care shall be taken in the establishment and organizntion
of campus groups so that the basic rights, freedoms and responsibilities of students ,viii be presernd.
"R. Student org:rnizations sha]l submit a clear statement of purpose, criteria. for membership, rulili of procedures and a li~t of
officers as a condition of institutionnl recognition. They shall not be
required to submit n membership list ns a condition of institutional
recognition.
"C. Membership in campus organizntions shall be limited to
matriculated students (clay or enning) at the college. Membership
shall not be rcstrirt ed by race. religion or nationality. The members
shall have sole power to determine orgnnizntion policy consistent with
the regulations of the college.
"D. Ench orgnnization is free to choose its own adviser. Ad,·isers
to organizations shall arh·i~e but not control the organizntions and
their policies.
"E. College st udents and student organizations shall have the right
to examine and discuss all que~tions of interest to them. to express
opinion publicly and prirntely, and to support causes by orderly
means. They ma)· orgnnize 1mblic dcmonstra tions nnd protest
gatherings and utilize the right of petition. Students do not have
the right to deprive others of the opportunity to speak or be hea rd,
to invade the prirncy of others, to damage the property of others,
to disrupt the regular and es~ential operation of the collrge, or to
interfere with the rights of others."
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not be granted to any group . · "openly repudiates"
the _,£,Ollege's dedication to academic freedom.
Denial of official recognition posed serious problems
for the organization's existence and growth. Its members were deprived of the opportunity to place announcements regarding meetings, rallies or other activities in
the student newspaper; they were precluded from using
various campus bulletin boards; and-most importantly-non recognition barred them from using campus
facilities for holdillg meetings. This latter disability
was brought home to petitioners shortly after the President's announcement. Petitioners circulated a notice
calling a meeting to discuss what further action should
be taken in light of the group's official rejection. The
members met at the coffee shop in the Student Center
("Devil's Den") but "·ere disbanded on the President's
order since nonrecognized groups were not entitled to
use such facilities.a
Their efforts to gain recognition having proved ultimately unsuccessful, and having been made to feel the
burden of nonrecognition. petitioners resorted to the
courts. They filed a suit in the Federal District Court
in Connecticut, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the President of the .,,gpllege, other administrators, and the State Board of Trustees. Petitioners'
6 During the meeting petitioners were appronched by two of the
~1llrge's deans who sen-eel petitioners with n memorandum from
the Prrsident stntin!).":
"Kotice ha s been rccci\·ed by this office of a meeting of the
'C. C. S. C.-S. D. S. on Thusrclay-Non•mber 6 at 7:00 p. m. at,
the Devils' Den.'
"Such meeting mn~· not take place in the DeYils Den of the Student Center nor in or on an~· other propert)' of the college since the
C. C. S. a.-S. D. S. is not a dul~· recognized college organization.
"You are hereby notified by this action to cease and desist from
meeting on the college propert~·-"
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primary complaint centered on the denial of First Amendment rights of expression and association arising from
denial of campus recognition. The cause was submitted
initially on stipulated facts and, after a short hearing,
the judge ruled that petitioners had been denied procedural due process because the President had based
his decision on conclusions regarding the applicant's
affiliation which "·ere outside the record before him.
The court concluded that if the President wished to act
on the basis of material outside the application he must
at least provide petitioners a hearing and opportunity
~ 3 1 1 F. Supp., at 1276. 1281. While retaining jurisdiction over the case. the District Court
ordered respondents to hold a hearing in order to clarify
the several ambiguities surrounding the President's dec1s10n. One of the matters to be explored was ·whether
the local organization, true to its repeated affirmations,
was in fact independent of the National SDS. Id., at
1282. And if the hearing demonstrated that the two
were not separable, the respondents were instructed that
they might then review the "aims and philosophy" of
the National organization. Ibid.
Pursuant to the court's order, the President designated Dean Judd, the Dean of Student Affairs, to serve
as hearing officer and a hearing was scheduled. The
hearing, which spanned two dates and lasted approximately two hours, added little in terms of objective
substantive evidence to the record in this case. Petitioners introduced a statement offering to change the
organization's name from "CCSC local chapter of SDS"
to "Students for a Democratic Society of Central Connecticut State College." They further reaffirmed that
they would "have no connection whatsoever to the
structure of an existing national organization." 7 Peti7

319 F. Supp., a t 114. The hearing offi cer, oYcr rietitioncr~' objection, ruled that the statement was inadmissible apparently on the·
ground that it would constitute an amendment to the original appli-
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tioners also introduced the testimony of their faculty
adviser to the effect that some local SDS organizations
else·where were unaffiliated ;.vith any national organization . The hearing officer, in addition to introducing·
the minutes from the two pertinent Student Affairs Committee meetings, also introduced sua sponte portions
of a transcript of hearings before the United States
House of Representatives Internal Security Committee
investigating the activities of SDS. Excerpts were offered both to prove that violent and disruptive activities
had been attributed to SDS elsewhere and to demonstrate that there existed a national organization. that
recognized and cooperated with regional and local college
campus affiliates. Petitioners did not challenge the asserted existence of a National SDS, nor did they question that it did have a system of affiliations of some
sort. Their contention. was simply that their organization would not associate with that network. Throughout the hearing the parties were acting at cross purposes.
What seemed relevant to one appea.red completely immaterial to the other. This failure of the hearing to
advance the litigation was, at- bottom, the con.sequence
of a more basic failure to join issue on the considerations that should control the President's ultimate decision, a problem to which we will return in the ensuing
section.
Upon reviewing the hearing transcript and exhibits,
the President reaffirmed his prior decision. to deny petitioners't recognition as a campus organization. The
reasons stated, closely paralleling his initial reasons, were
that the group would be a "disruptive influence" at
CCSC and that recognition would be "contrary to the·
orderly process of change" on the campus.
cation and would be beyond t lie permissible scope of t he hearing ..
WhateYer the merits of this ruling, it was still in the record reYiewcd by the President and \\·as relied on in the subsequent Dist rict
Court opinion wi thout reference to its prior exclusion . Ibid.
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After the President's second statement issued, the case
then returned to the District Court where it was ordered
dismissed. The court concluded, first, that the formal
requisites of procedural due process had been complied
with, second, that petitioners had failed to meet their
burden of showing that they could function free from
the National organization, and, third, that the ~ollege's
refusal to place its stamp of approval on an of.ganization whose conduct it found "likely to cause violent acts
of disruption" did not viola.te petitioners' associational
rights. 319 F. Supp. 113.
Petitioners appealed to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals where, by a two-to-one vote, the District Court's
judgment was affirmed. The majority purported not
to reach the substantive First Amendment issues on the
theory that petitioners had failed to avail themselves
of the due process accorded them and had failed to meet
their burden of complying with the prevailing standards for recognition. 445 F. 2d, at 1131-1132. Judge
Smith dissented, disagreeing with the majority's refusal
to address the merits and finding that pet,i tioners had
been deprived of basic First Amendment rights. Id.,
at 1136. This Court granted certiorari and, for the
reasons ~ follow, we conclude that the judgment
of the courts belo,v must be reversed and the case remanded for reconsidera.tion.

II

J" t o..4C.

At the outset \Ye note that{colleges and universi ties
are not enclaves immune from the s,Yeep of the First
Amendment. "It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of expression at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker
,·. Des Moines Independent Community School D1·strict, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). Of course. as Mr. Justice Fort.as made clear in Tinker, First Amendment rights
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must always be applied "in light of the special characteristics of the ... environment" in the particular case.
Ibid. And, " ·here state-operated educational institutions are involved, this Court has long recognized "the
need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the
states and of school officials, consistent with fundamental
constitutional safeguards. to prescribe and control con- _,
duct in the schools." Id., at 507. ~ precedents of
this Court leave no room for the view that, because of
the ackno,Yledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college campuses than in the community at large. Quite to the
contrary, "[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community
of American schools." Shelton v. Tuck er, 314 U. S.
479, 487 ( 1960) . The college classroom ,Yith its surrnunding environs is peculiarly the "market place of
ideas" and ,rn break no new con stitutional ground in
reaffirming this Xation 's dedication to safeguarding academic freedom. K eyishian v. Board of R egents, 385
U. S. 589, 603 ( 1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U. S. 234, 249-250 (plurality opinion of Mr. Chief Justice \Varren ) . 262 ( 1957) (Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion ).
Among the rights protected by the First Amendment is
the right of individuals to associate to further their personal beliefs. "\Vhile the freedom of association is not explicitly set out in the Amendment, it has long been held
to be implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly and
petition. See, e. g., Bafrd v. State Bar of Arizona, 401
U. S. 1, 6 (1971); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415,
430 ( 1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP,
366 U. S. 293. 296 (1961); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
PaUerson, 357 U. S. 449 ( 1958) (Mr. Justice Harlan
for a unanimous Court). There can be no doubt that
denial ,Yithout justification of official recognition to col-

/
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,_,e organizations burdens or abridges that associational right~ The primary impediment to free association flowing from nonrecognition is the denial of use of
campus facilities for meetings and other appropriate
purposes. The practical effect of nonrecognition was
demonstrated in this case when, several days after the
President's decision was announced, petitioners were not
allowed to hold a meeting in the campus coffee shop
because they were not an approved group.
Petitioners' associational interests also were circumscribed by the denial of the use of campus bulletin boards
and the school newspaper. If an organization is to remain a viable entity in a. campus community in which
new students enter on a regular basis, it must possess
the means of communicating with these students. Moreover, the organization 's ability to participate in the intellectual give and take of campus debate, and to pursue
its stated purposes, is limited by denial of access to the
customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty members, and other students. 9 Such
impediments cannot be vie\Yed as insubstantial.

•..,.
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,
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11
It i~ unclear on this record whet.her recognition :-d .,o ca rries wi1h
it a right to seek funds from the school budget. Petitioners' counsel
at oral argument indicated that official recognition entitled the group
to "make application for use of student funds." Tr. of Oral Arg.,
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Respondents and the courts below appear to have
taken the view that denial of official recognition in this
case abridged no constitutional rights. The District
Court concluded that,
"President James' discretionary action in denying this application cannot be legitimately magnified and distorted into a constitutionally cognizableinterference with the personal ideas or beliefs of
any segment of the college students; neither does
his action deter in any material way the individual
advocacy of their personal beliefs; nor can his action
be reasonably construed to be an invasion of, or
have a chilling effect on academic freedom." 319
F. Supp., at 116.
In that court's view all that was denied petitioners was
the "administrative seal of official college respectability." rn Ibid. A majority of the Court of Appeals
agreed that petitioners had been denied only the "college's stamp of approval." 445 F. 2d, at 1131. Re-spondents take that same position here, arguing that
petitioners still may meet as a group off campus, that
they still may distribute written material off campus,
and that they still may meet together informally on
campus-as individuals but not as CCSC-SDS.
We do not agree with the characterization by thecourts below of the consequences of nonrecognition. ViTe
at 4. The first District Court opinion, however, stat es flatly that
"[r] ecognition does not thereby entitle an organization to college
financial support ." 311 F. Supp., at 1277. Since it appears that,
at the least, recognit ion only entitles a group to apply for funds,
and since the record is silent as to the criteria used in allocating
such funds, we do not consider possible funding as an associational
aspect of nonrecognition in this case.
rn These statements are in contrast to t11e first opinion by the
District Court, which reflected a full appreciation of the constitut ional significance of petition ers' chim. 311 F. Supp., at 1280- 12~2 -
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may concede, as did Mr. Justice Harlan in his unanimous
opinion for the Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 461 ( 1958), that the administration "has taken no direct a.ction ... to restrict the
rights of petitioners' members to associate freely." But
the Constitution's protection is not limited to direct
interference \Yith fundamental rights. The requirement
in Patterson that the NAACP disclose its membership
lists was found to be an impermissible, though indirect,
infringement of the members' associational rights. Likewise, in this case, the group's possible ability to exist
outside the campus cornrnunity does not ameliorate significantly the disabilities imposed by the President's
action. We are not free to disregard the practical realities. MR. JuSTICE STEWART has made the salient point:
"Freedoms such as these are protected not only against
heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled
by more subtle governmental interference." Bates v.
City of Little Rock, 361 U. S. 516, 523 ( 1960) . See
also Sweezy v. New Harnpshire, 354 U.S. 234. 263 ( 1957)
(Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring); Watkins v.
United States, 354 U. S. 178, 197 (1957).
The opinions below also assumed that petitioners had
the burden of showing entitlement to recognition by the -----:-11
_£..ollege.n While petitioners have
<1-0+ challe111 e:dl Nie.
we1e t'l'Opelly l€Qlfl.PO!!l tlil....fmg an application in
J
I
formity \Yith the fQOis91108r rules of the 3.ollegc."'
p 1-0CC (Ira., 1-e3v 1 re -::::::.
7nG7J I- rha..f- rhe

f

1

"4-l-5 F. 2d , at 1131: 319 F. Supp. , at llG.
"I
I IG
The 3ta ndards for official rerogllition require applirant8 to
pro\·ide a clear st:itement of purposes, criteria fo r membership, rules'-----.:------ of procedure, and a li~t of officers. Applicants must limit membership to "matriculated students" and ma>· not discriminate on the
basis of race, religion or nationalit_v. The standards further state
that groups may "examine and discuss all questions of interest,"
they may conduct demonst rations and utilize their right of petition,
but they are prohibited from interfering with the rights of other
12
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~u<iU~l~ the view of the courts below that final rejec-

~/
~1

tion could rest on their failure to convince the administration that their organization was unaffiliated with
the National SDS. For reasons to be stated later in
this opinion , we do not consider the issue of affiliation
to be a controlling one. But apart from any particular issue, once petitioners had filed an application in
conformity " ·ith college requirements, the burden was
upon the Q9llege administration to justify its decision
of rejectio11. See, e. g., Law Studen ~SCivil Rights Research Council Y. H' admo11d, 401 U. S. 154. 162--163
( 1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 376- 377
( 1968); Speiser Y. Randall, 357 U. S. 513 (1958). It
is to be remembered that the effect of the j;.ollege's denial
of recognition vvas a form of prior restraint, denying to
petitioners' organization the range of associational activities described above. While a college has a legitimate
interest in preventing disruption on the campus. which
under circumstances requiring the safeguarding of that
interest may justify such restraint, a "heavy burden"
rests on the college to demonstrate the appropriateness
of that action. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697,
713-716 (1931); Organization for a Better Austin v.
K eefe, 402 U. S. 415, 418 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U. S. 51, 57 (1965).

III
These fundamental errors-discounting the existence
of a cognizable First Amendment interest and misplacing the burden of proof-require that the judgments
below be reversed. But ,rn are unable to conclude that
no basis exists upon which nonrecognition might be appropriate. Indeed, based on a reasonable reading of
students. See n. 5, supra. Petitioners haYc not challenged these
standards and their adequac~· is not here in question.

~

--~
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the ambiguous facts of this case, there appears to be
at least one potentially acceptable ground for a denial
of recognition. Because of this ambiguous state of the
record we conclude that the case should be remanded,
and~ in an effort to provide guidance to the lo,rnr courts
upo'.'n reconsideration,/.\ it is appropriate to discuss the
several bases of Pre~ident James' decision. Four possible justifications for nonrecognition , all closely related,
might be derived from the record and his statements.
Three of those grounds are inadequate to substantiate
his decision: a fourth, however, has merit.
A

From the outset the controversy in this case has centered in large measure around the relationship, if any,
between petitioners' group and the National SDS. The
Student Affairs Committee meetings, as reflected in its
minutes, focused considerable attention on this issue;
the court-ordered hearing also was directed primarily
to this question. Despite assurances from petitioners
and their counsel that the local group was in fact independent of the National organization, it is evident that
President James was significantly influenced by his apprehension that there ,:vas a connection. Aware of the
fact that some SDS chapters had been associated with
disruptive and violent campus activity, he apparently
considered that affiliation itself was sufficient just-ification for denying recognition. 1 3
Although this precise issue has not come before the
Court heretofore, the Court has consistently disapproved
governmental action imposing criminal sanctions or denying rights and privileges solely because of a citizen's
association with an unpopular organization . See, e. g.,
United States v. Robel, 389 U. S. 258 (1967); K eyishian
I:J

Seen. 4, supra, for the complete text of the President's statement.

.,..
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v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589, 605-610 (1967);

Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U. S. 11 (1966); Scales v.
United States, 367 U. S. 203 (1961). In these cases
it has been established that "guilt by association alone,
without [establishing] that an individual's associat.ion
poses the threat feared by the Government," is an impermissible basis upon which to deny First Amendment
rights. United States v. Robel, 389 U. S., at 265. The
Government has the burden of establishing a knowing
affiliation with an organization possessing unlawful aims
and goals, and a specific intent to further those illegal

f.

u~•
..,
~

~

SDS, as conceded by th~ College and the lower courts,
is loosely organized, having various factions and promoting a number of diverse social and political views,
only some of which call for unlawful action. 15 Not only
did petitioners proclaim their complete independence
from this organization ,rn but they also indicated that
they shared only some of the beliefs its leaders have
14 Tn addibon to the cases cit ed in the text above, see also Law
.Students Civil Rights R esearch Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154,
164-166 (1971); In re Stolar, 401 U. S. 23 , 28 (1971); Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U . S. 500 (1964); Noto v. Unit ed States,
367 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1961).
15 Sec F BI , Appropriation 59-60 (1972) , in whi ch the former Diroctor of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover, states
that while violent factions haYe spun off from SDS, its present
leadership is "critical of bombing and ,·iolence. "
1<; P etitioners asserted their independence both ornll~· nnd in a
written submission before the Student Affairs Committee. They rest at ed their nonaffiliation in a formal statem ent filed prior to the
court-ordered hearing. The only indication to the contrary is their
unwillingness to eschew use of the SDS name altogether. But see
n. 3, supra.

~
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expressed." On this record it is clear that the relationship was not an adequate ground for the denial
of recognition.
B
Having concluded that petitioners were affiliated with,
or at least retained an affinity for , X ational SDS, President James attributed what he believed to be the philosophy of that organizatiou to the local group. He
characterized the petitioning group as adhering to "some
of the major tenets of the national organization," iucluding a philosophy of violence and disruption_, s Understandably, he found that philosophy abhorrent. In an
article signed by President James in an alumni periodical, and made a part of the record below, he announced
his unwillingness to "sanction an organization that openly
~
advocates the destruction of the very ideals ~1d freedoms,,,../
upon ,,-hich the academic life is founded. "
The mere disagreement of the President with the
group's philosophy affords no reason to deny it recognition. As repugnant as these views may ha,·e been ,
especially to one with President James' responsibility,
the mere expression of them would not justify the denial
of First Amendment rights. Whether petitioners did
in fact advocate a philosophy of "destruction" thus becomes immaterial. The ~ollege, acting here as the instrumentality of the State, may not restrict speech or
association simply because it finds the views expressed
by any group to be abhorrent. As Mr. Justice Black
put it most simply and clearly:
"I do not believe that it can be too of ten repeated
that the freedoms of speech. press. petition and

U::J/

;/

"H eprr.-rn t:1tin'~ of tbr group ~t:1trcl dmi11iJ; tbr Studrnt Affairs
Committee meetings tha t they did not iclentif~- with all of the Kationa l's statements . but wished simply to " pick . . . certain ideas"
from that organization.
"Sec n . 4, supra .

,(
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assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must
be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later
they will be denied to the ideas we cherish." Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board,
367 U. S. 1, 137 (1061).
C

~1

As the litigation progressed in the District Court, a
third rationale for President James' decision-beyond
the questions of affiliation and philosophy-began to
emerge. His second statement, issued after the courtordered a•;;h·~iui'ltrati1:,C hearing, indicates that he based
rejection on a conclusion that this particular group would
be a "disruptive influence at CCSC." This language
was underscored in the second District Court opinion.
In fact, the Court concluded that the President had
determined that CCSC-SDS 's "prospective campus a.c tivities were likely to cause a disruptive influence at CCSC."
319 F. Supp., at 116.
If this reason , directed at the organization's activities
rather than its philosophy, were factually supported by
the record, this Court's prior decisions would provide
a basis for considering the propriety of nonrecognition.
The critical line heretofore dra.wn for determining the
permissibility of regulation is the line bet"·een mere
advocacy and advocacy "directed to inciting or producing imminent la\\·less action and ... likely to incite
or produce such action." Bra.ndenberg v. Ohio, 395 U. S.
444. 447 (1969) (unanimous per curiam, opinion). See
also Scales v. United States, 367 U. S. 203, 230-232
(1961); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 289,298 (1961);
Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 ( 1957). In the
context of the "special characteristics of the school
environment," 19 the power of the government to pro10

Tink er

at 506.

Y.

D ('s Moines Ind . Commimity School Dist., 393 U. S.,

.,.
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hibit "lawless action" is not limited to acts of a criminal
nature. Also prohibitable are actions which "materially
and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the
school." Tinker v. Des ivloines Independent Community School D~trict, 393 U. S., at 513. Associational
activities need not be tolerated ,vhere they infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes or substantially
interfere with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education.
The "Student Bill of Rights" at CCSC, upon which
great emphasis 'rrns placed by the President, dra,Ys precisely this distinction between advocacy and action. It
purports to impose no limitations on the right of college student organizations "to examine and discuss all
questions of interest to them." But it also states that
students have no right (1) "to deprive others of the opportunity to speak or be heard," (2) "to invade the
privacy of others," (3) "to damage the property of
others," ( 4) "to disrupt the regular and essential operation of the college," or (5) "to interfere with the rights
of others." 20 The lin e between permissible speech and
impermissible conduct tracks the constitutional requirement, and if there were an evidential basis to support
the conclusion that CCSC-SDS posed a substantial threat
of material disruption in violation of that command the
President's decision should be affirmed .21
Seen. 5; supra .
It may not be sufficient merely to show the existence of a legitimate and substantial state interest. Where state action designed to
regulate prohibitable action also restricts associational rights-as
nonrecognition does-the State must demonstrate that the action
taken is reasonably related to protection of the State's interest and
that "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than essential to the furtherance of that interest.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,377 (1968). See also NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 337 U. S. 288 (1964); Gibson v. Floiida
Legislative Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama
00

21
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The record, however, offers no substantial basis for
that conclusion. The only support for the view expressed by the President other than the repudiated
affiliation with ~ is to be found in the
ambivalent responses offered by the group's representatives at the Student Affairs Committee hearing, during
which they stated that they did not know whether they
might respond to "issues of violence" in the same manner that other SDS chapters had on other campuses.
Nor would they state unequivocally that they could
never "envision . . . interrupting a class." Whatever
force these statements might be thought to have is
largely dissipated by the following exchange between
petitioners' counsel and the Dean of Student Affairs
during the court-ordered hearing:
"Counsel: I just read the document that you're
offering [minutes from Student Affairs Committee
meeting] a.nd I can't see that there's anything in
it that intimates that these students contemplate
any illegal or disruptive practice.
"Dean: No. There's no question raised to that,
counsel."
Dean Judd's remark reaffirms, in accord with the full
record, that there was no substantial evidence that
these particular individuals acting together would constitute a disruptive force on campus. Therefore, insofar
as nonrecognition flowed from such fears, it constituted
little more than the sort of "undifferentiated fear ~ ~
apprehension of disturbance [ which] is not enough to
overcome the right of freedom of expression." Tinker
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 444 (1958). On this record , absent a
showing of any likelihood of disruption or unwillingness to recognize
reasonable rules goyerning campus conduct, it is not necessary for
us to decide whether denial of recognition is an appropriately related
and narrow response.
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D es Moines Independent Community School D£strict, 393 U. S., at 508.
D

Y.

- These
-

same references in the record to the group's
equivocation regarding how it might respond to "issues
of violence" and whether it could ever "envision . . .
interrupting a class," suggest a fourth possible reason
why recognition might have been denied to these petitio ners. These remarks might well have been read as
announcing petitioners' unwillingness to be bound by
reasonable school rules governing conduct. 2 " The college's Statement of Rights. Freedoms and Responsibilities of Students, contains, as we have seen, an explicit
stat ement with respect to campus disruption. The regulation , carefully differentiating between advocacy and
action, is a reasonable one and petitioners have not
questioned it directly.~ 3 Yet their statements raise considerable question whether they intend to abide by the
prohibitions contained therein.~ 4
"" The Court -of Appml~ re:1d thr rrrord :1~ shmrinp: that petitioners "failed c:1ndidl~- to rr~pond to inquiries whether t hey would
resort to Yiolence and disruption on the CCSC campus, including
interruption of classes." 445 F. 2d, at 1131. While petitioner's
statements may be read :1s intimating a rejection of reasonable college regulations in adrnnre . there is substanti:11 ambiguity on this
point. Petitioners appea r to ronrede the approp riateness of thosestandards and the Student Affairs Committee never asked specifically
whether they were willing to abide b_\· these rules. Moreoyer, the
issue was not among those referred by the District Court to the
administrafo·e hearing and neither party pursued this problem at
t hat time. Indeed, the failure of the District Court to identify this
as a significant subject of inquiry Jen~ support for the view that
remand is necessnry.
"'1 Sre n . 5. supra.
"' :Kor did tho adm ini~t r.1tin• lw;1ring clarify this (]ne~lion. It " ·ns
then addressed only tangcnt inlly; the petitioners who had given t heambiguous responses before the Student Affairs Committee failed

~
I~
~

----
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As we have already stated in Parts B and C, the
critical line for First Amendment purposes must be
drawn between advocacy, which is entitled to full protection, and action, which is not. Petitioners may, if
they so choose, preach the propriety of amending or
even doing away with any or all campus regulations.
They may not, however, undertake to flaunt these rules.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, at the time he ,ms a circuit
judge on the Eighth Circuit, stated:
"We ... hold that a college has the inherent power
to promulgate rules and regulations; that it has
the inherent power properly to discipline; that it
has power appropriately to protect itself and its
property; that it may expect that its students adhere
to generally accepted standards of conduct." Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F. 2d
1077, 1089 (CA8 1969), cert. denied, 398 U. S. 965
(1970).
Just as in the community at large, reasonable regulations with respect to the time, the place, and the manner
in which student groups conduct their speech-related
activities must be respected.~5 A college administration
may impose a requirement, such as the one apparently
imposed in this case, that a group seeking official recognition affirm in advance its willingness to adhere to reasonable campus law. Such a requirement does not
impose an impermissible condition on the students' associational rights. Their freedom to speak out, to asto clarify their position; and their counsel, whose tactics were characterized as "disruptive" by the Court of Appeals, elected to make
argumentative statements rather than elicit relevant testimony. 445
F. 2d, at 1126.
~" See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Mosley, - U.S.-, (19,2);
Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 47-48 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U. S. 536, 558 (1965); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP,
366 U.S. 293,397 (1961).
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semble, or to petition for changes in school rules is in
no sense infringed. It merely constitutes an agreement
to conform with reasonable standards respecting conduct. This is a minimal requirement, in the interest
of the entire academic community, of any group seeking the privilege of official recognition .
'f5":"m ·r n-e-ques.tion-.,~1etlrer-these --pe titimrn
ent thr-eat to campus order, we conclude
be denied the benefit-IS of partici-pat"l." in the internal
life of the colle~~ ' f -0rl .i:~ and it becomes
clear that~uoners reserve the right to viol

p; ; ~

(i)

:!( i

IV
We think the above discussion establishes the appropriate framework for consideration of petitioners' request for campus recognition. Because respondents
failed to accord due recognition to First Amendment
principles, the judgment below approving respondents'
denial of recognition must be reversed. Since we cannot conclude from this record that petitioners J:l,i@t thlfc. w ~ i- c
threshgld r'ilquir01H:ent dZf willing~to abide by reasonable campus rules and regulation5i-eMOO~
df!mt :Qi.U ef ~ ,i,~loi,t~' ,ye order the case remanded for
reconsideration. We note. in so holding. that the wide
latitude accorded by the Constitution to the freedoms

=/

"" In addition to the £._ollcge admini., trntion's broad rnlcmaking
power to assure thnt thif traditional ar::idemic ntmospherc is safeguarded, it may nlso im ose sanctions on those "·ho Yiolate the rules. ;
We find, for instan ce, the Student
airs ommittee's admonition to
petitioners in this cnse to SJJ!!f!...__One permissible pra.cticc-recognk:_ ~
tion, once accorded, may be withdrawn or susp ended if petitioners
fail to respect campus law. Sec, e. g., Mississippi Civil Liberties
Union Y. University of Southern iliississipJJi, No. 71-1801 (CA5
1971) ; American Civil Liberties Union Y. Radford College, 315 F.
Supp. 893 (WD Va . 1970).
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of expression and association is not without its costs
in terms of the risk to the maintenance of civility and
an ordered society. Indeed, this latitude often has resulted, on the campus and elsewhere, in the infringement of the rights of others. Though we deplore the
tendency of some to abuse the very constitutional privileges they invoke, and although the infringement of
rights of others certainly should not be tolerated, we
reaffirm this Court's dedication to the principles of the
Bill of Rights upon which our vigorous and free society
is founded.
Reversed and remanded.

